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Editors

Music Education for Changing Times

Guiding Visions for Practice

Springer
Welcome to a book about the practice of teaching music and the collective range of practices—methods, routines, processes, procedures, habits, customs, paradigms, traditions, models, etc.—that music education practice in general typically accepts uncritically as valid and valuable.

Individual teachers are too often unaware that their own teaching practice is strongly rooted in that collective practice. Their formative experiences as music students, for example, often lead to uncritical acceptance of the practices of their music teachers. As music education students, they are subject to the strong socializing influences of their music and music education professors and, later, by their cooperating teachers, and by formal and informal mentors and models during their beginning years of teaching. Of course, all these figures were themselves influenced by their experiences with music education as a social practice and institution. Thus, while society, music, and schools are undergoing rapid and often major changes, music education in schools continues largely in the well-worn paths inherited from the past.

The book is predicated on a short document called Action for Change in Music Education (see pp. xxxi–xxxvii) that “critically” challenges taken-for-granted, personal, collective, or institutionally accepted practice in music education. Thus, it accepts the premise that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that serious problems exist in the taken-for-granted practices of music education today—problems that prevent it from fulfilling its promised contributions to the musical lives of all students and to the “music world” outside of schools that is central to society and culture. This failure of music education practice to tangibly fulfill its lofty claims is in large part a source of progressive challenges to the very existence of “school music.”

The “critique” of Action for Change is best compared to the evaluation given in the best of music lessons; the intention is constructive not negative. Without a clear recognition that present “practicing” falls short of more appropriate musical results, music students just continue with the same (or ever-new) weaknesses—indeed, they’re usually even satisfied with their current results. And the same holds for a music teacher whose teaching is uninformed by awareness of more appropriate educational possibilities and practices, and thus who exhibits various weaknesses—despite being self-satisfied with results. Action for Change, then, critiques current
practice by promoting alternatives for guiding music teaching practice in more effective directions and ways.

Action for Change does this by stating seven brief propositions and related questions that are intended to begin the ongoing process of identifying major issues music teachers need to analyze and consider mindfully. However, unlike the typical music lesson where the student usually gets only one “critical” perspective, Action for Change encourages—actually anticipates and welcomes—a variety of points of view, even critiques of its perspective. The present book aims in effect, then, to present a colloquium of “critical” views of current music education practice that demonstrates the richness of analysis and diagnosis that careful consideration of each issue can promote.

The practices that characterize a particular teacher’s everyday teaching and those that collectively characterize music education in general, being habits typically inherited uncritically from others, are employed more or less mindlessly. Many of our daily habits are performed more mindlessly than others, and teaching is no exception. In part, then, this book is intended to promote, even provoke, a greater degree and depth of reflection about the field of music education and the musical and sociocultural and educational needs of students than uncritical, “accepted practice” typically involves or allows.

Social Practices

In social theory, a social practice (as opposed to a personal habit) is a collection of customs shared by a particular group that, through that group, makes a contribution to society and culture. “Practice,” in this collective sense, then, describes social customs and social institutions that have come into being precisely because of the societal needs or “goods” they serve. Schooling, religion, government, science, sports, language, art, just to mention a few, are all social practices. However, each instance of a social practice takes unique form (for example, the practices of this school, this religion, this sport, this science, this art form, etc.) while still sharing some identity with the larger, shared community of practice.

Music is a social practice and its contribution to society and culture is unquestionable. However, the word “music” only identifies the social practice as an abstract noun. “In practice” (or “as practiced”), then, music is not a thing-in-itself, not even a single or uniform practice: It is actually a collection of “musics,” and each is a distinct practice, however closely it may be linked with other musics within the community of practices grouped under the abstract heading of “music.”

Typically, then, any practice consists of a network of practices that have some relation to others in the community of practice, the network; for example, musics that nonetheless share certain similarities of purpose, process, and so on—though experts may argue about these. Similarly, music education is a practice within the “music world” and within the larger practice of schooling (and schooling itself is but one subcomponent of education, a larger social practice that involves the family, community, religion, culture, society, ethnicity, etc.). And, like music, music
education is actually a collection of specialized practices. Unfortunately, some of these take on lives of their own, like band, chorus, and orchestra do when the practice is undertaken for its own sake (that is, as “school music”) rather than as part of the larger practices of schooling and music education and their promised contributions to society and culture.

**Practice, Theory, and Research**

Practice, too, is inherently connected with theory—although the connection is not always explicit or even recognized (or appreciated) by some practitioners. That some practices come into existence at all depends in part on certain theorized values that the practice is needed, makes a social contribution (for example, schooling, formal music education).

Other practices arise in connection with problems or needs that are clearly practical to begin with, for example, farming. Most practices evolve on the basis of research and theoretical advances or changes. Thus farming, as with the practice of medicine, is regularly informed by new developments in our rapidly changing world. And ever-new needs in turn fuel new research and theorizing for a practice. Practices change, then, and become living traditions as a result of their continued vitality and usefulness; or they die, and disappear altogether (for example, dueling), or become only ritualistically or minimally observed but not honored or advanced. That music education may be at such a crossroad is a concern of each author in this book!

Any social practice gains vitality and becomes more influential in society (or for practitioners if they participate for their own sake, as with certain hobbies) as it is participated in by or successfully serves others. Just being involved in a practice, however, does not entail being well served by its present theories and supposed values. In particular, the current practices and theories of schooling and music education do not always or unequivocally serve students’ educational and musical needs or the needs of a democratic society. For example, the ability to think for oneself, central to a democracy, is not well served by any kind or degree of autocratic teaching; and, without question, much traditional music education practice is autocratic, even dictatorial. The criterion of “serving others,” thus, is not always simple or clear.

**Praxis as Action**

This raises the idea of praxis, as understood in philosophy and social theory. Since the time of the ancient Greeks, praxis has referred to action(s) undertaken to serve the needs of others. However, praxis involves people (not, for example, things) and because people and their needs are unique, no single or “common practice” (common praxis) is possible. In fact, though “praxis” is sometimes used interchangeably with “practice” (for example, “medical practice”), a distinction should be observed when human needs are at stake and where, therefore, ethical criteria of care (that is, the carefulness of actions) are required. In such situations, praxis is at stake, by whatever name.
Good actions (that is, good results), in the ethical, praxial sense, can be judged only in terms of those served. The “goodness” of the practitioner’s actions, thus, is not predecided, predetermined, a matter of tradition, habit, or of taken-for-granted, hand-me-down assumptions or methods. “Goodness” (that is, success) depends, first, on the diagnosis of individual needs and variables and, then, of reflecting on how satisfactory results are for those served. When results are not “good” (that is, “good for” those affected), re-diagnosis, adaptive action (praxis), and further reflection on the subsequent results are required.

One implication of this praxial interpretation of social practices such as teaching and music education is that the ethic of careful action (that is, diagnosis and reflection) leads to professionalizing the practice rather than equating it with craft-like, prescriptive, or recipe-like formulae that presume to treat everyone with one-size-fits-all methods; that assume all teaching situations are more alike than different; and that are too easily satisfied with the supposed “good delivery” of lessons, and not with appropriate attention to the quality of results for individual students. Where “good delivery” is equated simply with a smoothly running lesson plan (explicit or tacit), it is all too easy to overlook whether anything was learned, or whether what was learned was worthwhile (pragmatic) and lasting.

In modern philosophy and social theory, praxis also is understood as creative action (even sometimes as “corrective action”)—not as merely re-creative, as in executing a recipe, or following a formula or “method.” In this sense, praxis—action undertaken by and for individuals and groups—is creative in the sense that every instance of action (praxis) is seen as a new and unique situation (or solution), no matter how similar it might only seem to past occasions. Thus, an instance of praxis always creates new results that are uniquely satisfactory because present needs are unique and can never be properly served simply by replicating habits of the past. Such effectiveness, however, is not an all-or-nothing matter: effectiveness or goodness in human affairs is always complicated, equivocal, and relative to the tangible needs, criteria, and constraints of the moment.

Among other virtues of conceiving teaching in praxial and thus creative terms, then, is that, like an artist, present actions always motivate more “practice” in search of ever-more satisfactory—that is, creatively successful—results. Conceived praxially, teaching practice and the practice of music education in general are viewed creatively—as literally involving a never-ending, never-repeated (in the exact particulars) series of problems, situations, or needs that, as a result, always require new and thus creative solutions—solutions that are never final because they can never be fully satisfactory.

**Praxis and Praxial Knowledge**

Past solutions at most become among the potential bases (that is, theoretical premises) called upon to serve future, creative actions.

However, they are not sufficient. Even over the short term, “things change”—in the present case, notably our schools, our students, society, and the “music
world” outside of school. And, especially over the longer term, changes occur in
the research and theory available to support, in our case, the practice of teaching
music. Unfortunately, however, teachers often complain about theory! Nonetheless,
practice is impossible without some theoretical supports. Hence, all teachers, and
music teachers among them, have personal but usually tacit theories of, for exam-
ple, human nature, society, culture, schooling, learning, and so on. These theories
too often remain unexamined. If challenged, then, teachers can feel attacked, in part
because they can validate their theory only with “I believe” or by claims that “it
works”—where “works” remains unanalyzed or without defensible criteria.

One of the advantages, then, of the praxial approach taken in general by authors
in this collection of essays is that when the ethical and creative criteria of praxis,
informed by relevant theory, are kept in mind as premises of teaching practice,
praxial knowledge (practical knowledge) is created by teaching actions that pro-
gressively inform and thus change each teacher’s teaching theory and practice. This
praxial knowledge is in the spirit of action research because of the tangibility and
pragmatism of consequences that are at stake for students in a particular teaching
situation. Over time, then, students are actually more musically capable, enriched,
and involved than when they entered school, and carry their music education with
them into life, society, and culture.

Default Settings and Action Ideals

Although, as was acknowledged earlier, “practice” is sometimes used as a synonym
for “praxis,” (and, especially “practices” instead of “praxes”), the ordinary meaning
of “practice” does not capture the good action and creative action senses of “praxis.”
In its ordinary use, then, the term can be used to refer approvingly to what might
be called mindless habits, rather than mindful ones. The authors included in this
book may use various terms but are unified in seeking to inspire music teachers to
replace mindless teaching with a more fully mindful teaching practice (that is, as
praxis).

Viewed pragmatically, habits can be compared to the default settings of com-
puter software. Users who can customize those settings, instead of relying blindly
or solely on factory-installed or inherited settings, can maximize results. Otherwise,
they are at the mercy of default settings—built-in habits—that can interfere with
intended results. Those altogether unaware that default settings exist are even worse
off.

They can be compared to practitioners, in our case music teachers, who don’t
even realize that their teaching is affected by unknown and uncritically accepted
default settings—outdated or dysfunctional “software”—and the negative effect
those settings can have on the teaching and learning process and results.

One way toward a greater awareness of the dysfunctional default settings of much
teaching practice is through the corrective guidance and creative inspiration pro-
vided by action ideals. No reasonable person expects default settings in regard to
such ideals as a good marriage, a good life, a good musical performance, good parenting, being a good friend, and the like. These “goods,” in contrast, all represent examples of action ideals. Abstract concepts, such as democracy, freedom, and human rights, are also typically expressed as action ideals.

Action ideals are generally intended to motivate and guide thinking and thus to regulate action in the direction of certain values and practices—for example, practices of good parenting or good health, or freedom and democracy—and away from others (thus, they are sometimes also called “guiding” or “regulative” ideals). No reasonable person thinks that the kinds of “goods” pointed to by action ideals—good health, democracy, good marriage (etc.)—are states of definable perfection incapable of further improvement and refinement, or that seeking such ideals is futile, idealistic, or utopian.

However, action ideals are stated in emphatic terms, as a doctor does, for example, in expressing changes needed for a patient’s improved health (“you should get more exercise and avoid cholesterol in your diet”) or as a music teacher would in the critique that will guide next week’s practicing (“this passage is marked legato not staccato, and works better musically as one phrase, not two”). Thus, action ideals point to (or point out) more creative and satisfactory ends-in-view and, in so doing, identify and critique taken-for-granted and problematic practices that stand in the way of more creative and valuable “goods,” for example, lax parenting, poor health habits, mistaken musical performance decisions, and (in this book) problems with current music education practice.

Action ideals promote no final state or single example of perfection; rather, in consideration of individual circumstances and particulars, action ideals unavoidably change things. They also lead to different results, different kinds and degrees of creative benefits or improvements or values. Thus, the action ideal of good health means one thing if you’re 80 and another if you’re 8; and democracy takes different forms in different democracies. The inevitability of changing conditions and needs makes action ideals dynamic not dogmatic, tangibly pragmatic not preachy, creative not craft-like copying. Thus, good marriage and good parenting take constant and creative practice and are infinitely variable.

Good health for music education practice, too, is infinitely variable. Like good parenting or good marriage, it demands constant and creative practice according to changing needs, circumstances, conditions, and theories.

The position taken in this book, then, is that music teachers need to become aware of dysfunctional practices and be motivated in new, creative directions—to start with, by considering the action ideals discussed here. Each scholar addresses aspects of, even interrogates, the ideal in question from a unique perspective, thereby demonstrating the wide-ranging nature of analysis that each ideal offers or provokes. These are offered for the reader’s consideration, particularly in regard to becoming aware of the problems of the unrecognized, tacit, or taken-for-granted default settings that complicate contemporary music teaching practice in a changing world, and with a view to getting the reader started on gaining control over the teaching habits (default settings) that need to be mindfully adopted and always under the teacher’s vigilant control.
The unifying concern of this agenda of action ideals is the need for creative change if school music is to survive—if it is, in other words, to fulfill its promised contribution to advancing the musical choices and capabilities of students and, thus, of directly influencing the music world at large in democratic society in effective and thus notable ways. Taken together, the seven ideals also form a cohesive whole, a logical progression that begins with a consideration of the nature of music and musicianship and culminates in the implications of each of the ideals for curriculum.

This sequence is not, however, a step-by-step plan for teaching that one follows like the “seven ways to beat stress.” The authors intend to discourage such recipe-like teaching or thinking and to replace it by more mindful and reflective practice that is as adjusted to the particular teaching situation as a doctor’s diagnosis is to the unique needs of each patient. Thus, the ideals of Action for Change are intended to help the reader recognize and be concerned with the existence and problems of uncritically accepting default settings in music education practice, and to use the action ideals, and their elaboration by leading scholars, as bases for “customizing” their own default settings.

The editors wish to thank Estelle Jorgensen whose prompting led to the idea of this project to begin with, and who later provided feedback and suggestions about the form it might best take. Obviously, without the efforts of the authors and their cooperation at various stages of the project, we would have no project to offer. In particular, thanks are due to Richard Colwell and Graham Welch for their guidance at the latter stages of the project.

Helsinki, Finland

Thomas A. Regelski
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Introduction: Grounding Music Education in Changing Times

J. Terry Gates

The purpose of this book is to present and explore seven ideals for practice in music education. Following this introductory chapter, you’ll find two essays related to each of the seven ideals that extend, clarify, challenge, embellish, or otherwise treat each one critically.1 Making these seven ideals come alive in practice will empower music teachers and students, and as a result, music education can be better. However, taking concrete action—even action that could make things better—without thinking about the roots and the consequences of alternative actions is antithetical to the point of view illustrated in this book.

Some question the need for change in practice. In some places, there are some disturbing indicators of a need for change, however. In the United States, for example, enrollment in public elementary and secondary schools rose 22% between 1985 and 2004, but the number of teachers rose 27% in that same period. In contrast with these upward trends, music staffing percentages dropped. In 1996, 4.2% of teachers were in music education; by 2001, that percentage shrank to 2.9% (NCES 2003: Table 69). Other countries, notably the United Kingdom, report improvements in staffing support for music teachers and a growing together of music teachers and community music leaders (Swanwick 2008).

In addition, music teachers have been reluctant to confront the issue of what we can learn from valid and reliable assessments of musical knowledge and skills. We need to lead the creation of good measures of musical skills and knowledge, and embrace them. We must, however, continue both to challenge weak assessments and also to be challenged by weak results from good assessments, as teachers in other fields do.2

We need a change. As the business adage goes: “If you do what you always did, you’ll get what you always got.” Shrinking percentages of music teachers in some countries and poorly assessed musical expertise are what we’re getting, and no one wants that to continue.

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The first step toward change is to critically review our own practices, and accept current instruction as problematic. In that way, we can begin to identify alternatives to our own accepted but unexamined habits, including the habits we have collectively accepted as “standard” professional practice. This is the work of this book.

In these pages, you’ll hear the voices of people who think and care deeply enough about music teaching and learning to criticize it. They are trying to improve it. By problematizing music education practice, guided by considerations such as the seven action ideals we take up here, music educators can reflect more clearly on their teaching and the results that they can verify in their students’ musical knowledge and skills. This book means to spark thought and initiate dialogue, not to present some unified view about what should be done. Its chapters present examples of theorizing around the seven issues raised in *Action for Change* (MayDay Group 1997), reprinted in the next section (pp. xxxi–xxxvii), and we invite and expect critical exchanges about such matters.

**How These Action Ideals Came About**

If we get the topics right, a fruitful dialogue can follow. Too many discussions of music education purposes have been sacrificed on the twin altars of localized professional politics and wasteful flights of quasi-philosophical fashion. *Action for Change* was conceived as a set of orientations for thinking about music teaching practice—an attempt to get the topics right. Although the action ideals in *Action for Change* are stated emphatically and authoritatively, they are *not* foundations in the usual sense—as “truths” to be accepted as fact—but are frameworks for building rationales for sound practice.

The action ideals are stated in strong language in order to provoke discussion. The people who drafted the action ideals wanted to force openings in the wall between instruction in music and the influences that shape it, both from without and within the profession. We wanted to find a logical and sufficient set of topics for the purpose of integrating music education with its context—to view music education ecologically both as an integral contributor to and as a beneficiary of broad settings for music teaching and learning, rather than to look at music teaching technically, methodologically, or through any other single lens.

Early drafts of *Action for Change* emerged from The MayDay Group’s wide-ranging talks in Buffalo and Toronto in 1993 and 1994. The document was refined by e-mail with members and finalized in Boston in May 1996. After further refinement, members from five countries endorsed the Boston draft reprinted here on pp. xxxi–xxxvii as a multifaceted orientation for subsequently thinking about key issues facing music education and for discussing its theoretical implications. The seven ideals formed the colloquium topics of The MayDay Group from 1998 to 2004. See the MayDay Group web site for more (www.maydaygroup.org).

These ideals frankly are designed to challenge the status quo. They address values from which issues can be defined, discussed, and analyzed, and then converted to
appropriate action in each teacher’s program. In our colloquiums, we have engaged nearly 50 prepared presentations of views related to the seven ideals, many of which challenged the assumptions reflected in the ideal itself. You will see such challenges in this book, illustrating in print the kind of critique-dominated engagement with ideas and with each other that characterized MayDay Group discussions throughout the past dozen years, and that continue to characterize our work today.

Why Things Got This Way: Entropy and Three Faces of Time

From physics, we can borrow the notion of entropy as a suitable metaphor for one aspect of how a once-good practice changes. Consider ice in a glass of cola. At the beginning, the contrast between the warm cola and the cold ice is worthy of attention—the cola fizzes and foams, the ice crackles. Quickly, the cola becomes “drinkable.” It isn’t long, however, before the ice melts, the cola becomes watered down, and the result is not the refreshing beverage it was when it was first poured.

Something like that happens over time in any once-laudable practice. The motivations and the energizing forces that created the practice dissipate. The purposes that gave direction to the practice are lost because the problem for which the practice was a solution disappears. If the practice continues in some form, it takes on the watered-down quality that social entropy can produce in any tradition that does not change with its times.

Entropy in music teaching happens over time—again, like ice melting in a cola. And time provides some other explanatory metaphors: (1) Changing times: New collective experience in society explains why our teaching must change—grow and “morph”—throughout our careers. (2) Science and practice: There is a time-related tension between science and practice that explains why we must construct flexible rather than rigid foundations for teaching so that we can intelligently accommodate change. (3) Preservation and progress: The ever-present conflict between preservationists and progressives is played out in professional relationships—one preferring past practice, the other focused on the present and future. This explains why we must understand each other’s attitudes about change and search for common, flexible, and grounding ideals for action.

1. Changing times: Music teaching changes with the times—an opportunity-filled truism. Today, however, music teachers have changed much more slowly than have the settings in which their students live and in which teachers teach—the ecology of teaching. Item: Electricity finally comes to an isolated region for the first time; the music of the local culture changes in that place. Item: Our students “discover” the Internet; their musical resources are no longer limited to what is nearby. Item: New musically important devices come on the market where we are—iPods, MP3, and media-rich cell phones; our classrooms change. Item: A new “super-store” arrives in the region and brings new access to music media; the people’s musical world expands. Armed conflicts, natural disasters, deaths of important societal leaders, and changing influences in and on governments from a variety of sources such as
religion, economics, social values, and more make life suddenly different because faraway events influence local life more now than ever before. Musical life responds to these changes, and life-transforming events such as these will occur in every generation of our students.

Even if none of these ecological changes was present, musical traditions advance and recede in importance to students. Ten or fifteen years ago, nine-year-olds had different musical and social lives than the nine-year-olds we are teaching today. Our practices are buffeted by big and small changes in the life of the community that both supports and benefits from our work. If students’ musical lives are different, our instructional practices must change as well.

However, in the face of rapid change, too many music teachers’ practices become rigid, “controlling” change by ignoring how music in the world both creates change and is shaped by changes in society and culture. This worked well enough when the lives of individuals changed slowly—when the experiences of parents and their children were essentially the same. In those times, the school could provide a haven against social and cultural change. Those times are over!

The ideas that seemed solid at one time as foundations for practice need to be challenged and changed in rapidly changing times; we need more flexible bases for rationalizing creative, inspired practice than we currently have. Just as buildings in earthquake zones are now built to flex or even move when they are under strain, we can build music education foundations that stand strongly in the shifting ground of ever-changing conditions. We can and must build resilient, flexible rationales for practice because the times will change our students by altering the musical resources by means of which they will live their musical lives.

2. Science and practice: Time enters these considerations from a second direc-
tion, and this explains the tension between science (as a theoretical model, for exam-
ple, of music teaching and learning) and practice. Practice is time intensive in ways that science is not. Pierre Bourdieu (1990) puts time at the center of the conflict between theories derived from science, on the one hand, and practice on the other: Scientists, he explains, aspire to generate theories and findings that are timeless (“intemporal time”), while practice is always on the clock (“temporal time”).

Practice unfolds in time and it has all the correlative properties, such as irreversibility, that synchronization destroys. Its temporal structure, that is, its rhythm, its tempo, and above all its directionality, is constitutive of its meaning. . . . In short, because it is entirely immersed in the current of time, practice is inseparable from temporality, not only because it is played out in time, but also because it plays strategically with time and especially with tempo (p. 81).

Practice for practitioners thus derives its meaning from its temporality, and not—surprisingly—from the underlying principles that illuminate it, regardless how skillfully science and philosophy are directed toward the conduct of enterprises such as music teaching and learning. Analysis (theorizing) follows practice. As Bourdieu goes on, “Scientific practice is so detemporalized that it tends to exclude even the idea of what it excludes” (p. 81). This tends to make theoretical principles based on analysis seem rigid and decontextualized when those principles are reviewed later. We concretize practice when we uncritically accept someone else’s post hoc
explanation about how music is taught and learned. Such explanations are always post hoc. In Bourdieu’s way of thinking, science provides good answers today for yesterday’s questions. A resilient, critical approach to setting practice on firm but flexible ground attempts to illuminate the questions arising from today’s musical resources and today’s students, not the past. The search for illumination about practice, therefore, can never end.

3. Preservation and progress: There is a third issue of time: its effects on professional politics. This is a condition that will also always be with us—the conflict between preservationists and progressives, between “transmitting” the past to our students and using the present to shape the future. Living traditions—including teaching praxis—have a quality that I call “dynamic permanence” (Gates 1994). A tradition is, by definition, a relatively unchanging set of practices that is represented by experts, exemplars, and tradition-keepers, all of whom share a body of specialized knowledge. Living traditions, however, allow people’s creativity in changing times to transform the tradition, to let it grow with conditions and new ideas—to make permanence dynamic.

The particulars of a living tradition change more slowly than time and conditions warrant because the tradition’s practices and materials (“the particulars”) are subject to the political tension between preservationists and progressives. Preservationists insist that what has worked in prior times should continue to work in the future. Progressives insist on transformation to meet changing conditions. Rigid foundations and mere precedent—the refuge of the preservationists—create political walls (“wedge issues”) between preservationists and progressives and, thus, fail to unify practice through productive dialogue in the face of the situational constant of how practice should respond to changing conditions.

Here is an example of political tension between preservationists and progressives in a musical tradition: In 1988, the Society for the Preservation and Encouragement of Barbershop Quartet Singing in America (SPEBSQSA, now called Barbershop Harmony Society) held its 50th anniversary conference in Tucson, Arizona. Preservationists were fearful that the old practice was dying out, and progressives wanted practice to change with the times. The leaders sought a dialogue informed by views from knowledgeable outsiders. I was part of a team of social scientists and educators that was invited to examine SPEBSQSA’s practices and policies and make recommendations about how its practice could continue. We attended meetings and performances and made a wide range of recommendations (Kaplan 1993).

The SPEBSQSA conference itself included expert performances that resulted in the crowning of an international champion quartet and an international champion chorus. This was governed by preservationist values. In the competition guidelines, there were strict rules that governed music selection, even defining “approved” chords to be used in the arrangements (Snyder 1993, 31–32).

But there was also an open category of events that featured quartet singing without the contest rules. In these events, the only requirement was that four male voices sing four-part arrangements a cappella. In contrast with the narrow repertoire of the contest categories, the open category was filled with a wide variety of contemporary selections—standard ballads, folk and patriotic songs, show tunes, originals,
and novelty selections. The harmonic language was broad, usually “contemporary,” sometimes edgy, with musical arrangements that were much more complex than the contest rules allowed. Preservationists, who valued the “old ways,” were concerned that SPEBSQSA would lose its focus if these progressive practices became dominant in the organization, eventually changing the harmonic rules and replacing the old repertoire.

A basic issue therefore emerged as a concern for SPEBSQSA’s musical future: Preservationists wanted to restrict the practice, progressives wanted to open it up. Both wanted SPEBSQSA to continue and all actively recruited new members for the practice.

What the preservationists overlooked was the original broad, grounding action ideal of the organization. In 1938, O. C. Cash, SPEBSQSA’s founder, “proposed to revive . . . a pastime that required no equipment except the human voice and the love of four-part harmony” (Snyder 1993, 14). This simple action ideal does not hold one repertoire above others or restrict its harmonic language; rather, it describes in relatively observable terms the kind of music making that the practice valued. It is an action ideal—four human voices expressing a love of four-part harmony—and it supports both the contest repertoire and the music making presented in the exhibition events. As it stood then, the “new” exhibition practices were more clearly expressive of the grounding action ideal of SPEBSQSA than was a practice based solely on the “given” rules of harmonic language and repertoire.

Somewhere along the way Cash’s action ideal got lost in inertia, nostalgia, habits, repertoire lists, and contest rules. Entropy occurred. As I advised in my report (Gates 1993), re-capturing Cash’s action ideal and making this value—not the contest rules—the guiding ideal for practice would preserve SPEBSQSA’s core values and allow the practice to change with the times. The repertoire list and harmonization limitations are not the core of SPEBSQSA’s tradition, I claimed; they are not expressions of its grounding action ideal. Cash’s action ideal was merely and powerfully to make music with four voice parts without instruments.

In our field, our profession’s leaders, especially at the state level, spend too much time on similar minutiae—contest rules, festival participation policies, repertoire lists, membership requirements, and the like. Rather than spending their precious time on these business issues, couldn’t these knowledgeable and experienced people find ways to bring to life some compelling and simple action ideals that re-capture the love of teaching music, of helping others to learn to know how to harness music’s power to create musical lives for themselves, today and in their futures? Action for Change is a start along the way back to this grounding human ideal.

“When the Way Is Lost . . . Then Come the Rites.”

What, then, provides the grounds for practice? Music teachers need a flexible but strong approach to thinking about music teaching practice rather than to accept a set of fixed “foundations” that purport to be timeless orientations for music teachers’ actions. Although teaching practice itself is timeless—teachers in all eras find ways
Introduction: Grounding Music Education in Changing Times

Making rules out of ideals is an ancient human trait, as the SPEBSQSA story illustrates. When ritual replaces thought, that is, when settled practices, governing policies, and participation rules replace human musical values, then we must speak out. The rules and participation policies that form the basis of many music teachers’ concerns today were created during the rise of the school music contest movement in the 1930s. James Mursell spoke out. In the late 1950s, a resurgence of interest in pedagogical science (spurred by Sputnik and its effects) created an appetite for so-called “foundations studies” in music education—principles based on the psychology, sociology, and musicology of the time, shaped philosophically as rationales for music education practice and distracted many leading music teachers from musical teaching. Charles Leonhard spoke out.

Human musical values lie at the core of music education practice, as we are reminded by thinkers such as James Mursell in the 1930s; Charles Leonhard, Max Kaplan, and Harry Broudy in the 1950s; Wolfgang Kuhn, Bennett Reimer, John Paynter, Murray Schafer, and Abraham Schwadron in the 1970s; and the large group of music education theorists of today, some of whom are represented in the list of this book’s authors.

The current wave of interest in music education “foundations” began in about 1985. Analysts of this period include thinkers such as Eunice Boardman, Wayne Bowman, David Elliott, Charles Fowler, Siegmund Helms, Estelle Jorgensen, Wolfgang Kuhn, Thomas Regelski, Christopher Small, Keith Swanwick, and Robert Walker. Others, writing in multiauthored books, include Harold Abeles, Charles Hoffer, and Paul Klotman; Richard Colwell, Lizabeth Wing, and Thomas Goolsby; Malcolm Tait and Paul Haack; two collections of essays published in 1958 and 1991 titled Basic Concepts in Music Education; and one in 1988 titled Music Education in the United States: Contemporary Issues. Authors sought to develop grounding ideas about music education that grew out of their research and their analyses of various issues related to music education policy. The results, in most cases, were sets of resolutions of the issues they raised—guidelines for their curricular recommendations and applications for teachers. Jorgensen’s approach (2003) is closer to ours here, where several important topics were identified and explored as problems without shaping them into concrete recommendations.

The ritualization of practice has occurred in music education practice for hundreds of years; it is a professional constant. However, and yet again, The Way of music as human discourse has been lost in contest rules, “what-works” methods, and repertoire lists. Entropy has occurred. We must speak out.

Where Is the Solid Ground?

Where do music teachers, then, plant their feet? If change is the way of things over a long career, how can music teachers feel confident that their practice has a sound rationale? Here are 11 candidates for grounding professional practice.
(a) Pedagogical traditions and “standard” methodologies.
(b) Musical practices within the teacher’s “comfort zone.”
(c) The community’s musical life.
(d) Students’ musical goals and needs.
(e) Local, state, province, and/or national educational goals and standards.
(f) Ideological or religious precepts and teachings.
(g) Practical musicianship and career building.
(h) “Best-practice” teaching procedures.
(i) “What-works” teaching systems.
(j) Methods based on psychological research in music learning and/or teaching.
(k) Applications of a philosophical position in music and/or education.

Planting one’s feet in grounds such as these feels solid enough. There are people in the school, community, and profession, who will support programs based on one of the categories of policy making in the list above. Acting on one of these options seems to clarify things for people in a music teacher’s life, including students. Most of these sources of rationales are commented on by at least one author in this book.

The rub comes when the ecology of teaching changes and the pedagogy doesn’t keep up—when the student’s life world and the teacher’s practice begin to take different paths. Friction results, draining energy from the interaction between teacher and student.

The resolution is not an easy or clear one, and it certainly is not a relativist abandonment of a teacher’s role as the adult in the interaction. Rather, it is an ongoing critical dialogue, led by the teacher, between the changing resources and needs of students and the life of the local and world-wide communities that nurture both the students and the school.

Well-grounded practice includes features of all 11 categories of foundation in the list above, orchestrated by musical leaders who are always thinking about their work and reflecting on its effectiveness.

**Dialogue Is Key: How This Book Is Different**

It is the stance of this book that the premises and principles that support teaching should be more a result of changing realities than “given” as a set of fixed foundations. It is grounded in the belief that dialogues about actual conditions can be guided fruitfully by attention to certain key issues that can be framed in order to transcend time, issues that are themselves open to challenge and change. Through this approach we can always learn from each other’s insights as times change, as the tension between science and practice produces better insights, and as we find ways to accommodate the politics of preservation and progress. And we can take advantage of good knowledge in any field that illuminates the questions at hand.

Informed dialogue around some central themes results in the kind of resilient, flexible foundation for practice that can guide and inform practice in changing times.
The 14 discussions that follow are related to more transcendent matters than contest rules and what tunes are good for students to learn on Monday. The authors in this book provide models for thinking about and building guiding ideals—flexible but strong guidelines for practice in changing times. We promote and encourage a dialogue between those who believe that the status quo should be maintained (“Who’s complaining?” said one such person) and those who believe that our practice can be more powerful than it is.

In the past, leading thinkers, some of whom authored chapters in this book, have advanced well-crafted arguments for resolving music education questions, questions for which our cherished habits and rituals seem to provide answers. We do not intend to compete with that literature. We intend this to be part of the dialogue. It deserves to be respectfully mined for insight about the professional contexts of the times in which they were written, and searched for ideas about more recent developments and challenges facing the profession.

However, we argue against creating fixed rules of practice out of the topics as we present them here—or any other set of expressed beliefs. The action ideals we confront here are stated in uncompromising terms only to promote dialogue in response to questions such as those that follow each one. Making fixed rules of action ideals would rigidify practice—as though there were only one way to teach music, or one kind of “good health”—a result we criticize and one we hope to avoid. If we make rules out of our current ideals and look uncritically to the rules for guidance, we create a situation where music education practice again falls out of synchrony with future conditions, and holding to this kind of rigid course would not help our future students confront and contribute to their ever-changing musical worlds. “When the Way is lost . . . then come the rites.” (Lao Tzu, ch. 38; see footnote 3)

**Action Ideals and a New Approach to Rationalizing Practice**

We propose that seven broad and intersecting topics demand our attention. They reflect the potential for both power and powerlessness in music teachers’ daily lives today. We urge you, the reader, to build a critically reflective approach to teaching, one that assesses the worth of specific teaching proposals and ideas through changing times, using these seven action ideals as lenses.

Critical analyses on these themes, we argue (and illustrate in this book), provide the guideposts and shape the action ideals that form the sound basis for a successful and satisfying professional life, one that intelligently integrates and unifies your beliefs, ideas, and actions over a lifetime of musical engagement with students. By critically using your own experience and growing knowledge to help students mindfully expand their musicianship, and by consistently revisiting the decisions you make about what you have students do in the light of changing times, you and they can contribute more effectively to the landscape of human insight we call music.

Action ideals are guideposts for discussion and decision making. Although they support and suggest action, they are not formulaic prescriptions for behavior
or thought. They do suggest some ideas to think about, and can orient one’s efforts toward naming and challenging the cherished taken-for-granted assumptions, uncriticized habits, and accepted dogma of music learning and music teaching—the “default settings” of music education mentioned in the Preface. Once thought through in terms of their inner consistency and meaning for practice, your explorations of these topics can function to bring your beliefs, ideas, and actions into closer harmony within your own professional life. Teachers can use them to create more flexible and supportive rationales for sound teaching practice regardless of the situations or times in which the practice occurs. This renders decisions easier to make on a daily and yearly basis, in both curriculum and instruction, about matters as practical as how to approach a piece of musical literature, what to emphasize in grading, and how to frame a performance or presentation.

Teachers who study, discuss, analyze, and act on ideals such as those in this book can look beyond teaching “tricks” to the many intersecting and complex variables, issues, and considerations that help them deal more deeply and successfully with the challenges that surround them. They plan more strategically. They are clear about their contributions to their students’ educational programs and musical lives. They think ecologically and strategically about advocacy, as they confidently integrate their students with the musical lives of the communities that support them.

Taking the approach illustrated here, teachers would critique various proposals for practice they encounter in professional development settings and in schools. They would be productively critical of their own practice, challenging their actual educational results on the basis of their intentions and plans. It would not stop there: They would challenge the plans, themselves.

Such teachers act on their beliefs, but they can also express them with conviction. Beliefs, ideas based on them, and actions based on those ideas become articulate and defensible in the face of challenges from students, taxpayers, parents, and administrators. Based on good action ideals, the belief/idea/action synergy forms a system that shapes the thinking teacher’s approach to teaching music, an approach that is resilient and breathes with life in the ever-changing times of a long professional career.

A resilient, rational practice is grounded in the multifaceted considerations promoted by action ideals. Teachers would then ground their practice not only in successful traditions and analytical thought but also in the realities that shape their students’ musical lives. They would begin to shape a “praxis” that grows with them and meets the musical challenges of every generation of their students.

How to Use This Book

We hope that you will approach this book critically. After seeking to understand each author’s ideas and the ways each one analyzes or extends an ideal, ask questions: How would I have examined the topic? What other viewpoints would illuminate and clarify the topic further? Authors were originally somewhat limited by
space and word count; writing deeply about such complex topics in such a short essay is very difficult. They often had to narrow their focus to only one aspect of the larger issue. What other aspects of the issue are left untreated? How would I treat some of these issues in 4000–5000 words?

All the authors would be pleased if you took up the challenge as they did. They would welcome e-mails with your comments and questions on their essays.

Engage these important ideals. Grapple with them. Deepen your own ideas, beliefs, and convictions. Be sure to support your ideas with findings from such fields as history, musicology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, neurology, acoustics, and other disciplines and fields of knowledge. Add other important topics to your list and take the same dialectical, critical approach that we model here. Create ideas that articulate your beliefs clearly. Act on your ideas, and reflect critically on the results. In this way, starting with yourself and your students, you will form the habit of looking ecologically at what music teachers do and value.

Notes

1. As briefly noted in the Preface, “critically” means analytically and systematically using tests of value, logic, and the likely consequences of acting on the idea. It does not mean only “disparagingly” or “dismissively.” The function of such a critique is to improve things by considering alternative values and purposes, and identifying the likely outcomes of acting on them.

2. Arguably, the American public readily supports programs with the music assessments that are currently in place—performance evaluations in music “competition-festivals.” In spite of some recent glitches (answers printed on the back of exam papers [Booth 2008]), British students expect to take music GCSEs and take them seriously. Teachers everywhere grumble when someone is “looking over their shoulders” at learning outcomes. But, in light of the fact that assessments are now de rigueur, teachers have even more reason to enter the process, shape the assessments to reasonable ends, and use the results as a professional challenge for local change. The music GCSE assesses 14–16-year-olds on performing, performing using technology, composing, and listening/appraising. See the UK Examiner’s Report (Edexcel 2007) for more on British results.

3. “Praxis” is a term, rich with meaning, that connotes deliberate, mindful action in the context of outcomes that are oriented and evaluated ethically and socially. I use the term “practice” with a looser definition, one that includes not only goal-directed acts but also some acts that are habitual or “traditional” rather than rationalized in terms of their ethical or social outcomes.

4. By “particulars” I mean such matters as the specific practices, tools and materials, knowledge content, repertoires, and lexicons of unique terms and their uses by the adepts of the tradition. This also includes the people named by tradition-keepers as experts, exemplars, and culture-bearers in the tradition.

5. As it turns out, 20 years later, the preservationists’ musical values guide contest rules. (See the current musical standards at http://www.barbershop.org/web/groups/public/documents/graphics/pub_cjhandbookver41apr2008.pdf.)

6. As Garrison Keillor describes Lake Woebegone: “It is a place we go to remember things that never happened.”

7. To paraphrase the 2500-year-old Tao Te Ching: “When the way is lost . . . then come the rites.” This famous excerpt from chapter 38 as translated by Feng & English (1972) reads: “Therefore when Tao [the Way] is lost, there is goodness. When goodness is lost, there is kindness. When kindness is lost, there is justice. When justice is lost, there is ritual. Now ritual is the husk of faith and loyalty, the beginning of confusion.” This translation uses the term “ritual” instead
of “the rites” or “the laws,” as do other translations. The timeless insight of this passage does not change; however, it applies to complex, organized practices such as SPEBSQSA’s case and music education generally. There are many translations of Tao Te Ching, a 2500-year-old work attributed to Lao Tzu, an older contemporary of Confucius (552–479 BCE).

8. Again, when done clearly, a studio teacher’s lesson critiques and a conductor’s directions to performers in rehearsals are excellent expressions of action ideals, guiding as they do a host of relevant variables for performers that, taken as a whole, are unique and personal expressions of the individual teacher’s insights and creativity.

9. As mentioned in the Preface, these are sometimes called “regulative” or “guiding.” I will use “action ideals” to point to their function as orientations for thinking about and thus guiding practice.

References


Action for Change in Music Education

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Action for Change in Music Education

The MayDay Group first met on May 1, 1993, with the intention of critically reexamining the status of practice in music education. This eclectic and varied group of thinkers, from a variety of disciplines and countries, continues to function as a think tank, concerned to identify, critique, and change taken-for-granted patterns of professional activity; polemical approaches to method; social, musical, and educational philosophies; and educational politics and public pressures that have threatened effective practice and stifled critical and open communication among music educators. This ongoing debate has resulted in a more formal two-fold purpose guiding future deliberations: (a) to apply critical theory and critical thinking to the purposes and practices of music education, and (b) to affirm the central importance of musical participation in human life and, thus, the value of music in the general education of all people.

The following regulative ideals have emerged. They are stated broadly as ideals for guiding dialogue and change, not as narrow or dogmatic conclusions. Each is followed by a brief rationale and a range of sample questions that point out directions for action. Because any consideration of ideals by diverse thinkers is a dynamic process, colloquy and reflection continue. Thus elaboration, refinement, and qualification by members and other interested parties are expected and welcomed.

Despite the difficulty of formulating such ideals in precise yet brief form, members and other participants nonetheless agree that these ideals for guiding necessary change are sufficiently warranted that the signers put them forth as bases for action in music education.

1. Musical action that is fully mindful of musical results is the necessary condition of music making and, therefore, of an effective music education.

The indifferent application of concepts, information, and technical skills taught for their own sakes leads to music making that lacks musical integrity. Skilled music making, instead, requires the purposeful and appropriate practice of musicianship. Expert musicians develop critical and reflective abilities that mindfully employ knowledge and skill in the service of musical results. Therefore, any formal education of musical skill, knowledge, and insight must similarly involve critically reflective, rather than unthinking or superficial, music making.

a. How can the profession focus less on teaching information and technical skills in isolation and for their own sakes, and more on the kind of critically reflective musicianship that results in individuals who can make thoughtful and appropriate musical choices independently of a teacher or conductor?

b. In what ways has inattention to the development of independent musicianship encouraged unthinking and therefore unmusical performance on the part of individuals?

c. How can all forms of music making in educational contexts achieve musical integrity while advancing the critical and independent musical thinking of performers and audiences alike?
2. The social and cultural contexts of musical actions are integral to musical meaning and cannot be ignored or minimized in music education.

Aesthetic theories, with their claims that musical meaning and value transcend time, place, context, and human purpose and usefulness, fail to account for the fullest range of meanings inherent in individual and collective musical actions. Such theories fall short of providing an adequate rationale for music making or music teaching. Instead, all music must be seen as intimately tied to social and cultural contexts and conditions. The theory and practice of music education must account for this situatedness of music and music making. Music educators must have, therefore, a theoretical foundation that unites the actions of producing music with the various contexts of those actions, so that musical meaning appropriately includes all of music’s humanizing and concrete functions.

a. How can musical values be understood in terms of the human needs and contexts that bring them forth, while at the same time retaining appropriate standards of musicianship and musicality?

b. What standards of musicianship and musicality in music education can be guided by traditions associated with aesthetic theories, while still emphasizing the situatedness of the musical practices in question?

c. How can students be guided to advance their aspirations for identifying and serving the musicianship needs called forth by different musics and situations?

d. What tangible qualities of musicianship can replace hypothesized and ephemeral aesthetic qualities as a basis for teaching, learning, and evaluating music making that is appropriately situated?

3. Since human musical actions create, sustain, and reshape musical cultures, music educators can and should formally channel this cultural process, influencing the directions in which it develops and the individual and collective human values it serves.

A musical culture is a living process, not a set of works or of given practices. It develops out of the special synergy of change and tradition unique to its people and conditions and cannot simply be passed on as a timeless, unchanging set of traditions. Music educators, thus, must not be satisfied simply to perpetuate any musical culture as a matter of received “fact.” Rather, they should guide and expand the musical initiatives, alternatives, and levels of musical excellence of their students, going beyond what is otherwise already available outside of school, helping musical cultures to continue their respective developments while building bridges for students to other musical expressions of culture.

a. How can music teachers be more accountable for increasing the likelihood that their students will value musical participation throughout their lives?
b. What can music teachers do to improve the individual, family, and society through the musical alternatives, initiatives, and choices made available and advanced through the school music curriculum?

c. What strategies can be developed to promote, improve, and encourage the musical traditions of particular segments of society and, at the same time, help individuals become sensitive to and more successful within musical cultures other than the ones in which they grew up?

d. How can the profession undertake a sustained campaign to reenergize musical life in society, and thus to expand the contributions of music to life?

4. The contributions made by schools, colleges, and other musical institutions are important to musical culture, but these need to be systematically examined and evaluated in terms of the directions and extent of their influence.

Despite their good intentions and the high claims often made for institutions such as schools, colleges, professional ensembles, churches, and mass media, institutionally mediated expressions of musical culture are unpredictable and often self-destructing or self-limiting. Music and musical actions, when institutionalized, are transformed by a variety of ideological, ethical, economic, and pedagogical motivations and agendas. Any theory and practice of music education must successfully account for these phenomena, shed light on ways to critique them, and set in motion means of minimizing negative effects of institutions at the individual or social levels.

a. In what ways do formal institutions of musical culture influence the actual musical life of a society and on what bases can these institutions be critiqued when the influences are ineffective, trifling, or negative?

b. How can a theory of music education account for the effects of institutions on music, provide ways to assess the cultural good or harm that various institutions can do, and devise means by which such institutions can be used for cultural good rather than harm?

c. How can we influence institutions such as publishing companies and the mass media to improve their contribution to raising the musical quality of social and cultural life?

d. What can the institution of music education do to reestablish avocational music making as the cultural norm for the general public, as opposed to mainly nurturing professional performers and the audiences that listen to them?

5. In order to be effective, music educators must establish and maintain contact with ideas and people from other disciplines.

The dominant model of study and research in music and music education minimizes the relevance and applicability of influences from outside music. The intellectual and pragmatic narrowness and limitations of this model have led music teachers and musicians to an insularity that has isolated them from communication with others in the arts and sciences, from the other helping professions, and thus from
the general public. Future teachers and musicians should apply valuable views from other fields to the problems that musicians and educators regularly face.

a. How can the range of professional and general knowledge of music teachers (and teachers of teachers) be broadened?
b. From what disciplines should such a broadened knowledge base for practice be drawn?
c. To what extent and how can we free music teachers from uncritically mimicking their own teachers’ techniques and instead develop rational, reflective, and effective personal teaching approaches based on new evidence, rather than on tradition alone?
d. What can accrediting, certifying, and professional organizations change to improve the general education of musicians who will be school music teachers and professors?

6. The research and theoretical bases for music education must simultaneously be refined and radically broadened both in terms of their theoretical interest and practical relevance.

A renewed search for insight in unraveling the problems and issues of teaching and learning music must replace the professional goals and rewards that motivate much current research which is, as a result, often uninteresting in its contribution to theory and irrelevant to practice. We support an approach to music education inquiry that draws its problems from and applies its conclusions to the authentic musical actions of people and thus from music that incorporates a rich diversity of musical meaning and experience. Furthermore, because such issues and questions in music education are inextricably wed to inquiry in other disciplines, music education research theories and practices must go well beyond the narrow paradigms and limitations traditionally accepted.

a. How can more adequate research criticism be developed for music education as a profession? And what theories and findings from other disciplines will support this criticism?
b. What items should be included on a profession-wide research agenda that will predictably lead to a more adequate research base for good practice? And how should items on this agenda be prioritized?
c. How can the profession encourage independent, critical researchers and, at the same time, reward innovative methods, collaborative action, and results that contradict tradition?
d. What additional means can be devised to referee and disseminate research findings? How can both the methodological expertise and the range of general knowledge of referees be improved?
7. An extensive and intensive consideration of curriculum for music education is needed as a foundation to greater professional unity and must be guided by a sound philosophical process.

Curriculum occupies a fundamental, central, and defining place in any effort to improve music education and thus should precede considerations of teaching and research techniques, methods, materials, and assessment. However, methods, materials, instruction, assessment, and supervision are too often undertaken without specific curricular reference, or under the mistaken assumption that certain traditional means automatically guarantee worthwhile musical ends. In light of the six ideals stated above, it is clear that when desirable results remain unclear, then methods, materials, and learning become haphazard at best and detrimental at worst. Thus a consensus on curricular standards—the criteria of effective teaching and learning—needs to be as strong a part of the preparation and practice of music educators as are the standards of musicianship.

a. What philosophical, curricular, psychological and social principles and criteria should guide curriculum development, evaluation, and criticism?
b. Will curriculum be influenced best by standards developed and imposed by national or regional entities, such as music educators associations and central governments, or by specific attempts to make curriculum design a strong part of music teacher preparation? Can these interact effectively?
c. How can a greater consensus on desirable outcomes take into account the institutional priorities, local conditions, and resources that relate to implementing curriculum?
d. To what extent and how can music education curriculums take broader educational and social concerns into account?

The MayDay Group—February 1997

The initial signatories of this document affirm their general agreement with the broad ideals contained here as a basis for action. In addition, they and others were invited to expand and elaborate on specific points. Any such commentary will be made available in a separate document.

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Chapter 1
No One True Way: Music Education Without Redemptive Truth*

Wayne D. Bowman

The business of reflection in determining the true good cannot be done once for all . . . It needs to be done over and over again, in terms of the conditions of concrete situations as they arise.

In a moving world solidification is always dangerous.
—John Dewey

“Musical action that is fully mindful of musical results is the necessary condition of music-making and, therefore, of an effective music education” (see p. xxxii, this volume). So states the first of the orienting ideals that have framed discourse among MayDay Group members since the group’s inception. This entails, among other things, renouncing unreflective music making and musical instruction: the rejection of practices pursued supposedly for their own sake, the renunciation of untheorized practice in which we do what we do simply because that is what we do—out of convenience, or habit, or simply because it is expected of us. Musical and instructional activity that is unreflective or critically uninformed lacks both substance and integrity. It is more about mimicry than true musical or educational engagement. Critically-reflective musicianship and “educatorship,” on the other hand, support

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*I borrow the phrase “redemptive truth” from Rorty (2001), who argues that its adherents (wrongly and naively) “think that there is a natural terminus to inquiry, a way things really are, and that understanding what that way is will tell us what to do with ourselves.” Redemptive truth thus designates a set of beliefs “which would end, once and for all, the process of reflection,” fulfilling the kind of need that religion has traditionally attempted to satisfy. To believe in redemptive truth, Rorty asserts, is to believe in “one true description” of what is “really” going on in the world, and thereby the possibility of a definitive answer to perennial questions about how best to live one’s life—or in the case at hand, how best to educate musically. Music education’s passion for positivistic research is part and parcel of the quest for redemptive truth, but that is a topic for deliberation under another MayDay group ideal. Lest I be misunderstood: I do not share Rorty’s enthusiasm for a literary turn. My position is more Deweyan than Rortyan.
thoughtful, independent, and appropriate musical decisions and choices. It is imperative, then, that music educators strive to engage their students in genuinely musical actions, in actions with musical and educational integrity, and in actions guided by critical and caring awareness of the ends they serve.

It is hard to imagine a reasonable person taking issue with statements like these. The need for reflective practice has become almost a cliché, and the claim that musical practices should have integrity sounds almost circular.¹ Surely, none of us advocates the pursuit of inauthentic musical activities guided by nothing more substantial than mindless habit. If that is so, why make an issue of it?

Unfortunately, the fact none of us openly endorses unreflective practice or musical inauthenticity does not mean they are not implicit or manifest in many of our musical and educational practices. It is not only possible but fairly common for our actions to serve unintended and unanticipated ends, ends at odds with those we espouse. Despite our altruistic intentions and passion for music making, our habits (our “default settings”) and our disciplinary imperatives (the things we do because they are what people in our situations are expected to do) often serve ends very different from the ones we claim or assume. Part of what this ideal suggests, then, is that to execute one’s duties unreflectively, unthinkingly, or mechanically²—even if with considerable fluency, efficiency, and passion, and even if in ways that are widely sanctioned by the profession at large—may well be antithetical to the basic aims and purposes of music education. Music teaching and musical education are not the same thing, and they may be, under certain circumstances, at odds with each other. The success or effectiveness of music education should be gauged not by the efficiency with which we do what we do, but by the tangible and durable differences our actions make in the lives of students and society.

This ideal challenges us to do whatever we do as music educators intelligently, and in light of foreseen or anticipated consequences. But again, who would take issue with this? Aren’t all people’s actions guided by assumptions about their outcomes? Not necessarily. For one thing, the results of instructional and musical actions are seldom uniform and predictable; and, for another, results interact in complicated ways. A consequence that is desirable on one level or in one way may be quite undesirable on another. The consequences of human action, then, are seldom singular, are often entangled with each other in complex ways, and may well be at odds with each other. Musical activities do not result in the uniformly predictable outcomes promised by naïve advocacy arguments, pat instructional methods, or comfortingly universal philosophical rationales. As humanly generated meanings, the consequences of musical and instructional actions are plural, ever-changing, and contextually and personally relative. Anticipating instructional and musical consequences thus requires considerable vigilance and discernment, attention to considerations that are unique to the situation at hand. Genuinely educational or musical consequences do not follow inevitably or automatically from music-related activity or from delivery of musical instruction. Consequences are contingent, dependent upon an almost limitless range of variables.

Music educators cannot just “coast,” then, as if the achievement of desirable and appropriate ends were simply a matter of having properly executed time-tested...
instructional strategies or having deployed “tricks that work.” The fact that we have successfully engaged students in musical activities does not assure the attainment of musically sound educational results. There is a potentially significant difference between being a music teacher (or band director, or choir director, or orchestra director) and being a music educator: success at the former is no guarantee of success at the latter.

Nor are we justified in assuming the music simply “has” value of a kind that is good for everyone, equally, and in a way that eliminates the need for critical reflection and adjustment on an ongoing basis. Critical reflection is not a one-time endeavor after which one is free to act with impunity, secure in the knowledge that instructional actions will serve desired ends. They may or they may not. Or perhaps more to the point, they may and they may not, both at the same time—such ends being plural, fluid, potentially contradictory, and so on. The values of music teaching and learning are always functions of the uses to which they are put, and of the ways they become related to other things, actions, and meanings.

One of the important conceptual/practical tools to emerge from MayDay Group dialogue about issues like these is the view of music as a mode of human praxis—as distinct, that is, from formal or technical affairs whose values are simply given, intrinsic, and only marginally related to matters of use or context. Praxial accounts of music (and of education) emphatically reject technical-rational models of musicianship and of music teaching and learning: the models that have come to dominate and define institutionalized music studies in many parts of the world. On a praxial view, the values of music and music education are always socially and politically modulated, and are relative to the ways they serve human living. Rather than straight-ahead affairs whose value is absolute and invariably positive, music and music education require utmost sensitivity to situational variables, and constant, critical reassessment.

In marked contrast to technical pursuits where actions relate straightforwardly to preordained ends, praxis is guided by highly refined ethical discernment—what Aristotle called *phronesis*. Phronesis is the ethical discernment that is required to negotiate one’s way in the realm of practical human affairs—to act rightly, in light of the potential human consequences of one’s actions. In contrast to the kind of know-how concerned with questions like “What works?” and “How well?”, phronesis is concerned with determining right courses of action where “rightness” must be qualified by answers to questions like – “For whom? Under what circumstances? Whether, and to what extent?” That is, phronesis is concerned with choosing a right course of action where “right” can only be decided in light of the particulars of a unique, human situation. Phronesis is at stake, then, in precisely those situations where prescriptions and generalizations fail—which is to say, in all matters involving human needs. Both music and education are prime examples of such situations.

Since this emphasis on “situatedness” and on knowledge and meaning as human actions (as distinct from the kind of objective generalities amenable to mechanical transfer from teacher to receptive student) is also characteristic of the current vogue called “constructivism,” it may be useful to ask how praxis, pragmatism, and practice theory differ. The primary difference, as I see it, is the praxial concern with
achieving right results. On its own, the claim that knowledge and meaning are constructions leaves us without a way of determining which knowledge constructions or meaning constructions are warranted—a situation in which, at least potentially, “anything goes.” The point of phronesis, though, is precisely that not just anything goes: its concern is with right action, as opposed to mere activity. Praxis, one might say, is a committed orientation whose interest is not so much activity as action—

the latter being intentional and to that extent grounded in concern about keeping activity on a course associated with desired ends.

To put it another way, music making is (as constructivist theory rightly maintains) an active process; only not all active processes are necessarily meaningful or in themselves desirable. Since praxis sees values as functions of use, praxis-oriented music education is concerned with the broadly human uses to which musical experiences may be put, the ways they enhance (or interfere with) human life and living. Praxial orientations are concerned that meanings and understandings be reasonable and appropriate to ends-in-view. Unlike technically oriented action whose concern is “whether what we desire is achievable,” praxis (pragmatically oriented action) asks “whether achieving it is desirable.”

Praxial orientations to music education thus reject transmission/reception models of teaching and learning. They insist that genuinely musical doings are intentional—that they are mindful of musical results. Musical activity is not inherently good: It may be good or bad, and is often both at once. Again, praxis-oriented musical action (as distinct from mere activity) is mindful of the differences it makes in the lives of those who engage in it.

Similarly, on grounds advanced by pragmatist theory, what constitutes “truth” or trustworthy knowledge is not a matter of natural fact, but of habit. Because not all habits are equally desirable or useful, though, action habits must be balanced by the mindful habit of changing and revising habits in light of ever-emerging and ever-changing ends-in-view. That is what “acting in light of foreseen consequences” means in the realm of human practice, where consequences are plural, divergent, and quite often unpredictable.

The significance of these considerations for music educators is enormous. For if music is a form of human praxis, and if, like all social practices, musical engagements serve different, divergent ends—for different people, at different times, in different contexts, and even for the same people at the same time—then it is fully possible for musical and educational actions to be at once very good in certain ways and very bad in others. In fact, that is fairly common. To be musical, to act in ways that have musical integrity, and to educate musically are always contextually situated undertakings. Their meanings are always open, never fixed, or final. Claims to the contrary are attempts to entrench the status quo and the particular interests it serves, by exempting them from critical examination. Human practices are inherently fluid, ever under construction. And negotiating one’s way within them—indeed, even the task of determining what counts as a genuine instance of the practice within which one presumes to be operating—is a matter of making fine adjustments in a domain without set tolerances. To engage responsibly in human practices like music and education, then, requires vigilance, care, creative imagina-
tion, and a deep commitment (tempered by awareness of one’s potential fallibility) to acting rightly.

The questions raised by this stance contrast rather strikingly with the pet procedures and pat prescriptions that so often guide common practice in music education. The answers implicated by praxial commitments are provisional, and the problems they raise are not temporary obstacles to be eliminated. They are, rather, constitutive features of professional practice. Indeed, on the view advanced here, professional action entails a capacity to wrestle with questions and issues to which there are no single, simple, or predetermined answers. Professional praxis makes its home amidst possibilities, not prescriptions.

Where is the boundary between the authentic and inauthentic to be drawn? In what does “integrity”—musical or otherwise—consist? What does it mean to be or to become musical? By what standard should the effectiveness of a musical education be gauged? Whose music is best suited to the educational needs and interests at hand? These are among the questions implicated by commitments to professional praxis.

Clearly, there is a lot more to this action ideal than first meets the eye, especially if one takes seriously the praxial and pragmatic convictions I have advanced here. These assumptions have the effect of dissolving comfortable boundaries and destabilizing categories conventionally regarded as bedrock—music, musicianship, education, and so on.

The conservatory tradition and apprenticeship models from which modern schools of music emerged were based on unwavering, unquestioned convictions as to whose music “counts” and how best to teach it. The equation of music education with school music stems likewise from largely unexamined assumptions about music education’s nature and sphere of influence. It is not surprising that technicism should thrive amidst such circumstances. Technical expertise alone, however, is not the kind of foundation from which a secure professional future for music education is likely to be forged.

None of this is to say, of course, that the ideal under consideration here—that music education needs to be fully mindful of its results (not all of them, strictly speaking, musical)—is the last word on these matters (as if that were either possible or desirable). Indeed, a central feature of the concerns I have been exploring here is deep suspicion toward “last words” and their attendant claims to redemptive truth. After more than a decade of study and debate, this action ideal continues to point in promising directions and to raise issues of broad potential significance.

In the remainder of this essay, I will suggest some issues that warrant our collective attention and concern as we attempt further clarification of this ideal, and as we seek to act in ways more consistent with its spirit. I will then conclude with a few points that reinforce the themes we have been exploring.

(1) Music education has lost touch with the diversity and the fluidity of its subjects, and their fundamental nature as human practices. When ends become nonnegotiable “givens” and means become utterly obligatory, the result is not so much disciplinary rigor as rigor mortis. Under such circumstances,
professional membership devolves into discipleship. We have embraced particular modes of musical engagement (performance, for instance) as though they exhausted the range of educationally useful musical action. We have sought to universalize instructional systems and strategies that are effective only under certain conditions. This naïve faith in one true way of being musical and of implementing curriculum is rooted in an understandable human need for confidence and security. But it is not well suited (whatever its therapeutic value) to the musical needs of students in a diverse and changing society. The action ideal we are discussing here rightfully stresses mindfulness of results and critically reflective musicianship. But because music and the results of musical instruction are both radically plural, the trick is to avoid hypostasis—to allow difference to be different, plurality to be plural, and the fluid to flow—without sacrificing rigor. ¹⁸

(2) Admitting plurality and change does not imply that just anything goes: “Many” does not mean “just any.” In human practices like music and education, what keeps actions evolving in the direction of further actions that are reasonable and desirable is the social process of communication. Practical knowledge is not created ex nihilo or arbitrarily, according to purely personal predilections. The “nerve” of human practices emerges from coordinated human action, within what Dewey calls a “conjoint community of functional use,”¹⁹ and in what Stubley characterizes as a “tuning” process.²⁰ What holds practices together are shared meanings, meanings forged through coordinated action in which individual agency is modified and regulated by mutuality and responsibility to partner participants. This kind of mutuality is rooted in the inclination and capacity to communicate across boundaries, and to find common (if provisional) ground amidst diversity and change. Dogma, doctrine, and discipleship obstruct the practical intersubjectivity that brings vitality and vigor to human practices.²¹ Instructional method dispensed as a substitute for inquiry, experimentation, and communication leads not to disciplinary vitality, but its opposite.

(3) This action ideal appears to suggest, if inadvertently, that it is professional or performing musicians²² who ground musical integrity in the context of music education—that “the necessary conditions of music-making” are the necessary conditions of “an effective music education.” Only, what of the substantial majority of the world’s musical participants whose primary mode of engagement is listening to music?²³ Is the action (as distinct from the activity) of musical listening not musical? And are there not varying degrees of listening veracity, standards of care²⁴ that distinguish intentional from incidental listening? Can one defensibly assert that what musicians hear is definitively musical, and that musicianship as generally understood by professional musicians is the point in becoming musically educated? If we concede that listening is a valid way of being musical (and how can we not?),²⁵ then it is difficult to maintain that things like “musicianly” listening and musicianship are sufficient grounds for music education. The tension between musician and “lay” listener, or between professional and amateur (which it resembles), is a function of specialization that is not a universal musical condition: societies exist in which
“musician” is not a distinct category and in which “to be musical” means simply to be a normal, functioning member of the society. To the resolution of this tension requires, I believe, an embodied account of musical meaning that denies musicians’ privileged musical access and asserts a basis for valid musical cognition rooted in the body.

(4) To be “fully mindful” does not mean simply to be intellectually aware. This is an important corollary of the pragmatic conviction that knowing in the rational or intellectual sense is not the only or the best way of being in touch with reality, and that such knowing is not the ultimate measure of validity for all modes of human experience. It is also congruent with the notion of a mind-body continuum, which insists that the borders between mind and body remain porous and permeable. Attempts to stress mindfulness without carefully elaborating what “mind” entails risk slipping into the flawed view that opposes mindfulness to mindlessness, which in turn is equated to unthinking habit or “mere” bodily experience. Action, habit, and the body that acts or habituates are serious omissions from our conventional understandings of music and musical experience. Concern for mind-body continuity is far from idle, since without the body and the “genius for ambiguity” it affords, the places for creativity and imagination in our accounts of music are precarious at best. To be “fully mindful of musical results,” then, is a deceptively complex commitment: first, mindfulness entails considerably more than logical or intellectual fluency; and second, “musical results” invariably entail more than just “the music” as conventionally understood.

(5) As with the border between mind and body, the border between music and its context (between the supposedly intra- and extra-musical) needs to be kept open, for it is precisely commerce across this border that keeps music engagements vital, meaningful, purposive, and relevant. We need, therefore, to be wary of claims to music’s intrinsic value, claims that attempt to establish for certain musics a value domain that is not relational, but “just is, in itself.” On pragmatic convictions, all value is grounded; all goodness is goodness for some purpose and in service of some human interest. The claim to intrinsicality, then, is a sleight of hand that attempts to exempt certain realms of musical action from the social realities that, as human practices, they invariably implicate. Musical value is never confined to sonic structure. Music draws its broad human significance and its power from the ways it articulates with the body, and from its cross-modal connections to other experience—what it says about the experiential world and how that world in turn informs music. To reiterate:

• “Musicianship” consists of far more than executive skills.
• The “musical results” of which this action ideal maintains musical action must be mindful extend far beyond the realm of “music alone.” And,
• Education that is musical (or musical experience that is educational) must concern itself with “results” that are far more extensive in range than those conventionally presumed to be its purview.
I will conclude these remarks with a list of brief points that I believe urgently warrant our consideration as we attempt to come to grips with the relationship between critically reflective musicianship and music education:

(a) Music is a diverse constellation of shifting practices without an essential core. With no essence, there can be no one true music, no such thing as musicianship in an absolute sense, nor one true way of teaching it.\(^{34}\) This stance is neither solipsistic nor nihilistic: Instead, it establishes a crucial place in musicianship and music education alike for decisions, judgments, and actions made with utmost sensitivity to the particulars of the situation at hand. The pragmatic challenge, and the challenge in recognizing both music and music education as forms of praxis, is to create and sustain value amidst—indeed, in terms of—transience, relativity, and change. To act rightly while respecting and accepting the openness of rightness requires highly developed ethical capacities that are largely neglected today in music teacher education.

(b) This capacity is not individual or private. Communication, dialogue, and mutuality are what keep practices alive. Working against such capacities within the ranks of music educators are the numerous special interest cliques vying for teachers’ exclusive allegiance.\(^{35}\) Such insularity is a long-standing impediment to music education as a profession.

(c) Music education is not straightforwardly the business of engaging students in sanctioned and ostensibly enjoyable musical activities. The success of a musical education can be gauged only in view of the ends to which it may be put, and these may differ profoundly according to individual, place, and time.

(d) Thus, teacher preparation requires more than transmitting the tricks of the trade, since “what works” can be determined only with regard to ends-in-view and these are not the same for all students, educators, or communities. Indeed, “what works” judged by short-term consequences\(^{36}\) may fail utterly in the larger task of making people’s lives and society musically richer, more vital, and more rewarding. It is essential that musically educative experiences engage students in actions that are potentially transformative: that generate meaningful engagements capable of enriching lives yet to be lived.

(e) “Musical results” are far broader and more inclusive than what we typically envision when we use that expression. They include people’s identities, both individual and social; power relations and political influences; and students’ inclinations and disinclinations toward music in their lives outside school and beyond schooling.\(^{37}\) Being musical includes more than musicianship. Musicianship involves (or should) more than music.

(f) Music education practice that is mindful of results requires a central role for music education research.\(^{38}\) Truly mindful practice is evidence-based practice. And a commitment to evidence-based practice entails, I urge, practice that is directed and monitored by educator-conducted inquiry. Thus, research should be among the basic dispositions and fluencies music educators carry into the field and continue to refine through their praxis.\(^{39}\)
(g) Music and music education are not unconditional goods. They can harm as well as heal. Detecting the difference requires discernment focused on the here and now, on this situation, and on this person. Furthermore, intended results on one level may be undesirable on another—good and bad at the same time. A commitment to wellness and to choosing the greatest good among potentially conflicting results are inevitable results of a broadened appreciation of the ethical dimensions of music and music education.

(h) Against the acknowledged potential pitfalls of relativism, plurality, and diversity, we need to weigh the very real (and increasingly manifest) dangers of technicism in music education: of automatic, unthinking rule following. The very controls, uniformity, and conformity believed to enhance disciplinary rigor can lead to stasis, arrest, and irrelevance. There is no one true way to musical education, no substitute for ethically oriented action based on informed judgment—even though it would make our lives infinitely simpler were that not the case. The words of Wittgenstein resonate strongly with our current situation:

We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and... because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!

Coda

Among music education’s most significant professional needs is a renewed commitment to critical examination of the pragmatic, “if-then” thinking that seeks to ground action in imaginative, creative discernment of desirable ends-in-view. Aesthetic philosophical rationales rooted in metaphysical doctrines instead of concrete, here-and-now circumstances; the desire to establish disciplinary rigor in the face of public skepticism; and willingness to follow pied pipers rather than becoming self-reliant creators of instructional method and curricula—such influences have left us defensively “circling wagons” instead of pursuing new frontiers. Our curricular decisions and instructional actions are motivated by “what has been” or “what is,” rather than “what should be.” Teacher preparation has neglected both the critical capacity and the inclination to gauge the success of our actions by the differences we make in the lives of our students, and in society at large. Our models are generally aimed at learning to do better or more efficiently or with greater precision and technical fluency what we already do.

Music education should instead be the place in the postsecondary music curriculum that focuses on questions, problems, and theory, in a vigorous effort to renew and reorient instructional practice. To the extent we have equated music education with school music, we have sold music education short. We have failed to engage the majority of postsecondary music students and our colleagues in critical dialogue about the nature and aims of music and of education. We have been complicit in the marginalization of music education within music studies. And we have unwittingly exempted many of those who will eventually teach music from knowledge of the music education literature, its significance, and its imperatives.
Music educators’ beliefs in redemptive truth and pursuit of the one true way suit neither the musical nor the educational needs of a diverse and changing society. It is the potential power of music, not just its integrity, that is compromised when existing techniques and systems and the inevitably partial answers they advance take priority over questions, problems, and the ever-changing realities of the human social world.

Notes

1. Circular in the sense that to be a viable and sustainable musical practice would seem to require musical integrity by definition. On the other hand, what counts as musical integrity is always very much an open and controversial question—or, in light of the nature of music to be explored in this brief essay, it should be. The fact that what constitutes musical integrity is seldom a concern of music education is itself a strong indicator that not all is well.
2. This is commonly referred to as “technicism”—an exclusive focus upon instructional means (“how to”) and utter neglect of the ends to which they may lead.
3. “Aesthetic” or otherwise.
4. Although I choose not to dwell on it here, these latter understandings lie at the heart of the Kantian version of aesthetic experience long dominant in music education’s espousal of music education as a form of “aesthetic education.”
5. Note that the fact both music and education are forms of praxis does not mean what is true of music is therefore necessarily true of all valid education involving music, or that when one has resolved issues having to do with appropriate and desirable musical action, educational issues will take care of themselves—the fallacious assumption, in other words, that the study of music in schools automatically guarantees educative musical benefits. This assumption is unfortunately prevalent among musicians and music educators, due to curricular configurations at the postsecondary level in which the development of musicianship is deemed self-evidently educational. The consequence is a tendency to equate musical praxis with educational praxis, a tendency that neglects the distinctive concerns of the latter. Musicianship, even highly refined musicianship, is not a sufficient basis for informed and reflective educational praxis.
6. In light of my criticisms of the technicism inherent in music education’s current approaches to disciplinarity, it is well worth considering Rorty’s words: “You can have an expert culture if you agree on what you want to get, but not if you are wondering what sort of life you ought to desire” (Rorty 2001). His claim is typically hyperbolic, of course: there can, in fact, be expertise that is nontechnical in its orientation. But it is precisely my point that the music education profession neglects that kind of expertise.
7. This brief essay is not the place for a detailed exposition of Aristotelian phronesis. Many such expositions exist. See, for instance: Bowman (2000a, 2002), Dunne (1997), and Regelski (1998).
8. It may sound contradictory to question the sufficiency of altruistic intentions to the achievement of desired ends on the one hand, while maintaining on the other that what is needed is ethical discernment. However, there is a crucial difference between intentions and the kind of discernment I am calling ethical. Central to ethical discernment as I see it is an acceptance of potential fallibility. That is part of what keeps phronesis attuned to the unanticipated and the particular. Intentions that are not subject to critical review and revision in light of novel, emergent meanings cannot detect and respond to subtle, but significant things that might change the end being pursued or alter the means deemed appropriate. Intentions without fallibility and attendant critical reflection are too coarse and crude to function reliably in the service of praxis.
9. Although “constructivism” is, properly speaking, a concern of psychology, only roughly paralleled in social theory by what that discipline designates “constructionism,” I take the liberty in this essay (with apologies to those it may trouble or offend) of loosely subsuming both under the former term.

10. I use praxis and practice theory more or less synonymously here. For useful discussions of practice theory, see Schatski (2001).


13. Support for this assertion is everywhere once its possibility is acknowledged. One serious example: the incidence of noise induced hearing loss (NIHL) among musicians and music educators—hearing loss induced, please note, by musical engagements that may be stirring and gratifying, to say nothing of authentic, stylistically appropriate, and beautiful. Leon Thurman (2004) provides an excellent overview of health-related concerns in his “eColumn” on the MayDay Group’s web site (http://www.maydaygroup.org). Link to Thurman’s “Music and Health” pages through (http://www.maydaygroup.org/php/ecolumns/musicandhealth-views.php).

14. This is precisely why the musical integrity at stake in this ideal is not a set or absolute state. It involves just such mindful, reflective negotiating of one’s way in terms of the situatedness of the moment.

15. To this list of questions I add, parenthetically, what does it mean to be a music educator, and whom should this designation exclude? Although at first gloss this question may seem to lie outside the scope of the ideal under consideration here, it is not: for a “music educator” is precisely one who asks (and bases instructional strategies upon) these former questions.

16. The apparent security that drives this obsession with the technical is just that: apparent and illusory. This is because “what works” is always specific to particular ends and circumstances, while educational ends and musical needs are plural, fluid, and relative. (The results of such technicism might be evident, for example, for those conservatory trained musicians who are unable to improvise or to “read” fluently in a studio recording session.)

17. “Subjects,” plural: meaning music and education, of course; but also the “subjects” or recipients of instructional efforts, the students.

18. Or to put it differently, the problem is to remain supple without becoming spineless. In a way, this question of balance is the central challenge presented by pragmatism and the idea of praxis: it is the ethical issue phronesis exists to address.


20. Stubley, Eleanor (1998: 93–105). This remarkable essay addresses the nature of musical performance. However, its discussion of the musical field and the ways it is sustained by trust resonate strongly with the account of praxis/phronesis advanced here—due to and evidence of, I believe, music’s fundamental praxial nature. What I hope to stress in drawing attention to these connections is the centrality of trust to praxis, whether musical or educational, and the devastating paralysis that ensues where trust fails.


23. One might counter that (intentional) acts of listening amount to acts of making—which of course they are. Only, this is production of a different order than that typically designated by the phrase “music-making.”


25. The need to account for musical processes that involve actions beyond just performing and composing is part of what motivates David Elliott (1995) and Christopher Small (1998) to deploy the terms “musicing” and “musicking,” respectively—although the meanings they impute to these terms is by no means identical, Small’s term being considerably more inclusive than Elliott’s.
John Blacking has shown us this in his many writings based on his field study of the Transvaal Venda people of South Africa.

I have made a preliminary attempt at such an account in Bowman (2004). One of the main points of that essay is that because musical perception and musical experience have deep roots in human bodily experience, they are therefore accessible to any embodied person—not just to those who have learned to use their bodies to make music to high levels of refinement. Equally important to this line of reasoning, however, is the point that this bodily dimension of musical experience is not merely what conventional aesthetic theory has designated “sensual” or “visceral” or “emotional.”

More specifically, Dewey’s pragmatic conviction.

In Dewey’s words, “Things are objects to be treated, used, acted upon and with, enjoyed and endured, even more than things to be known. They are things had before they are things cognized.” (Dewey 1925b, 28; italics original).

This is Merleau-Ponty’s phrase (1962, 189). See Bowman (2004).

“The music” as consisting, for instance, in “the score,” “the work,” “the sounds,” or “the performance.”

I have advanced the argument that the claim to intrinsic value amounts, from pragmatic perspective, to a kind of nihilism. (See Bowman 2005.)

Including sociopolitical, socioeconomic, sociocultural, and more.

But again, and emphatically: this does not mean that just any way goes. “The” way is at once necessarily plural and guided by rigorous, stringent standards of care that are grounded in the exigencies of the particular situation and shared by successful practitioners.

These have familiar names: Orff, Kodaly, Gordon, Band, Jazz Education, and on and on (and on).

Or, for that matter, by more mid-range results, such as when “what works” is judged only in terms of its efficacy for school music as an end in itself.

Indeed, it may well be that these so-called (wrongly, I think) extra-musical and extra-scholastic benefits are of even greater ultimate importance than those within school with which we concern ourselves so obsessively. The ultimate “musical results” may be the kind of people we become through our musical engagements.

The passing mention given research here is clearly incommensurate with its significance. However, later chapters address the issue at length.

I doubt very much that the kind of course currently typical of graduate instruction in music education research (or, indeed, the addition of any single “course” to a predominantly technicist curriculum) would satisfy the concern raised here. However, that does not diminish in the least the importance of nurturing research-oriented dispositions in preservice music educators—at very least, the idea of teaching as informal “action research.”

See Note 17 above. Note that here I refer to musical and music educational activities, as distinct from praxis. Praxis, guided as it is by phronesis, is invariably concerned with right results.

I admit to a certain fondness for the name of a “coffee house” I once passed in Amsterdam: “Rules for Fools.” That said, it would clearly be professionally irresponsible to dismiss faith in rules altogether. Dewey suggests that it is reasonable to think of the pursuit of rules for conduct of observation and inquiry—though not as prescriptions for overt action (what those preoccupied with “what works” generally have in mind). The findings of research function, Dewey asserts, “not directly with respect to practice and its results, but indirectly, through the medium of an altered mental attitude.” (Dewey 1925a, 15).

In a word, phronesis.

(Wittgenstein 1963, §107). The “rough ground” to which Wittgenstein advocates returning is emphatically not the security of “what works.” “What works” is, rather, the ice upon which we are currently sliding.

Although music in public schools is without question one extraordinarily important concern of music education. (For elaboration of these themes, see Bowman 2000b.)
References


Chapter 2
Critically Reflective Musicianship

Roger Johnson

 Appropriately, the first ideal in any consideration of directions for music teaching and learning is about musicianship: “critically reflective musicianship.” As the first action ideal of Action for Change states, “Musical action that is fully mindful of musical results is the necessary condition of music-making and, therefore, of an effective music education” (MayDay Group 1997; see pp. xxxi–xxxvii above). On first glance this might sound a lot like the old adage “practice makes perfect,” or the well-known quip by a New Yorker when asked how to get to Carnegie Hall: “Practice, practice, practice.” Indeed, these aphorisms do represent the conventional, “commonsense” understandings of musicianship with its goal-oriented musical results coming directly from hard and persistent work.

However, “critically reflective musicianship” represents a broader vision of musical praxis and is part of a growing movement to revitalize and update musical thinking and education. Yet, the conventional understandings of music and the old habits and entrenched positions surrounding them have made it difficult for many people—often some the best trained and most experienced among them—to understand and begin to account for what has been happening in musical scholarship, music making, understanding, and teaching. This essay seeks to explore the newer and broader conceptions of musicianship, as they have been expanding rapidly in the world and are beginning to make their way, however slowly, into educational practice.

The phrases “musical action” and “musical results,” like Christopher Small’s term “musicking” (1998), point to a central and critically important realization that, as Small says,

There is no such thing as music. Music is not a thing at all but an activity, something that people do. The apparent thing “music” is a figment, an abstraction of the action, whose reality vanishes as soon as we examine it at all closely (2).

This understanding of music as an action—as a diverse, active, and multidimensional force within society—has been emerging in critical and educational circles for at least the past half century. It also runs smack up against the older and opposite
position that music is indeed a “thing,” a stance that has loomed large in Western musical culture since at least the dawn of Enlightenment and the emergence of the conception of autonomous art. Of course this “thing” is really a complex set of traditions, understandings, cultural and ideological codes, practices, and documents: the canon, the mythic composer/ancestors, the great works, the old rituals and ceremonies, the gilded concert halls and opera houses, the great conductors, divas, and virtuosi, the symphony orchestras in their nineteenth century servant garb, the music appreciation books, the cult-like teaching methods with their quest for prodigies, and the list goes on. All of these institutions and traditions are deeply, deeply entrenched. They are the foundation for most of our conventional conceptions and practices of musicianship that still remain deeply embedded, despite fundamental changes in every aspect of music making. If we are going to foster newer, refreshed, more realistic, inclusive, holistic, and creative forms of musicianship—in a phrase, “critically reflective musicianship”—this is where we have to start the process of critical reflection.

There is a deep, long-standing, and now increasingly dysfunctional divide between the historic classical music practices and the contemporary ones that draw upon a much broader range of aural, notated, analog, and digital forms of music making. Despite some progressive pockets, most educational institutions in the developed world still teach the older classical skills and conventions exclusively and in isolation from almost anything else. While these older traditions and practices are indeed important in the history of Western music, they are now only a relatively small part of contemporary music and music making. At this point, our educational models and practices represent a bizarre misfit with the contemporary world that would be impossible to imagine in virtually any other field. As a comparison, in a previous article I have suggested that this situation would be “as if the great majority of biology departments were just beginning to notice Darwin and had refused to even acknowledge the possibility of, say, genetics.” I went on to offer—with only a touch of irony—that an even clearer comparison might be to “creationism,” and that, musically speaking, our schools and colleges have indeed come to “bear an uncanny resemblance to conservative theological seminaries” (2002, 1). By this I mean that they are practicing and teaching musical understandings and skills that are self-contained, useful only within a very limited and now largely historic repertory, and are mostly inapplicable and even counterproductive for present musical applications and understandings.

The real worlds of music continue to evolve whole sets of musical and cultural practices based on the realities of contemporary global cultures, societies, media, and technologies. Music education should have been accompanying these changes, particularly over the past half century. However, since it has not and since the discontinuity is now so great, it is essential to begin first with a closer examination of classical musical practices. Here, there is one all-encompassing and overriding initial premise or even credo: Worthwhile music—worthwhile musical action, we could also say—originates from the mind of a recognized, valued, and now usually also dead, white, male composer. Music, in this view, is embodied within and transmitted directly through the form of fully notated scores. Despite Small’s objection,
these scores are “things,” texts, permanent documents with explicit instructions to
performers whose job, then, is to translate these instructions into sonic form. In this
music world, therefore, the primary act of musicianship is reading and responding
to these musical instructions. The most valuable and important musical actions are
from the past, and it is our role to repeat, reenact, and re-experience them.

A classical performance itself is not the “thing” really, though it is as close to
it as most people are ever able to get. Instead, what performers do—and what we
hear—is understood as a reproduction or representation of the “work,” a specific
realization or interpretation of it. The “great works” themselves remain in a pure,
autonomous state, unrealized, unattained, and uncontaminated. This is where the
semiotics of classical music becomes very tricky and contentious; in the present
context, it would also amount to opening a huge Pandora’s Box. I won’t do that; but
at the same time it is necessary to at least crack the lid just a little, because there are
critical issues surrounding the actions of performing, listening, and finding meaning
within this tradition, which are essential in understanding the practice and teaching
of what is conventionally regarded as musicianship.

To perform the act of transformation from score to sound, classical musicians
must be very highly trained and skilled using their voices or instruments. They must
also be very, very good music readers and very good followers of instructions. In
ensembles, they are also isolated from each other with only their own part in front
of them, dependent upon a conductor to keep them together and to make musical
sense of what they are doing. Finally performers must learn to “appreciate” the
traditions they are drawing upon and develop the formalized codes and gestures
for what is usually called “interpretation.” In a nutshell, these have been the “three
Rs” of musicianship and of music education for a very long time. At the top of
the pyramid, the best of the musicians in this tradition are indeed stunning in their
highly specialized skills, collectively perfected over several centuries, and passed on
intimately, intensely, highly selectively, person to person, beginning in childhood.
These musicians are highly trained and sophisticated intermediaries; they alone are
able to reenact the great canon of classical music for the vast majority of us lacking
the knowledge, skill, and resources to retrieve it ourselves.

Like good method actors, these performers are able to fuse some of their own
musical and emotional intelligence within the prescribed music they are playing,
maintaining at best a fine line between simulation and authenticity. The music must
sound real and convincing, but the performer can never forget what is really involved
and who is in charge. To jump the bounds of the score or put too much originality
into a performance is strongly discouraged since it runs the risk of endangering the
whole process of replication. Classical musicianship actually has a built-in check
against this sort of performer autonomy. Without written music in front of them,
or without having memorized it first, many, if not most, classically trained musi-
cians are effectively mute. They often cannot initiate an original or spontaneous
musical action on their own, unless it is written out first. Comparing such a situa-
tion to language, it would be as if people could read and could speak aloud from
a written text but were unable to initiate coherent and communicative speech on
their own. Just such a serious, debilitating language disorder exists, called aphasia
or, more specifically, “anomic aphasia” (National Aphasia Association 1988/1999). While it may be an overstatement to say that classical musicianship too often results in a form of “musical aphasia,” the analogy is certainly not that far off. Classical musicianship is generally antithetical to improvisation, even though many of the “great composers” of the past were themselves skilled at improvising. Recently, a colleague who specializes in jazz improvisation described traveling a considerable distance with a classically trained friend to try out a special piano, but the friend had forgotten to bring along her “music.” Having nothing to play, she had no choice but simply to turn around and return home.

Classical musicianship is now largely limited to, yet determined by, the ritual function of the concert. Of course, this practice has evolved over many centuries. In the Medieval and Renaissance eras, high-culture music existed almost totally within the patronage, function, and power of the church and closely related courts. Gradually, it branched into more secular public forms and functions in much the same way. By the late eighteenth century, music had come to celebrate what musicologist Rose Rosengard Subotnick (1991), paraphrasing Kant, describes as “a posttheistic belief in universal reason... operating (like Western science today) as a kind of successor to religious belief” (101). Later she notes that, after Beethoven,

Rather than constituting some transparent modes of access to a world of meaning beyond subjective human experience, nineteenth century music seems merely to crystallize Western doubts about the correspondence, or necessity of any correspondence, between human images of reality and any reality beyond those images (229).

Then comes Modernism, the final step in the process, “the severing of subjective freedom from objective reality” (Subotnick 1991, 17)—or as my friend, art historian Carol Duncan (1983/1993) puts it, “Art and discourse in the nineteenth century distorted and idealized the external world and celebrated it as Beauty. Modern art celebrates alienation from that world and idealizes it as Freedom” (179). Thus, classical music has by and large returned to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in a movement that could easily be understood as a kind of “counter-reformation,” but now with a spirit of an almost desperate nostalgia as denials, fears, and fundamentalisms of all kinds are on the rise. Or as Small (1998) says bluntly, “a concert hall is a place where middle-class white people can feel safe together” (42). In other words, this is a deeply conservative, even reactionary ideological practice, particularly when it seeks to isolate itself and exclude most other kinds of music.

The first of the three questions in the first action ideal (MayDay Group 1997, see above pp. xxxi–xxxvii) asks how the profession can focus “more on the kind of critically reflective musicianship that results in individuals who can make thoughtful and appropriate musical choices independently of a teacher or conductor?” Of course this question points squarely at the large, top down, authoritarian ensembles drawing their primary inspiration from the symphony orchestra. It is certainly one of the truly iconic institutions of musical reenactment with its uninterrupted link
directly into the center of nineteenth century musical life. Here, there are two interlocking forms of authority determining the musical results. The scores represent the distant, mythic, and sacred authority of the great composers from the past, and the conductor functions as a very visible, individual, and public embodiment of authority and power, also serving the roles of puppet master, actor, celebrity, and cleric. In the most extreme forms, conductors end up posing as direct links to, or even reincarnations of, the mythic composer himself.

The role of the conductor is also easily seen in political terms. In a moment of both irony and candor, Ben Zander, founder and conductor of the Boston Philharmonic Orchestra, said in an interview, “The conductor is the last bastion of totalitarianism in the world—the one person whose authority never gets questioned. There’s a saying: Every dictator aspires to be a conductor” (LaBarre 1998, 110). Jazz/rock guitarist Mark Worrell (2002) puts it even more bluntly: “This is an incredibly authoritarian and antidemocratic model of musical production. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the symphony itself is a mass celebration of authoritarianism—perhaps even charismatic dictatorship” (1). The orchestra with its conductor have long been interpreted as a representation or even idealization of the smooth-running capitalist organizational structure. Even relatively recently, management guru Peter Drucker used the conductor as his model for his authoritarian “new CEO.” Commenting on this proposal, researcher Richard Hackman writes, “It is the job of the conductor, Drucker proposes, and increasingly will become the job of the CEO, to directly and insistently focus each player’s skill and knowledge on the ensemble’s joint performance” (2001, xiv).

Some of the most troubling examples of the weaknesses and wastefulness of the symphony orchestra, and particularly the role of the conductor, are summarized in a fascinating study of the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra under the title Leadership Ensemble: Lessons in Collaborative Management from the World’s Only Conductorless Orchestra, written by its Executive Director Harvey Seifter and business journalist Peter Economy (2001). In an article about the project Seifter writes,

In most orchestras, the conductor directly supervises each musician; the conductor not only decides what music will be played but how it will be played as well. There is little room for the opinions or suggestions of the musicians themselves; such input is rarely solicited and even less often welcomed. Like workers reporting to an autocratic manager, orchestral musicians are expected to unquestioningly follow the direction of the—conductor—anything less invites humiliation before one’s colleagues and may be grounds for immediate dismissal.

As a result, orchestral musicians are a notoriously unhappy class of employees. Paul Judy reports that when Harvard Business School professor J. Richard Hackman studied job attitudes among people working in 13 different job groups, he discovered that symphony orchestra musicians ranked below prison guards in job satisfaction. Further, when asked about their satisfaction with opportunities for career growth, symphony orchestra musicians fared even worse, ranking 9th out of the 13 surveyed job categories. Clearly, although the results of an orchestral performance can be exceptionally uplifting, the means of attaining these results are often anything but uplifting to those whose job it is to achieve them (Seifter 2001, 1).
In his own study of collaborative teams as a newer and more effective organization model Richard Hackman notes sadly that “large orchestras continue as they always have, playing great music to be sure, but doing it in a way that leaves enormous amounts of musical talent unused on the rehearsal stage and sufficing with less engagement and commitment from musicians than they could have” (Hackman 2002, 122). Both Hackman and Seifter are deeply committed to classical music and can’t understand why it has to persist in such negative and autocratic forms. They don’t seem to fully understand or account for the older and more powerful ritualistic and reenactment functions of these institutions. To unseat the great conductors, divas, and celebrity performers and to bring classical music down into the real world as one part of the whole global fabric of music would certainly be an interesting mission, though the old guard is certainly not going to “go gentle into that good night” (Thomas 1971).

Whatever place classical music finds for itself in the twenty-first century, one thing is certain: It will continue to represent only a very small part of the totality of music and music making on the planet. Through much of the twentieth century, many new musical forms, media, and social practices have emerged to become now the dominant and increasingly global standard for what contemporary, postmodern music is all about. The term “popular” is generally used to refer to this music, though it may not be the most descriptive or inclusive term to use. Its multiple meanings in various contexts can result in imprecision and confusion. Disciplines such as ethnomusicology, popular music studies, “new musicology,” cultural studies, communication, and others have done much to explore these practices and deepen our critical perspectives of them. At this point, I don’t want to belabor the definitions or many nuances of the term “popular music.” The important point here is that, taken in the broadest and most inclusive sense, it has totally reinvented and rediscovered what is meant by musicianship. This music, these practices and understandings, should now be at the core of what we engage and teach at all levels of education.

The idea of integrating popular music into education is certainly not a new one. Many colleges and universities have courses and programs for popular music study and the music industry, though few have even begun to integrate musicianship, performance practice, and production itself into this mix. Concerning precollege music education, MENC sponsored the 1967 Tanglewood Symposium under a mandate that “music of all periods, styles, forms and cultures belongs in the curriculum. The musical repertory should be expanded to include music of our time in its rich variety, including currently popular teenage music, avant-garde music, American folk music, and the music of other cultures.” (See Cutietta 1991, 27.) After a long break, the Music Educators Journal returned to this issue in 1991. Special edition editor Robert Cutietta pointed to a central tension: “Although pop music is in most curricula it is rare to find a program that attempts to perform it with the authenticity that would be given to a Renaissance motet” (28). Popular tunes and arrangements are used in what he called a “bait-and-switch” technique by which teachers, conductors, and publishers seek to appropriate watered-down, Muzak™-like tokens of familiar tunes to recruit students back into the old, traditional
ensembles and mindsets. Commenting on Cutietta’s analysis in an article from *Popular Music and Society*, educator/scholar Daniel Newsom (1998) writes,

Cutietta’s position correctly repudiates the policy of teaching popular music by assimilation and “taste changing”; however, it overlooks what is perhaps an even more fundamental issue. At the heart of popular music’s appeal, in the words of George Lipsitz, lies “music’s inescapable identity as a social practice... [and its] pervasiveness and power as a social force” (Lipsitz ix, xii). This power, and the often apparent disorder of social practice, can seem to pose a constant threat to the classroom equilibrium preserved by the traditional hierarchy of teacher and students (3).

In a school setting, it seems that popular music is safe and nonthreatening as long as it remains caged or does not challenge the power and authority of teachers and other representatives of the social order itself. It is only through real, effective, and authentic musicianship—in Newsom’s words (1998): “the convergence of music pedagogy and popular pleasure” when “the classroom meets the garage” (2)—that the full power, experience, and meaning of popular music is found. While classical practices ritualize Victorian ideals of good manners, discretion, and stable social order, popular music often flips all of that into a carnival of youth, rebellion, and sexuality. Yet, for all of that and much more, this is the music of our time, and “critically reflective musicianship” must engage all of it directly, honestly, completely, and critically. The real question, then, is: How do we more fully facilitate and build upon that within the new musical and educational paradigms of our own time?

In her book on just this subject, *How Popular Musicians Learn* (2002), British researcher Lucy Green notes that while classical music is learned primarily through reading music, “by far the overriding learning practice for the beginner popular musician, as is already well known, is to copy recordings by ear” (60). Later she adds, “For popular and other vernacular musicians, notation is used only as a means to an end, never for its own sake, rarely to analyze music, for that is done aurally, and rarely to learn a new piece, for that is done, first and foremost aurally” (206). This strongly suggests what to most musicians is already obvious: that contemporary musical practice has indeed become vastly more aural than visual, more interactive and collaborative than prescribed. Prenotational practices have fused with those of technology, and the need for notation has simply ceased to be nearly as important as it was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Educationally speaking, too, this development gives clear evidence that much of what is now taught and learned mostly through notation—theory, musicianship, performance skills, and analysis—would be more effectively and productively done primarily aurally and through direct application. No doubt some use of visual representation would still be useful, but mostly as a way to document what is first heard. However, the limiting and disabling kind of “musical aphasia” caused by over-reliance on notation has no place in musicianship now.

The most direct and immediate applications for what we could call “the new musicianship” are certainly in creating, rehearsing, and performing music in one of the many genres of “popular music.” It can be an entirely collaborative process or can involve direction of various kinds. Generally, it is ensemble based and involves many interpersonal and interactive processes in an authentic, interactive,
and creative setting. This is the process used from the “garage band” level right on up and has many valuable educational uses. As Professor Green (2002) describes, aural skills are also an essential part of learning to play music, first by copying and then gradually developing one’s own creative differences and adaptations. The value of all of these forms of musicking is that they teach and improve musical skills while also producing exciting musical results. This is obviously applied, experiential learning at its best.

The other dimension of contemporary popular musics of all kinds is obviously the very integrated role of electronic and digital technologies. Music has been one of the media arts since the inception of amplification, recording, and broadcasting. Magnetic tape first emerged just after World War II and began to be used not just to document performances but as a creative medium in itself, like film, through editing and multitrack recording. Analog technologies—electronic instruments, synthesizers, and effects processors—evolved through the 1960s and 1970s and were then followed by the rapid expansion of digital technologies and media. Throughout this entire era, music has been one of the pioneering forms of engagement with technology and still remains in its vanguard. Contemporary music and musicianship are totally synonymous with technology, that is, fully obvious, at least to every person in the developed world under about age 40. Needless to say, technology is completely integrated within all aspects of music making, performing, listening, producing, documenting, distributing, selling, communicating, and exchanging. Most music recordings, including those of classical music, are no longer documents of performances; they are performances themselves. This is a critical difference; these technologies and media can’t be separated or fragmented from musical praxis, nor should they be excluded from education. Fortunately, this aspect of music making and learning has been making stronger inroads into education for some time now.

In the past, prior to recording, notation and score reading were deemed to be necessary tools for any in-depth analysis of music. Perhaps they were. However, now the majority of newer music—the majority of all music really—is unavailable in this form. If it were, it would just be a transcription of an actual performance or, more likely, a recording. In most cases it is clear, then, that audible documents, not scores, are the primary sources for music study. In fact, the complete history of popular musics—from folk, blues, jazz, rock to hip-hop, electronica, and beyond—is accessible only through recordings. This history cannot be read; it must be heard. It is an aural history; and this fact, combined with the increasingly aural nature of music making, can only have profound implications for music education at all levels. We must revive and deepen listening, and we must free it from dependency on notation. There is much more to hear in music than just the formal mechanics of pitch and rhythm. There are whole worlds of timbre, texture, expression, and the nuances of production and postproduction, not to mention the many ways in which music encodes and transmits social and cultural tropes, meanings, experiences, and values. Listening of this kind might even be able to re-invigorate classical music.

Anyone involved with music education knows what enormous change it will be to retool the teaching of musicianship to fit the musical realities of our time. The fact that this process has not evolved as it should have over the past 50 years is both
a continued symptom of denial and resistance and, for some, a powerful argument against starting anything new at this point. Inertia is indeed a powerful force. At the same time, it is essential to face up to the fact that most of those participating in the educational process from early childhood through graduate school—that is, the students themselves—are already completely familiar, comfortable, and deeply engaged with the music of our own time. This music is everywhere, and it is also right outside of the doors and windows of virtually every music room in the world. It is time—long past time—to open wide these doors and windows.

Like the Medieval church or Victorian concert hall, music education has long imagined itself as a citadel of quality guarding the gates against the banality of the mob, uplifting the masses with rituals of civility and good taste. Teachers and professors love being in charge, being the ones who know, guiding (and impressing) the ones who don’t, being up there on the podium, baton raised, a towering figure, firmly in control. But imagine some new scenarios: (a) students bringing in examples of the music they are listening to, sharing and discussing them with their peers; (b) musicianship labs with plenty of instruments and interactive technologies; (c) students working on tracks for their own music in the computer lab; (d) ensembles rehearsing original songs or “covers” to play for the school; (e) students working on soundtracks for videos; and (f) professional musicians visiting classes, labs, or rehearsals—as models and to offer their support. Of course, these are creative, lab/studio models: decentralized, interactive, collaborative, fostering independent musicianship, and encouraging diversity. A particularly well-developed set of examples is found in Lucy Green’s (2008) recent book *Music, Informal Learning and the School: A New Classroom Pedagogy.*

The goals of the new musicianship are clear; they come right from the real worlds of musical practice. Educators like Lucy Green, Daniel Newsom, and others have begun to sketch out the details. There are conferences, workshops, and support groups for educators. Sure, there is a lot of work yet to be done, so let’s get going.

**References**


Chapter 3
Re-thinking “Music” in the Context of Education

Marie McCarthy

Since the middle decades of the twentieth century, scholars have questioned traditional assumptions about the nature of music and musical meaning. This scholarship was conducted in various disciplines such as philosophy, anthropology, musicology, ethnomusicology, and cultural studies. Its collective findings broadened the lens through which we view music and deepened the understanding about the function of music as a human endeavor and as a sociocultural phenomenon. Beginning with the writings of Charles Seeger on music and culture (see McCarthy 1995), the inquiry was further developed by music scholars such as Alan Merriam, Christopher Small, and John Shepherd. It finally entered the discourse of music educators in the late 1970s and 1980s, beginning with the writings of Barbara Reeder Lindquist, Thomas Regelski, and Patricia Shehan Campbell, and culminating more recently in a praxial approach to music education that is advocated by numerous scholars, including Wayne Bowman (1998, 2005), David Elliott (1995, 2005), Estelle Jorgensen (1997, 2003), and Thomas Regelski (2004).

The vantage point from which music is viewed by educators is changing, at least at the theoretical level, from music as “work” or object to be performed or consumed to seeing music as action, evident in phrases such as “to music,” “music-making,” “musicking,” or “musicing.” In the process, the contexts in which music making occurs become central to the meaning of music. For example, no longer is it sufficient to view the meaning of a piece of music narrowly through a notational analysis exclusively; the notation serves as one source of evidence in accessing the historical context, performance practices, and meanings of the performed work over time.

With this in mind, music educators are asked to re-conceptualize the way they hear and see music, that is, to attend to new aspects of a musical event; to listen for new levels of meaning from the sounds in context; to look with new eyes at the interaction of participants, place, and sound; to acknowledge the human values that are transmitted in the act of music making; and to acknowledge the role of cultural and social contexts as an integral part of embedded musical meaning.
Engaging with these various levels of musical meaning has presented challenges to music educators, sometimes technical and practical, other times philosophical. For example, if music educators focus on the social and cultural dimensions of musical meaning and value, then time and energy devoted to these aspects may detract from the development of high performance standards; or, accommodating the belief that the integration of social and cultural contexts into the study of music is indeed within the purview of music educators, and not exclusively the work of social studies, history, or literature teachers. Such statements can cause tension if one accepts that musical meaning is immanent and fixed. One of the underlying ideals of the MayDay Group is that the scope of musical meaning encompasses a broad spectrum of musical, sociocultural, psychological, and spiritual dimensions: “The social and cultural contexts of musical actions are integral to musical meaning and cannot be ignored or minimized in music education” (MayDay Group 1997, pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume).

Taking into account social and cultural contexts is complex, given “the messy and contradictory culture of real life” (Nieto 1999, 48). Nieto continues to explain this complexity by stating that culture is not static, and cultures are always hybrid and multifaceted; embedded in context; influenced by a broad array of social, economic, and political factors; full of inherent tensions; and constantly being constructed by human beings (Nieto 1999, 48–56). Add to that the complexity of the music classroom, a site of multiple subcultures based on ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, religious tradition, and generational difference. A teacher who commits to teach music with its many-layered meanings undertakes an exciting and challenging journey.

Roots of Contemporary Music Education Practice

The values and meanings of music are situated in the lives, needs, beliefs, and artistic traditions of a particular group at a particular point in time. Yet, as music in public education evolved since the middle of the nineteenth century, its connections with the functions and practices of music in society weakened (Kaplan 1966; McCarthy 2002). The wealth of musical traditions in the culture at large was not tapped or integrated into the school curriculum. Rather, the institution of music education narrowed its focus and aligned its values with the transmission of Western art music, in keeping with the goals of general education that advanced “the best of the West.” Thus, school music education reproduced the values of a narrow, albeit socially and culturally powerful, stratum of society. In the process, it minimized the human dimensions of music transmission, ignoring the fact that, “Fundamentally, music is something that people do” (Elliott 1995, 39), and presented music to students devoid of its origins in social and cultural contexts. The aspects of music transmission that came to be valued were: standardization, technical virtuosity, competition, classical music repertoire, aesthetic idealism, individual musical talent and achievement, and development of musicianship based on the model of the professional musician.
On the one hand, this is a criticism of how music developed in education. On the other, one must acknowledge that the values espoused by music educators in the past were in accord with the values of the greater society, that is, the goal of transmitting art music was seen as noble, valuable, and appropriate for increasing one’s cultural capital and gaining access to the delights of middle-class respectability. As the practices of music in education became more entrenched in and reflective of the values of one social stratum, however, the music curriculum brought to students a kind of music that was for the most part beyond their realm of experience and unrelated to their everyday lives. This cannot be viewed entirely negatively, since one of the purposes of education is to introduce students to content and experience that their life circumstances do not provide. Thus, introducing students to music that was deemed “good” and that they were not going to perform or hear in their homes or communities was a worthwhile goal in itself.

The music curriculum, however, did not place a similar emphasis on educating students to perform, understand, or evaluate the music that surrounded them in their daily lives. Predominant educational practices were instead supported by a philosophy of music education that explained and rationalized the values of teaching music from an aesthetic perspective. It was not until the middle decades of the twentieth century that the music of minority groups, popular music, and the musical expressions of all peoples began to be accepted as appropriate for inclusion in school music programs. In recent decades, albeit in small, incremental steps, the musical worlds of school children have been opened up to the sounds of non-Western musical cultures, and connections are beginning to be made with the music that students value, popular music.

The shift from a teacher-centered, high-art focus to a more egalitarian, student-centered orientation highlights several issues about musical and educational values. In the past, musical values were typically rooted in the widespread music conservatory system, and the music curriculum was implemented by classically trained music teachers. In the context of early twenty-first century education, musical values in education are increasingly motivated by multiple sources—political democracy, cultural policies, mass media, arts advocacy, social justice campaigns, school communities, and not least the individual musical preferences of teachers and students. The presence of these various sources is indicative of the breakdown of monolithic value systems, the demise of cultural hegemony, and the emergence of a worldview that acknowledges diverse ways of being musical. The goodness and value of individual music cultures are acknowledged in the multiple ways in which music functions in the everyday lives of people, whether it is their quest for freedom, celebration of rites of passage, rebellion against social injustice, gratitude for divine intervention, or transmission of cultural heritage in the telling of a story.

The transition from endorsing one set of values based on a limited number of musical traditions to one that seeks to value all musics, regardless of social, cultural, or historical circumstances, requires monumental change in the assumptions and structures that underlie curriculum. In any transition, it is important to bring forward those aspects of traditional practice that remain relevant to and valuable for achieving curricular goals. One of the primary strengths of music education in the
United States is its performance tradition, particularly in the context of ensembles at the secondary level. Should this tradition be challenged to integrate the social and cultural contexts of music into instruction, and if so, what impact will these have on maintaining its norms of excellence? In performance programs, there is already an implied goal of life-long participation in music; furthermore, band programs serve an important social function in the school and community. While these arguments are valid, ensembles serve but a small fraction of the secondary school student population and are limited to a specialized, albeit important, function of music in education.

The larger issue of the role of music in the general education of all students at various school levels is central to any discussion of musical value in education. In considering the topic of general music in contemporary education, we might ask: What are the meanings that various groups (general educators, students, music teachers, school principals, parents, policy makers, etc.) bring to music education, and how are those meanings reflected in contemporary curriculum? What provisions are made for the music education of the life-long amateur of music as well as that of the professional? What programs serve to provide a general as well as a specialized music education? In what ways is the music teacher prepared to be a teacher of general music, who understands and is able to transmit the social and cultural values of music? Can a praxial approach provide a unified philosophy that applies equally to the general and special aspects of music education? (McCarthy 2004).

**Standing at the Crossroads of Tradition and Change: Paving a Way Forward**

Traditions that developed around Western music education are rooted in aesthetic theories. Such traditions can be described using a number of sources that include school music textbooks, academic music and music education textbooks, research studies, and policy statements. The present purpose is to stand at the crossroads of tradition and change, as it were, and to explore how traditions associated with music education practice can be expanded to pave the way for a more comprehensive and global music education.

I have identified four traditions that have come to be associated with school music: priority given to musical works, preference for classical repertoire, emphasis on developing performance skills, and commitment to the values and practices of conservatory models of instruction. When students come to view music as synonymous with the notated work, their relationship to music as human expression is reduced and misguided. The teacher can lead students to understand the score as a starting point for exploring the uniqueness of a piece by examining it for clues about its origin and development. Different arrangements of a piece can be compared to show how music is dynamic and flexible. In a tradition that is orally transmitted, versions of the same tune can be compared in the context of who performed them, in what social context, and for what purposes. In cultures where the concept of a
notated musical “work” does not exist, students can examine how music is transmitted in the absence of a standardized notation system.

As school music repertoire began to include orally transmitted traditions in the curriculum as part of the multicultural education movement from the 1970s forward, problems arose when traditional pedagogy was used to transmit such music. A second challenge lay in identifying appropriate literature. When repertoires are notated, they are more easily classified and graded in terms of difficulty levels. This important pedagogical aspect has been missing when teachers approach other traditions, unless they learn the music from a tradition bearer who transmits this vital information as part of the instructional process. In sum, it is evident that “music literacy” takes many different forms depending on the cultural context; it is not limited to “reading music.”

In efforts to teach music from different traditions, music educators have come to a deeper understanding of the role of context in the meaning and transmission of a piece of music.

As already noted, perhaps the strongest legacy of school music in the United States is its performance tradition. This tradition is surrounded by a set of values and practices, among them: technically high standards, emphasis on product, dominance of competition, hierarchies and structures similar to professional ensembles, and rankings and ratings that classify and evaluate individuals and groups. The closest pedagogical and cultural models to school music performing ensembles are those found in higher education. Thus students move with ease from secondary- to college-level ensembles. This system of ensembles, which is deeply rooted in the professional music world, is one model for developing musicianship and musicality in children and youth. The challenge for the future is to develop new models that achieve the same goal, models grounded in the social and cultural contexts of the musical practices they represent—from steel drum to Ghanaian drumming groups, Irish traditional music to gamelan ensembles, or mariachi to popular music bands. The structures for setting up such groups are already in place—for example, in community schools or cultural centers. A successful juxtaposition of traditional, classically based ensembles and alternative school music groups would highlight the social and cultural aspects of musical meaning and revitalize the role of music in school and community culture.

**Connecting Students to Multiple Musical Worlds**

At no other time in the history of music education, has there been access to such a variety of world music as there is today. This situation results from a political climate that recognizes the benefits of cultural diversity, an educational system that nurtures it, and a technological world that facilitates it. Furthermore, global musical trends reflect increased amateur and community music making, collaboration among musicians across the world, increased consumption of music, and growth of hybrid musical genres. As cultural conditions change and music career opportunities
 afforded by technology increase, the scope of musical engagement expands. The traditional worlds of performer, listener or consumer, teacher, and composer are complemented by an ever-increasing range of music career choices such as media mixer, advocate, software designer, community musician, or web manager.

How can school music experiences motivate and educate students to participate in this rich musical culture and in the process help them find musical contexts that match their musicianship strengths and interests? Music teachers need to be aware of the networks, media, and music making that surround students in their everyday lives. That includes being conversant in musical languages and cultures other than those of classical music, connected with musicians in the community who can play a role in music education, and participating in music beyond a teacher’s primary musical culture.

At a more practical level, perhaps the most important goal is to help all students gain access to their own musicianship, a topic that is developed convincingly by Thomas Regelski in his book, *Teaching General Music in Grades 4–8: A Musicianship Approach* (2004). Regelski advances a theory of action learning for pragmatic musicianship that focuses on “real-life uses of music in everyday life” (ix). Performing, listening, and creating activities are built around developing musical skills and dispositions and empowering students as musicians. It is here in the act of musicking that students work with the materials of the art form and shape, conceptualize, or recreate with those materials. In addition, introducing students to the worlds of the composer, critic, manager, advocate, conductor, CD cover artist, or technician transmits the value that musicianship can be expressed in a variety of ways. As a complementary exercise in broadening students’ awareness of music in everyday life across cultures and historical eras, the teacher can present music so that students see its function and value to those who create and perform it. This has the effect of humanizing the musical “work” and providing opportunities to examine the relationships among music, media, and the norms and values that maintain it.

The diversity of social, cultural, and musical backgrounds and values interacting in the music classroom are central to curriculum development. The generational difference between teacher and students is the most obvious, reflected in the musical preferences and experiences of both generations. The difference does not stop at the level of the music itself; it includes the way the music is presented to the listener, listening habits involved, and the lifestyle and values that surround the listening. Research findings show how deeply connected youth are to popular music, and the powerful role it plays in their lives (North et al. 2002; MacDonald et al. 2002). When popular music is brought into the realm of school music, its context changes. The question of how it can function in school culture is a challenging one that needs input from the students themselves. The overall goal is to bring students to a place where they can see popular music for what it is, a significant expression of certain cultural and social norms and values. The cultural background of students is a second area of diversity in the classroom. A teacher is required to accommodate and interact with a broad range of cultural values and practices. In the music class, there is opportunity to integrate such diversity into the curriculum, capitalizing on student and community musical resources and expertise.
In addition to acknowledging diversity in the class and school culture, it is imperative to induct students into new musical cultures, those that originate in different parts of the world, and in different time eras. The frames of reference used to study and engage with music of their own generation and cultures can be used to introduce the new and unfamiliar. For example, basic drumming techniques can be used to perform rhythms from Ghana, Ireland, or Egypt. The music of celebration studied in the classroom and at the local level can be used as a basis for studying music as celebration in Bali, Japan, or Brazil.

One of the challenging and exciting aspects of presenting music of different cultures is the rate at which traditional music is changing. Musicians encounter musics of other cultures and integrate aspects of it into their own practices. Music also travels in the form of recordings, notations, and performers. Mass media are capable of disseminating music and their attendant cultures across the globe swiftly and efficiently. Such realities can serve the teacher in multiple ways. They illustrate that musical culture is dynamic; creative energy moves a tradition forward, and improvisation is at the heart of musical development. By their direct participation in a tradition, students can add to it, even direct its course of development. In this way, they can see themselves as creative musicians and their actions as interconnected with the larger world of music making.

Re-inventing Tradition: Music Education in Tune with Music in Contemporary Life

The philosophy of school music advocated in this chapter, and by many contemporary scholars of music education and related fields of study, demands an approach that is focused on students performing music, meeting musicians from various traditions and music careers, simulating music contexts from life outside the school, and learning about and experiencing the infinite variety of ways in which students can engage with music. In this approach, music instruction is likely to be relevant to students’ interests and skill levels, true to contemporary trends in musical culture, and flexible in its responses to change in that culture. In place of focusing on a canon of set musical works, it gives priority to performing a multiplicity of pieces from a variety of cultural sources. Music is conceived of as a verb and action word (musicing/musicking) rather than as a noun and static object (musical work). The inference is that music instruction will be more vital and students will be more motivated to learn, since pedagogy is focused on the tangible qualities that are concrete, visible, and in keeping with the values, lifestyle, and expectations of learners in the twenty-first century.

In general education today, the demand for relevant learning material, concrete results, measurable outcomes, and clear benefits to the consumer (that is, learner) represent values that are embedded in school culture. While these values are real and worthy and comprehensive, they do not directly address the more profound human needs that participation in arts can provide—the intangible, mystical
qualities beyond the realm of verbal discourse. As music educators, we are challenged to incorporate these qualities of musical experience into instruction: the spiritual, which connects humans to a divine source; the therapeutic, which assists in the healing process; and the psychosocial, which facilitates the bonding of human beings and the achievement of self-actualization. The negotiation of the two realms of experience—the concrete and the humanistic—was addressed by the MayDay Group: “Music educators must have... a theoretical foundation that unites the actions of producing music with the various contexts of those actions, so that musical meaning appropriately includes all of music’s humanizing and concrete functions” (MayDay Group 1997; pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume).

If practicing music teachers seek to redefine “music” in education, then teacher education programs must also take the lead on this task. The theoretical foundations underpinning typical contemporary programs do not prepare teachers for implementing a curriculum based on the principles described above. In addition, the structures of school music education need to be expanded to give priority to general music programs, education of the amateur musician, and introduction of alternative ways of engaging students in music making. Ongoing interaction between music teacher educators and school personnel will in large part determine the direction and the success of this expanded definition for music in education. The goal of attuning music in education to music in society at large is both grand in scope and powerful in consequence. The roots of school music traditions are often disconnected from the dynamic sociocultural force we call “music”; they can be revitalized by drawing on the wellsprings of music in the daily lives of students, teachers, and communities, from local to global.

References


Chapter 4
Musicianship, Musical Identity, and Meaning as Embodied Practice

David G. Hebert

Music making and the imparting of musical understandings and techniques entail deeply personal experiences that largely remain in the realm of the ineffable, characterized by seemingly irreconcilable dichotomies: introspective yet communal, traditional yet innovative, and disciplined yet liberating. The preceding verse is derived from phenomenological writings produced during my experience of conducting the All-State Band of Connecticut Independent Schools in 2008. It was my attempt to express poetically the sense of heightened awareness, immediacy, and intensity of the awesome challenge of effectively leading a large ensemble toward attainment of a higher level of musical performance. Increasingly, each musical experience such as this one has bolstered my belief that music education should focus on the objective of fostering a critical, flexible, and comprehensive musicianship among students, and that research must seek to more effectively address the phenomena of

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subjectivity and meaning in musical experience. However, in the United States and in other nations, an array of political factors currently stands in the way of those who would teach music for the purpose of musically empowering their students, while various disciplinary ideologies hinder the advancement of innovative approaches to research and teaching practice.

Wind bands, choirs, and orchestras have long served as a staple of school music education in the United States, but this large ensemble model has for good reason met criticism in recent years as progressive music educators contemplate ways that music education might be re-envisioned in order to become more effective and meaningful in students’ musical lives in, outside of, and after graduation from school. Questions have been raised regarding the extent to which large performance ensembles might or should continue to hold a prominent position in the future of school music education. Specifically, what are their unique advantages, and what of importance is missing from the typical large ensemble experience that might be imparted through the use of new approaches or even entirely different forms of music teaching?

Through reflecting on Ideal #2, this chapter will offer some suggestions for reconceptualizing the connections between music in schools and communities. The aesthetic traditions referred to in Ideal #2, “with their claims that musical meaning and value transcend time, place, context and human purpose and usefulness” (pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume) fail to acknowledge the intimate connection between music and its social and cultural contexts and conditions and, therefore, do not fully account for music and music making as situated in local communities (that is, outside of schools) and communities of musical practice (that is, which are distinguished by the musicianship and other skills and cognitions that characterize particular musics). Recommendations regarding issues are proposed for careful consideration in the development of future music education policy and pedagogy.

Musicianship, Schooling, and Cultural Context

Over 30 years ago, in an article in the Music Educators Journal entitled “Music Education in a Changing Society,” then MENC president Charles Benner (1975) expressed his concern that “there is still a wide gap between existing goals and practice” within American music education (p. 35). From reading the discourse of music and music education academics and administrators, one may get the impression that this predicament is a perennial problem; yet perhaps the situation has never been as dire as some have imagined. Surely the opposite would be far worse: not having such ambitious and lofty dreams for our music students and finding that we have no sense of how to improve the field. Particularly in the last two decades, the field of music education has been enriched by the rapid growth of philosophical inquiry into a vibrant subfield of music education scholarship. Philosophers thrive on problems, deriving fulfillment from spinning arguments that sometimes seem destined to remain only in the realm of theory, perhaps never to be fully realized. On the other hand, those who focus their efforts on effecting actual changes in practice are
sometimes viewed as doing work that is less sophisticated and scholarly in nature, even when it clearly leads to improvements. Meanwhile, the field of school music education continues to evolve, sometimes aligned with, and at other times quite distant from theoretical or scholarly thinking.

Action Ideal #2 (pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume) seeks to inspire positive change by emphasizing the highly relevant themes of musicianship and cultural context, both of which are areas of great importance.

This, as with the other action ideals, raises many provocative points that invite the interpretations that are the focus of this book. The concepts of “balance” and “connection” are useful starting points for this discussion. The writers of Ideal #2 have suggested that a balance needs to be maintained in music instruction between the objectives of instilling “musicianship and musicality” and an understanding of the “human needs and contexts” to which musical values are inextricably connected. They also assert that the “situatedness of musical practices” that is ignored or rejected by traditional aesthetic theories needs to be properly acknowledged and that “hypothesized and ephemeral aesthetic qualities” should be replaced as a foundation for music education by an emphasis on “tangible qualities of musicianship” that, in contrast, provide a “basis for teaching, learning, and evaluating music-making.” The position advocated in this statement is partly based on a recognition that the kinds of musical offerings traditionally provided in American schools have often failed to represent the cultural diversity of surrounding communities on which they have also often had little impact. “School music,” following the premises of aestheticism, is thus often viewed by music educators as transcending the “time, place, context, and human purpose and usefulness” mentioned in Ideal #2 and, instead, is “for itself” and fails to “connect” with, or have a consequential impact on the musics outside the schoolhouse doors.

However, school music does not lack precedents of going beyond aestheticism and, thus, of addressing musical pluralism. Multicultural education and multicultural music education, in particular, are movements that have addressed this challenge, especially since the late 1980s (Banks 2008, Campbell 2004, Campbell et al. 2005). More recently, popular music pedagogy also has built on the trajectory pioneered by multicultural music education and jazz pedagogy (Green 2008, Hebert in press). Nowadays, music from diverse cultures is much more widely encountered in general music programs at the elementary school level, and there are indications that the music curriculum is changing considerably in response to societal shifts in recent years (Barrett 2007, Campbell 2007). Perhaps the greatest challenge remaining for multicultural music education is within the domain of secondary instrumental music education programs, which for many communities continues to consist exclusively of traditional school bands performing standard Euro-American educational repertoire, including Westernized arrangements of traditional musics. The concepts of balance and connection will be particularly useful when we consider the relationship—or lack of one—between musical practices in schools, the pluralistic musical practices in local communities, and the distinctive communities of practice that produce those musics. Action Ideal #2 provides important “food for thought” regarding all these considerations and relationships.
Fundamentalism and Its Discontents

It is useful to begin by identifying the problem that serves as a rationale for the argument that will follow: What happens when the objective of fostering a relevant, flexible, and creative musicianship on the part of students does not always serve as the central aim of music education, and when musical identities and meanings are imposed, instead, from above? One answer may arguably be found through examination of various musical challenges afflicting American society today, some of which are implied by the aforementioned action ideal. On this note, it seems reasonable to suggest that American music education has until recent years suffered from a kind of “fundamentalism.” Fundamentalism has been defined as “any belief or policy that promotes a return to basic principles and founding doctrines; most commonly associated with religious movements in Christianity and Islam” (Rohmann 2002, 152). In other words, it is a belief or policy that promotes reliance on assumed basic principles and uncritically accepted doctrines as “the” best or only premise for action. Fundamentalism in religion typically insists that there is a single correct way of interpreting how the words of prophets from a strikingly different culture more than 2000 years in the past should be understood and applied to particular situations in one’s own life: All other possibilities are ignored or rejected.

A fundamentalist attitude in music may similarly assert, equally uncritically, that the music of European royal courts and high society from more than a century in the past is “naturally” more significant and worthy of study than other forms of music: All other musics are less profound and less civilized. Extending this interpretation, one might acknowledge that traditional aesthetics and the resulting “music is for itself” aestheticism referred to in Ideal #2 have functioned as a kind of theology for what might be called “musical fundamentalists,” guiding the rationalization of their passionate views. Even in the twenty-first century, such “canonic” positions are advocated by a handful of scholars who occupy powerful positions in their fields. Recent books by philosopher Roger Scruton (1999, 2000) and music educator Robert Walker (2007) may be interpreted as a last desperate gasp of this form of musical fundamentalism or neoconservativism—the kind that tells the masses what is “good for them” on the grounds that they lack adequate bases for judgments of their own—thus exiting in a manner reminiscent of T. S. Elliot’s verse, “not with a bang but a whimper.”

Yet, the world has rapidly changed. The imperfect reality of European art music, the community of practice that sustains it, and its dubious claims of universal relevance, and “for its own sake” aestheticism are increasingly critiqued in both scholarly and popular culture representations (Brown and Volgsten 2006, Tindall 2005). It is difficult to imagine music scholars of a younger generation advocating fundamentalist positions so contrary to the pluralistic world we have all experienced, in which much of the profound artistry associated with many creative performers of popular music (and non-Western traditions) is undeniably self-evident. As Campbell et al. (2005) have observed, in many parts of the world music teachers now face
“a generation of students for whom cultural diversity in music is almost as common as cultural diversity in food for the previous generation” (p. v). Still, music education has not accommodated this diversity as much as it could or should if it is to claim to be relevant to the pluralistic world of music and musical options that exist outside the schoolhouse doors.

Despite the obvious risks associated with any predictions of the future, I am convinced future historians will look back on the state of early twenty-first century American music education policy with a sense of bewildered curiosity. They will note that during the politically and socially divisive era of the George W. Bush presidency, many leaders of our field supported an extraordinarily misguided agenda in diametric opposition to the scholarly discourse of music education, placing greater emphasis on patriotism (for example, lists of patriotic songs to be included in curriculum) than on creative musicianship; on “advocacy” for programs that are outdated and unresponsive to the needs of society rather than on reflection and renewal (in terms of both improved relevance and effectiveness); and on dogmatic adherence to a prescriptive national standards-based curriculum rather than flexible programs rooted in student-centered learning (Brown and Volgsten 2006, Gee 2002, Hebert 2006, Heller 2005, Regelski 2002).

Fortunately, historians may at the same time look upon early twenty-first century American music education practice with entirely different impressions. While the positions of music education organizations may currently be more misguided than at other points in history, examples can be cited of important developments in the areas of both research and practice (for example, McPherson 2006, McCarthy 2002). While some critics insist music is under siege in American schools, there are programs that exemplify important success stories, as visionary school teachers eschew fundamentalist dogma to pioneer intuitive approaches. Thus, in the hands of innovative thinkers and teachers, there are hopeful indications that school music education is gradually improving on many fronts in the United States, in spite of its leadership. Such is the story of how marimba ensembles and both instrumental and vocal jazz ensembles have attained such high levels of achievement in the Pacific Northwest, as mariachi ensembles have also done in the Southwest, while the creative use of music technologies is embraced in the Great Lakes states, and Gospel choirs and innovative popular music programs forge notable new paths in various urban centers nationwide.

Still, it is important to note that in the United Kingdom, Scandinavia and Australasia, school music education programs have for decades emphasized, particularly innovative approaches to creative musicianship, including song writing and composition, the widespread use of new technologies, and performance of popular music on characteristic instruments in schools. The United States has lagged in some of these areas, but has pioneered new approaches in other domains, such as improvisation (within school jazz ensembles) and multicultural music education. Whether these new approaches are ultimately accepted at the national level remains to be seen. These examples are hopeful indicators, however, of positive innovation and are certainly in tune with the Action for Change agenda at stake in this book.
Rethinking School Music Ensembles

One section of the Ideal #2 questions the “standards of musicianship and musicality in music education” that “can be guided by traditions associated with aesthetic theories while still emphasizing the situatedness of the musical practices.” This brings us to consideration of the kinds of musicianship traditions actually promoted in most American school music programs. Many recent innovations in music education have been at least partly inspired by the conviction that traditional school ensembles provide inadequate educational opportunities to students. Particularly in North America, the phenomenon of school bands represents a notable example of institutionalized music with increasingly dubious connections to the reality of community music practices. Patrick Jones (2008) has recently observed that “Band music is no longer the popular music of the day, the utility of school bands in the community has been diminished, the educational climate is not conducive to their continuance as historically conceived” and even warned that “if we fail to transform it and ourselves, the school band, as we have known it will either limp along as a quaint anachronism or be eliminated altogether (14).”

It is important here to recognize that the typical American approach to music education is unique compared with the educational systems of most other nations, where bands, choirs, and orchestras are extracurricular activities and where general music education (sometimes called “classroom music”) is offered not only at the elementary but also at the intermediate and secondary levels of schooling. There may be advantages to these other approaches. On the other hand, Pitts (2008) observes that in the United Kingdom, “the role of extra-curricular music [ensembles] appears to be particularly crucial in shaping attitudes to music that are carried into later life, and offers one of the strongest points of connection with the independent musical development that young people engage with out of school (14).” This finding appears to suggest that classroom music alone may be insufficient to inspire lifelong music participation, or at least that extracurricular performance ensemble offerings may be more appealing to certain students within such educational systems.

Let’s return for a moment to the verse used at the opening of this chapter. While it seems clear from the first stanza that, as conductor (perhaps like many ensemble directors), I am earnestly seizing the intensity of each moment in the rehearsal described, it is entirely possible that the fourth-chair Third Clarinet player is not in the slightest experiencing that musical intensity, as she incessantly blows through the repetitive and uninteresting passages, failing to grasp how each fits into the fabric of the ensemble and the larger or holistic experience of the piece, and how (or whether) we are collectively progressing “ever nearer to ideal.” Despite my careful choice of repertoire and eager efforts to provide inspiring conducting and effective instruction, such inherent limitations associated with the fundamental structure of this instructional vehicle demonstrate that large ensembles are simply not conducive to the learning of much of what really matters in music. Learning the notes for the next concert is not a proper “curriculum”; rather, the music should promote musical experiences that are the bases of personal musicianship and of future choices
that such musicianship makes possible. For example, the music I have chosen for this concert, although interesting and relatively unusual for the wind band idiom, is surely not what most students would consider to best fit their musical preferences. Given such scenarios, should we continue to confidently assure ourselves that the relevance of bands can be salvaged, or should school bands be reinvented or revitalized through creative agency on the part of visionary teachers?

My recent research has considered this question from various angles, proceeding with the recognition that much remains unknown to instrumental directors regarding various band music traditions and hybrid genres throughout the world (Hebert 2008a, b, c). My findings suggest that the reality of “community band” activity is actually remarkably diverse, but that the typical American school band does not even begin to represent the global musical diversity that can be encountered through even this one specific group of traditional instruments. Still, the question remains of whether (or to what degree) traditional European wind, percussion, and string instruments alone can adequately represent the diverse world of contemporary music, particularly considered in terms of student interests and musical identities. Elsewhere, I have attempted to demonstrate ways that even very young students may be empowered to become creative improvisers and songwriters in multicultural hybrid genres, such as jazz and rock music (Hebert in press). Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, music teachers at the secondary level are now widely encouraged to step back and let students organize and operate their own music ensembles based on personal interests (Green 2008). We still have much to learn from both successes and shortcomings of such approaches.

While composition is notably absent from most American school music programs, the inclusion of such genres would provide further opportunities for creative music making of the kind more commonly encountered in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Meanwhile, in the United States the field of choral music is already experiencing pioneering developments that greatly exceed that of instrumental music in terms of the new connections being forged with local communities and musics outside of the traditional canon. Consider the innovative work of Mary Goetze with the “International Vocal Ensemble” at Indiana University (Goetze 2008), or Horace Clarence Boyer’s work with Gospel music at University of Massachusetts (Boyer 2008), or Jane Wilburn Sapp’s outreach activities in Atlanta and elsewhere (Sapp 2008).

Musical Identity and Agency in Music Education

As Ideal #2 prompts us to reflect further on the relevance and “situatedness” of school music programs, the concepts of identity and agency are useful in framing the process by which the musical self is both externally and internally defined through its negotiation of the expectations and constraints of society or communities within the larger society. In the words of philosopher Mark Johnson (1994), “human beings are not fixed quasi-objects that have an independent prior identity and then go about making choices from which they are distanced. We are, rather,
beings in process whose identity emerges and is continually transformed in an ongoing process of reflection and action (148).” Identity is also comprised largely of the personal narratives that one constructs to make sense of both past experiences and present challenges.

Music plays an important role in identity construction, especially of adolescents. But while the theme of “musical identities” has long been of interest to ethnomusicologists, it has only recently become a major concern in music education (due, in part, to the rise of multicultural music education, as well as the pioneering efforts of music education scholars, such as Max Kaplan (1993) and Brian Roberts (1993)). Some critical questions associated with identity in music education include: (a) Who are our students and what is their music?; (b) Whose music are we teaching?; and (c) How can we bridge the gap between our students’ present musical choices and experiences and the cultural distinctiveness, qualities, and other values of the musics we hope to help them understand, value, and thus choose to avail themselves of after they leave us?

Some answers are pointed to by Johnson (1994) who writes that the self “develops its identity by inhabiting characters embedded within socially shared roles and by creatively appropriating these roles, even to the point of co-authoring new ones (151).” Thus it is useful to recognize that musical activities are unusually rich in terms of the diverse kinds of musical identities they engender, opening many possibilities in this regard. The musics encountered in schools—often selected for students by their teachers—shape identity and thus influence the “musical selves” that students are always “becoming” through their present and future choices. This, in the spirit of Ideal #2, is perhaps the most direct aspect of music’s situatedness and of its value beyond “for-itself” kinds of aestheticism. Music is for self and collections of selves—or communities of musical practice—as embodied experience.

The notion of “communities of practice” (see, for example, Wenger 1998) is thus a useful concept for considering the role school programs can play in the musical identity formation of students. Elsewhere, I also applied this concept from the cognitive and social sciences to the field of music education. At the risk of oversimplification, the notion of communities of practice suggests in essence that through engaging in social practices we learn and gain acceptance into social groups in which these practices are both valued and nurtured. Music, of course, involves just such communities of practice, whether they consist of those who value certain musics over other kinds or the various communities whose musicianship practices define a particular music or even bring it into being to begin with (for example, different communities of practice or taste within the world of rock music, or different drumming traditions). Then there are also communities of practice that put music to use, through personal and social agency, but also in the service of social and economic ends—everything from religious music to entertainment, dance music to advertising. This perspective is also consistent with “practice” theories of contemporary anthropology that highlight the role of power within culture (for example, Ortner 2006).

One advantage of the communities of practice concept in contemporary social theory is that it enables us to more clearly recognize the role of subjectivity in
experience, as we contemplate the larger implications of both our actions and our interpretations of them. In contrast to a typical understanding of subjectivity as consciousness of one’s perceived states of mind, Ortner (2006) defines subjectivity anthropologically as “a specifically cultural and historical consciousness,” and suggests that “to ignore it theoretically is to impoverish the sense of the human in the so-called human sciences” because such subjectivity is “a major dimension of human existence (110).” Ortner (2006) also sees subjectivity as “the basis of ‘agency,’ a necessary part of understanding why and how people (try to) act on the world even as they are acted upon (110).” Essentially, through their agency, individuals challenge, problematize, and thereby contribute to the collective modification of social structures—including communities of practice of all kinds, at all levels of society—from which their personal narratives and identities emerge. Subjectivity is, therefore, a central ingredient of creative agency in music.

What implications does such a theoretical perspective have for the development of critical and creative musicianship among our students? Despite widespread resistance to the idea within higher education, we know it is possible to be a highly competent performer, composer, and scholar in more than one musical tradition. This is evident from the lives of historical figures such as Bela Bartok, Ralph Vaughan Williams, Percy Grainger, and even medieval musician Hildegard von Bingen, as well as contemporary examples such as Gunther Schuller, Bobby McFerrin, Maria Schneider, Yo-Yo Ma, Wynton Marsalis, Libby Larsen, Zakir Hussain, and the list goes on. Such models can serve to inspire us to instill in our students comparably flexible and imaginative dispositions, open to the exploration of new identities via creative agency: an artistry of liberated originality without borders and beyond the reach of standardized evaluative structures. While such a musicianship might fail to attain the enthusiastic approval of contest adjudicators and conservatory fundamentalists, it would instead produce well-rounded and thoughtful individuals, critical thinkers who might contribute to society in richly diverse ways, and not only in music. For those rare individuals for whom music becomes even more than a lifelong avocation, they would have mastered the flexibility to adapt to or lead change in the ever-changing demands of the global music world. This creative musicianship and agency would enable students to see for themselves the “countless possibilities for resolution” mentioned in my opening verse and perhaps even suggest ones I had never imagined possible.

Embodiment and Meaning in Music Education

Further consideration of that “specifically cultural and historical consciousness” that Ortner associates with subjectivity, perhaps the most central aspect of music’s “situatedness,” is the role of the individual body in a particular music context. The aestheticism that follows from the traditional aesthetic theories critiqued in Ideal #2 has typically denied a role to the body. Instead, an intellectual, rationalist, or cognitive basis for aesthetic responding is advanced: the “chills” and other intense visceral responses that many people experience in connection with music are, from the
perspective of such theories, often wrongly called “aesthetic responses.” Great care is taken, therefore, to distinguish “true” “aesthetic experiences” from mere sensory or hedonistic delight, which is seen as consisting of responding in purely emotional, not aesthetic, terms (see, for example, Walker 2007).

Johnson (1994) notes, “both our concepts and our reasoning about them are grounded in the nature of our bodily experience and are structured by various kinds of imaginative processes (1).” As Johnson demonstrated (more recently and comprehensively [2007]), bodily experience plays a fundamental role in even the most abstract and seemingly disengaged forms of cognition, including our reasoning associated with ethical and artistic judgments. In fact, our most fundamental analytical concepts, rooted in metaphors, are based upon specific forms of bodily experience.

Musical experience is rooted in just such embodied metaphors, for example, consider traditional dance forms (minuet, waltz, etc.) and even the “movements” of our symphonies and references to being “moved” by music depend on such embodied meanings. Reference to “a walking bass line” only “makes sense” according to such embodied metaphors, and even references to intonation—that pitch is somehow “high” or “low”—depend in part on spatial experiences metaphorically extended to describe sound’s effect in relation to the body. Similarly, performing is intimately tied to the development of desirable habits comprising precise physical movements that correspond to an affectively attuned cognition that apprehends and guides the ongoing trajectory of movement.

Despite the positions of some traditional aesthetes, it should be clear, therefore, that musical meaning is deeply rooted in embodied experience. Musicianship is both subjective and culturally shared, and warrants being conceived in terms of embodied practice. It is not a simple accumulation of musical information and skills but the sharing of a lived practice—shared in a community of practitioners (of whatever kind of musicking is at stake) and available only within that community, since the practice in question is “defined” or “carried” collectively, not in the mind of any individual practitioner. Thus, even when we just listen to music and reflect upon it, the very nature of our reflection inevitably makes use of a host of schema derived from embodied experience. Contrary to the traditional intellectualized aestheticism that Ideal #2 seeks to overcome, the resulting embodied and subjective meaning is particularly salient due to the profundity of its role in all human meaning construction.

Music’s strong connection to emotions, and the essential role that emotions play in the human experience (see, for example, Juslin and Sloboda 2001, Nussbaum 2003), are thus issues that seem to require further consideration in relation to proposed rationales and objectives for music education. What are the implications of this process in terms of the aforementioned themes of identity and cultural diversity? One important issue to consider here is the extent to which the “meanings” of musics from diverse cultures may be apprehended and fully understood by people from outside those cultures and to consider whether a perspective that accounts for embodied meaning can also entail the flexibility necessary to accommodate musical diversity and change.
The first step in such a consideration is to take into account the convergence of musical cultures in institutional contexts—*institutionalized* communities of practice that respond as much (or more) to the demands of the institution as to influences from outside the institution. To return to an earlier concern, the danger of what was called musical fundamentalism often arises where the pronouncements of an institution’s leaders, authorities, gatekeepers (who control entrance and exit to the institution), and “mindguards” (who dogmatically defend the status quo against unacceptable practices, views, or values) take on lives of their own, often expressed as “standards.” The relevance of this danger for the various institutions of music education (not only schools, universities, and conservatories but orchestras, opera companies, music disciplines, music criticism, and all attempts to impose dogma, “canons” or “high standards” from outside the practice of music itself) should be clear.

Elsewhere I have argued that “the merging of musical cultures is a highly complex, unpredictable, and politically-charged process,” in part due to the tendencies of any musical culture to submit to fundamentalisms and institutionalization. But this should not be taken to mean that such change, such creative agency, is an unfathomable social phenomenon beyond analysis or reach (Hebert 2008a, 198). Rather, there is much to be learned from careful examination of how new musical traditions develop, which frequently results from the kind of musical hybridity (Hebert 2008b, c) that either resists fundamentalism and institutional practices or that frees itself from such static tendencies because, in the end, as a living, breathing, embodied art, musical dynamics and energies cannot be institutionalized into such “standards” or standardized practices. Studies of musical hybridity often highlight the significance of the fact that new musical traditions typically develop according to just such musical dynamics and energies that expand into an entirely new and distinct musical sensibility, whether the music of Meredith Monk, the Art Ensemble of Chicago, Tongan *fangufangau* noseflute, or the Thai Elephant Orchestra. Sound makers are guided by judgments about the values and effects of sound that arise as embodied practices within a specific sociocultural context.

The embodied basis of meaning was first suggested in the *aisthesis* (also spelled *aesthesis*), of Ancient Greece—a term that referred to knowledge directly gained through sensory experience; that is, through fully embodied experience. By the mid-eighteenth century, the idea of *aisthesis* had evolved into what became “aesthetics,” various philosophical attempts to validate sensory experiences of art and music in rational and therefore universal terms. This eventually led to the diverse aesthetic theories that arose in quite large numbers in the ensuing centuries—in effect there were, and still are, as many different theories as there are theorists—by which *aisthesis* became “rationalized” and presumed to serve as a basis for judgments of the beautiful (or, for romanticism, of the “sublime”) in art and music.

Leading postmodernist philosophers who have continued to write of “aesthetics,” for example, Foucault’s discussion of the “aesthetics of self,” Baudrillard’s “aestheticization of the whole world” (Sepp 2004, Baudrillard 1993), have tended to do so by recourse to concepts that take a postmodern approach to *aisthesis*. Moreover, it is worth noting that in recent scholarship the very notion of “music” was also increasingly reconsidered in terms of its ontological foundations. For example,
Alperson (1991), a leading aesthetician, critiqued the validity of aesthetic theory as an adequate basis for music education and was the first to propose the need for a “praxial” theory to account for all music and, thus for the word “music” in music education—a project that, among other effects, became central to The May-Day Group’s agenda of Action for Change in 1997 (pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume), with Ideal #2 taking its lead directly from Alperson.

Many scholars associated with the field of “aesthetics” continue to write about music—often, these days, in terms that are, like Alperson’s seminal paper, at odds with the kind of aestheticism objected to in Ideal #2—and it would be foolhardy to ignore such theorizing. But, just as traditional aesthetic theories of music have distanced music from the social and cultural contexts of music, so too has school music been distanced from those same contexts by its reliance on aesthetic theories (see, for example, McCarthy this volume). And the “ephemeral” aspects of such theories cannot serve as an adequate basis for planning and evaluating music learning; instead a focus on practice—communities of practice, musicianship practices, and music as personal and social agency (etc.)—provides tangible bases, while still relying on aestheticism—and particularly aisthesis in regard to the qualities and effects of sound (see Shepherd this volume)—as the source of music’s appeal and attraction.

As regards the earlier discussion of hybridity and the creation and evolution of different musics, we may recognize that musicians forging new paths in hybrid genres often are responsive to social, cultural, and musical contexts—sometimes “reflecting” such contexts (for example, rap and reggae), but sometimes steadfastly striking off in new directions (for example, Arnold Schoenberg’s dodecaphonic system, Gunther Schuller’s “Third Stream” fusion of jazz and classical music, all “crossovers” between genres, and virtually every “new” sound or sensibility in music from Elvis or the Beatles to punk and heavy metal). Such innovators often creatively negotiate between competing systems (for example, Schuller), while others “do their own thing” either without regard to existing musics or simply on the basis of “what sounds good” to them. In all cases, contrary to traditional aesthetic theory and aestheticist tendencies toward “music for its own sake,” such innovation and hybridity are inevitably rooted in the kinds of “social and cultural contexts” and “situatedness” mentioned in Ideal #2.

“Aesthetics”—understood as philosophizing or theorizing about music or other arts—comes into play when musicians actively debate (with others or themselves) which sounds best fit into the music they are creating. Otherwise, “aesthetics,” as a subdiscipline within philosophy, is propounded by aestheticicians, critics, and other scholars (for example, the “new aestheticism” in literary criticism). In any event, “aesthetics” as a scholarly field is itself always culturally situated, for example, situated within certain philosophical traditions or schools of philosophy, thus not sharing any “core” or consistent meaning for the word “aesthetic.” However, as Wayne Bowman (2000) has indicated, “Foreign musical practices are seldom completely closed books to us, and we do often succeed in catching glimpses of musical ‘sense’ even in practices with which we are not at all conversant (55).”

Music’s universal appeal may thus be taken as a sign of the possibility that aisthesis in connection with sound and its social use as music is alive and well everywhere.
in the world. The illuminating work of Stephen Davies (2003), although based primarily on consideration of European art music, also relies on his experiences with jazz and Balinese traditions. Thus, the notion of “situatedness” and the importance of social and cultural context to music and music education increasingly inform contemporary scholarship about music in the fields of philosophy, musicology, and social sciences (for example, Davies 2003, Gracyk 2007, Johnson 2007, Martin 2006).

Understanding music in terms of the social and cultural contexts in which it arises and is used certainly merits consideration within music education, but such understandings are only one component of a comprehensive music education, for example, the other action ideals in the Action for Change agenda address other important components. The issue here, in my view, is not whether “aesthetics” should be discarded from music education, but rather, how artistic understandings are best taught: whether they are to be conveyed as a kind of fundamentalist ideology (much like the way that patriotism is often imparted in schools) or as conceptual tools that students may use to articulate their preferences and empathetic understandings of the choices made by creative musicians within diverse traditions. That is why the “traditions associated with aesthetic theories” discussed in Ideal #2 are so important to acknowledge and build upon, but in the tangible terms of living musical practices. Thus, we can and should avoid throwing out the baby—the musicianship practices—with the bathwater of aestheticist fundamentalism.

Earlier, questions were raised about the central role of large ensembles in music education and the educational problems associated with them. However, the kinds of musicianship, values, and judgments that I have argued should be at the core of a comprehensive music education are difficult, perhaps impossible, to adequately address in traditional large ensembles. Such ensembles clearly offer few opportunities for individual judgments and musical independence (viz., from the director, who typically makes all musical decisions). One way of applying these ideas of comprehensive musicianship that supports the most fruitful engagement with a variety of musics is through the teaching of composition, where provocative questions from teachers can inspire the exploration of new possibilities and develop a comprehensive musicianship through the students’ own creative agency (see, for example, Hickey 2003, Wilkins 2006). New technologies are rapidly transforming all aspects of how we create and consume music, and much more can be done to empower music teachers with the ability to use such technologies to their fullest capability, enabling musical opportunities to reach greater numbers of students (see, for example, Finney and Burnard 2007, Hebert 2008d, Williams and Webster 2006). Ironically, online and virtual environments may even enable the development of a “critical virtual embodiment” that empowers and transcends the passive condition of “schizophonia”—a divorcing of musical sounds from their authentic contexts—decried by some scholars (Keil and Feld 1994). I argue that music teachers should do more to embrace innovation that promotes such comprehensive and personally useful musicianship and that music teacher educators need to set more of an example in this area for them to follow.
Leading by Example in Music Education

The scholarship of music teacher education seems to struggle for legitimacy among more powerful disciplinary peers within the academic areas of music. Regrettably, music educators often suffer from a kind of methodocentrism that prevents them from recognizing the value of research methods that differ from their own personal preferences. In this regard, the focus of such scholarship can be critiqued as too often uninformed by, and lacking the insights provided by, other perspectives and contexts. In a manner of speaking, it can be seen as distanced from actual music teaching (including the local social and cultural contexts that teachers call “the trenches” as opposed to ivory-tower theorizing) just as aestheticism is from the sociocultural contexts of music. By focusing their scholarly efforts in, or deriving guidance from, the scholarship of music theory, ethnomusicology, or historical musicology (or even from the broader field of education), music teacher educators may bring wider appreciation and acknowledgement to scholarly work also being done in the oft-misunderstood field of music education research. Thus, they not only can improve the effectiveness and relevance of their teaching (see, for example, both Palmer and Shepherd this volume) but also can attract wider appreciation of the relevance of music education research. Indeed, done well, music education research should more often be of the quality and kind that other music disciplines could draw from in advancing their theories. A related problem in research is that of allowing fascination with the latest fashionable theory to take precedence over direct confrontation of problems via rigorous studies designed around precise questions that are both unanswered and answerable. Most would agree that research should clearly address the real problems faced, and questions raised, by practicing music teachers, yet too often this seems to not be the case in our scholarly journals.

If we allow that actions tend to “speak louder than words,” it seems reasonable to suggest that no amount of theoretical argumentation regarding cultural diversity and lifelong musicianship is likely to compensate for the reality of music teachers (and teacher educators) who do not deeply experience other musical cultures and sensibilities for themselves, or who do not continue to explore music in all its richness as performers over the course of their own lives. Remarkably, some music education professors and programs actively discourage their graduate students from continuing their own music making on the assumption (stated or tacit) that “it is time for you to focus on research.” This situation leads some outstanding musicians to be justifiably uninterested in research written by “people who can’t play” and who, therefore, presumably teach from outside appropriate communities of practice and the musicianship that characterizes those practices. Most would agree that research should clearly address the real problems faced by musicians, and that a greater appreciation for the field of music education would develop if the relationship between research-based knowledge and practice were acknowledged by leading musicians.

What I have written here seems to implicate many in our profession whom I genuinely respect and admire. My point here is not to suggest that things have gone terribly wrong in our field, but rather than we should keep striving to do even better and that “action for change” is warranted—for example, following the lead of some
of the innovations and innovators mentioned earlier. It is never too late, for example, to start learning music technology, guitar, or a second language spoken in great numbers by students, or to join a community music ensemble—all of which, of course, would help “ground” a music teacher in local musical contexts. Such activities are even offered in some childcare facilities and retirement homes, which are additional local domains to which music educators should devote greater attention.

My central point here has been that music education is likely to become far more relevant and effective when we: (a) enact progressive educational policies and practices embracing musical innovation that builds on tradition and thus promotes living genres (including acceptance of creative agency via new technologies and musical hybridity); (b) forge communities of practice that directly link institutionalized school music to community music, thereby bridging the gap between it and other aspects of students’ musical identities and preferences; and (c) reconceptualize both musicianship and musical meaning as embodied practices within which “situated” understanding—critical awareness of the sociocultural contexts that give rise to a music and the practices through which it flourishes—is acknowledged as an essential component of creativity.

Implications for Policy and Practice

In recent years, music education has increasingly faced challenges associated with corporatization and commercialization, both within our educational institutions and professional organizations. As one reflects on various controversies that have impacted our field, it seems clear that more must be done to ensure integrity is maintained in leadership in the field of music education, so a focus may be successfully sustained on the kinds of points I have suggested in relation to Ideal #2. Music teachers need to be critical thinkers who promote democratic forums in which issues of concern are raised to those in positions of leadership. Such models of critical engagement, in turn, will result in students whose abilities entail a comprehensive and empowering musicianship as the basis for their lifelong musical practices.

The observations and arguments presented in this chapter suggest certain key questions that require careful consideration when faced with a new music education initiative:

1. Does this initiative provide maximum benefit to students in terms of quality musical experiences?
2. If money is involved, exactly how will the money be used and how can this be verified?
3. Are there additional conflicting agendas associated with this initiative, besides musical benefit to students, that might be cause for concern, (for example, opportunities for executives to attain the favor of politicians or CEOs of major corporations, to profit from stock options, to promote themselves, or to sell additional products, etc.)?
Music teachers and teacher educators owe it to their students, to society, and to the musical cultures in society to ensure that the focus of music education is always maintained on the objective of fostering flexible and creative musicianship within programs that value diverse musical identities attuned to the reality of musical practices outside of schools.

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Musical cultures are created in relationship to space and time. Unstable and multiple, they “perform the past” (Munt 1998, 137) even as they engage the present in porous space. As “living process[es]” that emerge from the amalgamation of “change and tradition,” musical cultures cannot be only the result of “human actions” (MayDay Group 1997, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv, this volume), as that delimitation would constrain both potentialities (virtualities) and possibilities (actualities) of musical engagement (Deleuze 1994, Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Rather than a “special synergy” consequently, I would suggest that this process is more like “alchemy” (Popkewitz and Gustafson 2002) in which human and nonhuman components are mixed in mysterious ways to produce specific musical values, practices, and discourses, as if by magic. Unique to each situation, such results cannot be duplicated or necessarily predicted because they each depend on a singular or peculiar alchemy of ultimately unknowable elements. Moreover, when “translated” into or as school music culture,¹ they become something quite different. As dynamic processes, nearly all of which are in some way also irrevocably altered by current digital and online music and media technologies, contemporary musical cultures, particularly those “beyond what is otherwise already available outside of school” (Ideal 3), are entirely resistant to domestication by school music culture practices and discourses—except those, of course, that are themselves constituted as school music cultures. The latter cultures, remarkably resilient in their ostensibly persistent stasis,² are manifested in myriads of ways, but most notably in the United States and Canada by large music ensemble (band, orchestra, and choir) instruction. Even beyond the obvious educational shortcomings of this configuration, engaging students in musical cultures beyond school music culture and students’ own communities is clearly inevitable in postcolonial twenty-first century information technology society.

That current school music education practices have changed so little in Canada, and the United States in the last 100 years is a function of many musical and cultural factors, not the least of which is the inherently conservative nature of schooling
itself. Intent upon reproducing itself in its own likeness, schooling—including its school music culture—has been mostly intended to build and maintain the nation-state through the production of citizens committed to upholding and extending now late-capitalist liberal democracies. With notable exceptions (feminist, antioppressive, and some critical pedagogies, for instance), schooling has not been much interested in lifelong learning (Ideal 3a); individual, familial, or societal improvement (Ideal 3b); promoting, improving, and encouraging traditions outside mainstream Western European culture (Ideal 3c); or reenergizing intellectual or musical life in society (Ideal 3d). Instead, the homosocial reproduction perpetuating schooling as well as school music culture functions to preserve and conserve current practices and values, stabilizing along well-established lines and traditions that would bequeath an assumed worthy past to a largely unknown future. This inheritance brings with it assumptions and prescriptions of acceptability and livability: literally musical lives worth living (Ahmed 2006, Butler 1993). Seeking not the same so much as institutionalizing it, the inheritance of school music culture disciplines and normalizes not only music and music education cultural practices, but also musicians and audiences, and most notably students and teachers. Because it depends on identity or likeness, however, this inheritance disallows difference, which of course is the very implication of the spirit of any call for change such as Ideal 3.

Difference, by contrast, is integral to queer sexual and social configurations that disrupt norms and implicate desire. This is not desire responding to lack (Ahmed 2006, Deleuze and Guattari 1983), but desire that is “productive, excessive, expansive, a pleasure-machine which can open up new spaces in which we can live” (Munt 1998, 6) socially, which is to say musically and sexually. Change in music education, as a function of difference, will cause disorientation of people and practices (Ahmed 2006), coming neither easily nor quickly in the spaces of school music culture. Responsive to and of that which tends toward something more, something different, change involves openings in and challenges to our discourses and practices that “queer” them, making them strange to us—and us to them. These processes of “othering,” however, enable us to (temporarily) realign our discourses and practices in multiple contingent and oblique ways, resisting and co-opting the “straightening devices” (Ahmed 2006) that would render change otherwise impossible. Any call for change in school music culture (such as Ideal 3) conceived to disrupt normative values and practices might nevertheless function as a straightening device that inadvertently supports those values and practices if it is read as failing to interrogate the very assumptions on which the profession is based (the inevitability of educator-student configurations, for instance). Reading with Sara Ahmed’s (2006) concepts of orientation, extension, and desire, I explore and argue potentialities of music education as queer music cultural space.

**Orientation(s) Sexual and Musical**

To speak of orientation is to infer position and location in space. While location fixes a point in space, position implies a perspective, a view from which that location may be seen or known. Indeed, black feminists such as Patricia Hill Collins (1998),
Valerie Smith (1998), and Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) stress intersectionalities of multiple positionalities by which subjects are situated, a concept that is co-extensive with what (typically) white feminists (see for instance, Harding 2004) discuss as “standpoint theory.” For her part, Ahmed (2006) notes that space does not just depend on our individual or collective positions—or intersectionalities of positions (positionalities)—because that would establish each of us as originary in terms of space—the point at which space begins. Rather, space works multidimensionally in relative and absolute terms, both of which are “invented” even as they manifest material consequences. Orientation, Ahmed notes, occurs as a result of “know[ing] where we are,” literally, of being able to find our way as we use specific recognizable objects so that “when we face them we know which way we are facing” (1). How these objects are arranged or gathered arranges or gathers us in particular ways, thus creating very different possibilities for experience. These experiences are shaped in large part through our perceiving the proximity and distance between objects and ourselves, “shap[ing] not only how we inhabit space, but how we apprehend this world of shared inhabitance, as well as ‘who’ or ‘what’ we direct our energy and attention toward” (3). Consequently, how an object or others approach us and how we turn toward it or them leaves an impression that makes possible tending toward some objects and people and away from others.

As a function of “bodily inhabitance” of space, this taking direction or “turning” orients us by “aligning body and space” with what is familiar. As we reach for what we already know, what is comfortable, “toward objects that are already within reach” (7), we shape the familiar. We extend the familiar by “extend[ing] the reach of the body,” reaching beyond our grasp toward “what is ‘just about’ familiar or what is ‘just about’ within reach,” which orients us in terms of “tending toward the ‘just about’ ” (8). Disorientation, by contrast, occurs when extensions beyond the familiar fail; that is, when we are unable to “familiarize” that which is strange, or when we inhabit spaces that “extend certain bodies and simply do not leave room for others” (11). An obvious example of this in music education occurs when voice auditions are limited to repertoire from the Western art music canon (see Koza this volume). Not only is this repertoire and style of singing within the reach of certain bodies, but it also does not leave room for other bodies.

Speaking in phenomenological terms, Ahmed argues that orientation as the alignment of the body and space occurs along lines, because space after all, and not incidentally music and education, is about movement. Facing familiar objects, the body is orientated by “lining itself up with the direction of the space it inhabits” (13), thus establishing directionality—and movement—vis-à-vis right and left. These directions are not neutral, as evidenced by the etymology of the word “left” as “weak, foolish” (O.E.), “prompted by malice or ill-will” (O.Fr.) and “unlucky, unfavorable” (L.), as well as connotations of concepts such as “the political left” and “left field.” Meanwhile “[t]he right is associated with truth, reason, normality, and with getting ‘straight to the point’ ” (Ahmed 2006, 13). Thus, right and left become associated with norms and deviance, respectively, as “the right becomes the straight line, and the left becomes the origin of deviation” (14). Supporting this contention with Kant’s (1992) philosophical work and Robert Hertz’s (1973) anthropological work, Ahmed asserts similar asymmetry to the distinction of west and east, which also are
orientated and acquire directionality only from pregiven, which is to say, accepted points of view.

The lines we follow are important not only because they make some things available and others unavailable, or some experiences possible and others impossible, but also as a function of repetition that directs the body “in some ways more than others” (Ahmed 2006, 15), a body that itself is influenced by how—the direction in which—it turns. Directions that act as guides instructing us as to “where,” “how,” and “what” we follow directly—which is to say without delay, “without detour, without mediation” in a straight line—are “produced over time” and are in that sense performative. The lines we are in some manner “directed” to follow, then, constitute ways of “becoming straight,” provided we are not “deviating at any point” (16). Any deviation, of course, produces oblique or bent lines—lines that in any event are not straight and are literally “off the (official) beaten path,” what are notably designated in landscape architecture as “desire lines:” paths people follow that extend beyond the “straight and narrow.”

Using this terminology, music education in Canada and the United States is orientated along lines of “quality music” and “outstanding musicianship,” both of which are conflated with “excellence.” The former is demonstrated by the Western art music canon, jazz music of approximately 1915–1965, and increasingly music of “other” cultures that is (mis)appropriated to conform to school music instrumental and large choral ensembles. The latter, in turn, is characterized by playing orchestral, band, and acoustic keyboard instruments, and head-voice singing, both in the context of reading and writing (as opposed to composing) standard Western music notation. This orientation, of course, brings very specific objects and experiences within reach, and necessarily excludes others, shaping musical bodies and lives in very particular—if not peculiar—ways. What is reachable is the familiar, that which reproduces what is already available. This reproduction may involve new or strange materials, by using so-called “multicultural music” made familiar by arranging it with Western harmonies and/or rhythms, or by keeping it more or less intact but listening and analyzing it according to Western values and techniques. Even the admonition of Ideal 3 that teachers

should guide and expand the musical initiatives, alternatives and levels of musical excellence of their students, going beyond what is otherwise already available outside of school, helping musical cultures to continue their respective developments while building bridges for students to other musical expressions of culture (MayDay Group 1997, emphasis added)

may follow a straight line if this surprisingly normative call to help follows a colonialist salvation narrative line, thus extending the body of school music culture as a straightening device to musical cultures outside of school and the immediate community. By contrast, orientation(s) of music educators who would attempt to extend the musical cultures of school music culture beyond schooling—let alone what is otherwise available in the community—in ways that do not repudiate desire, which is to say in ways that do not disallow difference, will necessarily tend toward the strange, queering the familiar, orientating music educators along queer lines and music education as queer space.
Musician as Homosexual

Philip Brett’s (2006) now (in)famous assertion, “All musicians... are faggots” (18–19), speaks to both the tenuous place of music (particularly so-called Western art music, the presumed pinnacle of successful music education) in society and the questionable qualities of musicians them/ourselves. As a profession, music is “socially peripheral” (Shepherd 1991) because it does not participate in the production of durable goods in industrial societies or information technology in postindustrial societies. Primarily for entertainment or functioning as cultural capital for those with “status,” music is both “trivialized and marginalized” (Shepherd 1993). Its historical association with emotion, irrationality, and the body (McClary 1994) and its subsequent feminization have only contributed to its emasculation generally (Koza 1993, La Rue 1994). Not only was music thoroughly “feminized” as a profession in the United States by the beginning of the twentieth century (Eaklor 1994), women’s musical roles were narrowly prescribed in misogynist (homophobic) efforts to fend off stereotypes of musicians as powerless or effeminate (homosexual) (Brett 2006, Koskoff 1991, Stokes 1994). Further, Brett contends that constructing musicians as deviant in relation to the norms of society “serves the function of keeping the rest of society in a state of decorum and restraint” (17). Thus, the “open secret” of Benjamin Britten’s and Aaron Copland’s homosexuality in Britain and the United States, respectively, as well as Glenn Gould’s sexual ambiguity in Canada, for instance, enabled all three musicians to live in so-called socially “deviant” configurations even as they were and remain iconic in their respective countries and highly respected musically around the world, their sexuality no longer secret.

With queer theory’s dismantling the closet orientations of musicians (where everyone involved in school music culture is understood as “musician”), queer lines become even more salient in the context of implementing change in music education. How bodies inhabit space is what makes them different, and how they inhabit space is a function of what they do. The repetition of what bodies actually do results in their tending in some ways rather than others, differentially including and excluding specific objects, people, and possibilities; consequently “what we ‘do do’ affects what we ‘can do’” (Ahmed 2006, 58). The ways in which we change music education practices, consequently, are an effect of those very practices. Establishing the normative performatively, through “the repetition of bodily actions over time” (58), renders the straight line itself as both interested (political) and constructed.

Musicians—at least male musical bodies, particularly male singers—are socially constructed in Western societies as homosexual. Indeed, apparently at one US “choir college” male students must demonstrate that they are not homosexual. Female musical bodies are much more typically constructed as heterosexual—particularly women singers—as long as they avoid those instruments (brass and percussion, that is) and musical roles such as conductor and composer that “disrupt” constructions of femininity (Green 1997). Interestingly, even operatic “pants roles” for which women sing the parts of men disturb neither the femininity nor the heterosexuality of women singers. Nevertheless, homophobia, particularly that perpetuated by male musicians about other male musicians, has been historically
rampant (Brett 2006), perhaps the most famous example of which is Charles Ives who denounced certain (male) composers as homosexuals—or even worse—women (Kirkpatrick 1991). Eve Sedgwick (1990) traces this homosexual panic to at least eighteenth century England and the United States when male homosocial relationships—which were exclusively social and not sexual in nature—eventually came to be “structured by a secularized and psychologized homophobia” (185) that necessarily excludes certain men from accessing social power. Particularly in the nineteenth century, she argues, “Because the paths of male entitlement... required certain intense male bonds that were not readily distinguishable from the most repro-bated bonds, an endemic and ineradicable state of what I am calling male homosexual panic became the normal condition of male heterosexual entitlement” (185). Among heterosexual and homosexual musicians in a profession that was thoroughly feminized in the United States by the turn of the twentieth century (Eaklor 1994), and in the context of a culture where homophobia and misogyny ideologically con-flate (Bredbeck 1995), this panic is only exacerbated. With homosexual panic, of course, space for homosexual bodies of all kinds in music and school music culture is foreclosed.

Queer Movement, Queer Pleasure

The word “queer” has several meanings, but is primarily understood today in two ways. First, to “queer” something is to spoil or ruin it, to interfere with its success: “My facial expression queered the joke’s punch line.” Second, “queer” also characterizes something that is unusual, peculiar, and unique, perhaps in a vaguely unsettling sort of way: “That was a queer comment.” The latter meaning, of course, easily morphs to individuals: “He’s a queer sort of fellow,” which may have nothing at all to do with sexuality—or everything to do with it, given that homosexuality deviates from or is peculiar to the “straight line” of heterosexuality. When referring to sexuality, of course, “queer” has traditionally been used pejoratively—regardless of one’s sexual orientation. While academics vigorously contest “queer theory,” activist groups such as Queer Nation have reclaimed the word: “We’re here. We’re queer. Get used to it.”

Inasmuch as the crooked or “twisted” (Ahmed 2006, Valentine 1996) path obscures the straight line, queer bodies and spaces both disorient and themselves are disoriented. The oblique or slantwise lines of “queer moments” make the “vertical and horizontal axes appear ‘out of line’ [and] must be overcome not because such moments contradict laws that govern objective space, but because they block bodily action: they inhibit the body such that it ceases to extend into phenomenal space” (Ahmed 2006, 66). Queer moments disorienting and disoriented in the music profession and school music culture incite discomfort that is palpable; hence, the need for various “straightening devices” to stabilize and re-orientate bodies and practices. Perform the music of non-White or homosexual composers? Straighten those musics by rehearsing them as aesthetic “objects” free of the contamination
of social context—positioning them as “just as good” as the music of so-called acceptable white, straight composers. “Channel” and “influence” music cultural processes beyond both the classroom and the immediate community? Straighten those processes by incorporating them into a curriculum written in terms of sequential goals and objectives.

The straightening device of homosocial reproduction (as Kanter defines it; see Note 4 above) similarly provides a sense of comfort that enables those who are orientated along pregiven heterosexual lines to feel completely at ease in school music culture—an easiness that is noticed only when it is absent, making the heteronormativity of music and school music culture not only invisible but also untouchable. Bodies, Ahmed claims, that “move with comfort through space, and... inhabit the world as if it were home... take up more space” (136). Moreover, these spaces of comfort are not neutral, which is to say that they are more comfortable for some bodies than they are for others. The point of course is not to simply increase the number or kinds of bodies that are comfortable, but to make various “style[s] of embodiment... of inhabiting space” (136) fluid and multiple in terms of desire.

What this means for music education—or any other social practice—is that any queer movement will be met with both overt and covert straightening forces that are at once imposed and self-imposed—by both heterosexual and homosexual bodies. Maintaining our own orientations requires us to implement straightening interventions to prevent or remediate anything that would throw us and our relationships “off balance” or “out of kilter.” And those who may orientate along queer lines are not immune to this necessary “righting.” Ahmed (2006) discusses this in terms of “homonormativity” by which queer bodies are assimilated as a function of their quite deliberately “following the straight line” (173). Queer movement requires effort; indeed, it is hard work (Ahmed 2006, Munt 1998), involving desire that Munt characterizes as “heroic.” Not only is stepping away from the straight line difficult, but maintaining divergent, oblique, and twisted queer lines is quite literally dizzying. Consequently, queer movement that has been successfully assimilated by the profession has been “straightened” so that it “lines up” at least momentarily.

Movement, of course, is associated with both time and space (Foucault 1986, Grosz 2004, Munt 1998). Rather than occupying space, though, movement here is expressed as Bergson’s concept of duration\textsuperscript{16} that is understood both spatially and temporally: “To be in the body is to be in time” (Game 1991, 95; emphasis in original). Using Ahmed’s vocabulary, to move in the body, to engage in musical embodiments, is to tend along lines that extend bodies into school music space. Repetitions of these movements do not constitute “fixed moments... [but] are acts of duration, of space-in-time” (Munt 1998, 177). Consequently, musical bodies in motion are always becoming as they are “directed” along lines toward the future, simultaneously an inheritance and materialization of desire. Repetitions of this “tending” (or these “tendings”) occur performatively, which is to say over time. Further, as a function of the “attending” pleasure that comes from such “tending” or “tendings” is something to which we “turn” our attention, devote our time. Instead of measuring time, however, time is embodied, experienced; it moves. Embodied time is “compat-
ible with positive desire, reproducing itself for its own sake, moving for pleasure” (Munt 1998, 177; emphasis added). Pleasure, then (in a more Deleuzian sense), is a function of desire instead of a facet of desire, becoming a line along which we tend rather than something toward which we tend. Pleasure in this sense is a means of becoming a musician, a Deleuzian becoming a musician, or problematization of teaching and learning music that is decidedly queer in much school music culture. Rather than pleasure that would be productive of musical and musician becomings, school music culture restricts pleasure to enjoyment and “having fun” that serve to “straighten” music teaching and learning.

Similarly, bodily desire and erotic pleasure are distinctly absent from music education discourse generally, despite the profoundly corporeal nature of music (Bowman 2002) and education (Kelly 1997). These issues are being taken up, however, by a slowly growing number of education theorists such as Ursula Kelly (1997) who describes her own reluctance and self-consciousness when writing about eros and pedagogy. She notes that her ambivalence is reinforced by the hesitance and discomfort of colleagues who have wondered why she “needed to use ‘those words’” (145, n2). By contrast, popular culture has been fairly enthusiastic about depicting eroticism and pedagogy through movies such as To Sir, With Love or Educating Rita, for instance. Even in the Disney production Mr. Holland’s Opus, eroticism between music teacher and student is vaguely implied.

Research in music education, however, has mostly focused on the flip side of pleasure: pain in school music culture (see for instance, Kogan 1987, Lamb 1993/1994, 1995, 1996, O’Toole 1994, Persson 1996, Tschaikov 2001). In elementary general music programs, psychological pain experienced by students is often associated with problems surrounding pitch matching that result in students being asked not to sing or to lip-synch lyrics, or teachers grouping students according to their singing abilities: bluebirds and blackbirds. While the latter practice has fallen into some disfavor of late, many music teachers continue to screen students in various covert and obvious ways. In large ensemble secondary and postsecondary music programs, some conductors are legendary for the verbal abuse they dispense from the podium. Perhaps most egregiously, though, sexual harassment, typically perpetrated by male teachers against female students and colleagues, characterizes many private music applied lessons, office appointments, and professional conference meetings. An ongoing source of (apparently unspeakable) pain in the profession at all levels that remains to be addressed by researchers, sexual harassment currently is music education’s unspoken “dirty little secret.”

Advocacy statements constitute most openly “upbeat” and positive discourse in the profession: music makes you smarter/better/more just. It might even make you more musical—which also is constructed as an inherently positive attribute. Intended to protect school music programs as they currently exist, which is to say to straighten school music culture as it has been normalized, advocacy arguments are often made by business interests financially connected to the profession. Theoretical discussions within music education that may be construed to involve pleasure tend to refer to psychological “flow” experiences induced by active engagement
with music, or the disinterested quasi Zen-like state of the allegedly uplifting “aesthetic experience.” None of these conversations even remotely evokes sexuality or Deleuzian pleasure because, of course, school music education has no space for celebratory pleasure or sexuality. Such space would be queer, indeed.

Music Education Queer

Yet queer moments do happen in music education; disorientation does occur. As a “'becoming oblique’ of the world, a becoming that is at once interior and exterior, as that which is given, or as that which gives what is given its new angle” (Ahmed 2006, 162), disorientation involves not only slippage, but “retreating” when objects “slip away” or “when things fail to cohere” (170). In these moments we must, of course, face (“line up” with) these objects in order to detect their loss of proximity. Ahmed suggests that a queer orientation would not experience this loss as deprivation but would “approach ‘the retreat’ as an approach—not in the sense that what retreats will return but in the sense that in the retreat of an object a space is cleared for a new arrival” (171). In other words, disorientation is not about loss of the straight line, but opening spaces for different lines—lines that are not straight, but oblique, bent, twisted, and full of potential.

This suggests, for Ahmed, that our concern should not be with “what a queer orientation [is], but how we are orientated toward queer moments when objects slip” (171). With this (dis)orientation, “queer” is understood as critique rather than a thing, place, way of life, or even achievement (Munt 1998). Queer moments in music education, moments when processes of musical culture are sustained and celebrated, become not moments of cultural relativism or canonical loss, but rather musical engagements of potentiality opening different ways of musician-ness that do not depend on teacher/student dyads or our musical culture/your musical culture distinctions. Ideal 3 might seek to shift our orientation “off line,” but if it faces these slippages on the straight line of teacher behaviors that “channel” and “influence,” “guide” and “expand” “human musical actions”—which is to say, student learning—without retreating from the apparently assumed active role of teachers and passive roles of students, it may be effectively straightened, becoming yet another way to do very much what music education has done before but with different musical cultures.

Our orientations toward slipping canonic school music cultures are consequently accompanied by commitments to extensions of queer bodies and spaces. These extensions occur both musically and socially, which is to say sexually. As both a sexual and a political (dis)orientation, “queer” must be framed in terms of its “sexual specificity” in order to keep in sight “how compulsory heterosexuality shapes what coheres as given, and the effects of this coherence on those who refuse to be compelled” (Ahmed 2006, 172). Not only do queer interventions “queer” more than sexuality, heteronormativity compels more than specific sexual activities. Further, disorientation itself is not obligatory, but is shaped by how we live, and hence is “an
effect of how we do politics” (177) with clearly ethical implications. The goal is to make strange what is familiar sexually, socially, and musically, making it possible for what is strange, ignored, or overlooked to “dance with renewed life” (177). As a refusal of the inheritance of the straight body, which is never neutral, this dance is imbued with wonder, joy, and yes—pleasure.

Through the embrace of pleasure we also are orientated around things, a tending that makes them central (Ahmed 2006). Being orientated around music education, for instance, concomitantly orientates us toward particular things such as students, musical cultures, musical engagements, and embodiments. This orientation functions to place us at the center as we take music education as part of us, devoting ourselves and our passion to it. Placing ourselves at the center, we face those things toward which we are orientated, and “those things face us. In other words, to be orientated around something is to make ‘that thing’ binding, or to constitute oneself as that thing” (116). Instead of a normative inheritance, this is a promise, a commitment, a concern—to and for students, musical cultures, and ourselves. Not “channeling,” “guiding,” or “expanding,” we dance—with students, musical cultures, and ourselves—as music educators, as those who are orientated as responsive with students, musical cultures, and ourselves. Taking music education as central, “at the center of [our] being or action” (116), we respond “queerly,” with pleasure, “queering” music education practices and discourses, engaged as sexual musical bodies connecting with people and musical cultures in ways that are, for all that, joyfully unpredictable. Music education “can” change only when it “does” change, that is, when it extends itself around queer spaces of desire.

Notes

1. The configuration “school music culture” signals school music itself as a musical culture within the context of music education that occurs in schools.
2. It is this intransigence, naturally, that provides the impetus for this very book.
3. This is not to suggest that the interest evidenced by those notable exceptions developed as a result of the MayDay Group Ideal 3.
4. “Homosocial reproduction” is understood here in the sense described by Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) as “homosexual reproduction” in which corporate executives [professional leaders] hire, promote, and socialize with individuals who are like themselves, which is to say, who exhibit the same social characteristics as they possess. In music education, this includes individuals who are white, male, heterosexual, and middle class.
5. It is important to note that Deleuze and Parnet (2002) explicitly distinguish “desire” from “pleasure,” and that Deleuze and Guattari (1983) use the term “desiring-machine” to describe connections proliferated by and as desire. Estelle Jorgensen (2007), however, advocates for considerations of “desire” in terms of “pleasure,” an exploration I begin here.
6. This is not to infer that black feminists or white feminists are in agreement about intersectionalities or standpoint theory or that the two notions are necessarily competing or incompatible.
8. I once used the name “Left Edge Jazz Band” to depict an ensemble that was both “edgy” in that it was on the “leading edge” and “left” in that it was nontraditional.
9. Ahmed discusses this in terms of Judith Butler’s (1997) work with Louis Althusser’s (1971) now famous description of subject formation in which the subject is “recruited” by turning to the hail, “ ‘Hey, you there’ ” (163).
10. With notable exceptions, nascent interest in composing in Canadian and US school music programs mandated by curriculum documents typically constitutes an ‘add-on’ to traditional large ensemble performance curricula.
11. For a more detailed discussion, see Gould (2003).
13. Personal communication.
14. Sedgwick (1990) implicates “male entitlement” in terms of “the complex web of male power over the production, reproduction, and exchange of goods, persons, and meanings” (185).
15. This meaning reflects one of the ways in which Ahmed (2006) articulates “queer” as commitment to dissident or “nonnormative” sexuality. She also uses “queer” in reference to what is said to be “off-center” or “out of plumb.”
16. Deleuze’s work is indebted to Bergson, as well. See his (2002) Bergsonism.
17. Except for the phrase in italics, this is remarkably similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983) concept of desire.
18. With thanks to Tom Regelski for pointing out many educators’ concern with their students “having fun” in music class irrespective of whether anything is actually learned.
19. Perhaps the most overt expression of queer passion expressed by a student for a teacher in popular song is Meg Christian’s recording of Sue Fink and Joelyn Grippo’s song, “Ode to a Gym Teacher.” (Fink, Sue and Joelyn Grippo 1977/2003)

References


I approach the notion that music teachers can affect musical culture from the perspective of pragmatist philosophy, specifically that of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), who is widely regarded as the founder of pragmatism. Despite relative obscurity during his own lifetime, Peirce has had a major, if indirect, influence on philosophy over much of the past century; William James, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty, among other notable philosophers, have all identified themselves as pragmatists and borrowed from Peirce in their writings. Numerous anthropologists and sociologists have turned to Peirce for guidance in recent years, owing to the uniquely comprehensive way in which he addressed matters of human cognition as well as the usefulness of his concepts for sorting out matters of cultural difference. As the cultural makeup of schools has become increasingly diverse over the past several decades, more scholars have brought anthropological and sociological lenses to their studies of music education, so consideration of Peirce’s perspectives seems particularly appropriate at present.

I will begin this chapter by providing an introduction to some of the basic concepts of Peirce’s pragmatism, as well as a very brief account of semiotic, his attendant theory of cognition. Next, I will show how Peirce’s philosophy might be used to illuminate the human phenomenon of “music,” considering briefly the widely differing manifestations of music in different cultural contexts and its place in contemporary schooling. Finally, I will turn to issues that arise when one sees music teachers as change agents (see MayDay Group 1997, pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume), responding to related questions from the perspective of Peirce’s pragmatism, using his concepts for clarification.
Peirce’s Pragmatism

Contrary to the prevailing Cartesian dualism of his time and place, Peirce based his philosophy on the fundamental premise that all phenomena—including matter and mind—are interconnected (or perhaps are different aspects of the same totality); he termed this premise *synechism* (Peirce MS949, Unpublished). With this principle as a foundation, Peirce noted that human beings born in different places and under different conditions develop different sets of *habits*, both physical and mental, to survive. He thus regarded different individuals as relatively unique “bundles of habits” (1931–1935, 6.228).

Peirce observed that when an individual encounters an interruption of his/her habitual survival patterns of thought and action, the individual experiences *doubt*. By making guesses or hypotheses (a process that Peirce termed *abduction* [1931–1935, 5.416]) and testing them to determine how a situation might be different from the way in which it was originally conceived, the individual has the possibility of resolving doubt. Once one of these hypotheses is confirmed, he/she is able to return to habitual mental action or *belief*.

Peirce noted that individuals who live together in the same circumstances tend to face similar challenges and develop shared habits of survival. In their interchanges, the members of a community thus also tend to experience the same doubts and to develop a shared comprehensive abduction of “the way the world is” (that is, a common worldview or conception of reality). Notably, the worldview held within any given community is inevitably partial and biased due to having its origins in its members’ unique efforts toward survival. Therefore, the beliefs (or mental habits) of any given community are inevitably different from those of other communities, and they cannot be said to fully reveal true reality.

In order to understand the actions and ideas of a particular community, it follows that one must always consider them in terms of the *effects* they are conceived to have by its members. Peirce advanced the following “pragmatic maxim” for the purpose of making ideas “clear” (that is, identifying their meaning within the collective abduction or worldview of a community):

> Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (1931–1935, 5.402)

Accordingly, in Peirce’s view, the *meaning* of any individual’s thought or action stems from the efficacy it is believed to have within the habitual coping actions of the community to which the individual belongs; it is on this basis that a thought or action is (or is not) judged to be “sensible” or “reasonable” by the members of that community. (Today, of course, anthropologists typically use the term “cultural group” rather than “community.”)
Semiotic

As an outgrowth of his pragmatic philosophy, *semiotic* is Peirce’s theory of the signs—or foundational elements—of all cognition (which he termed *semiosis*). Semiotics is commonly defined as the “science of signs,” the conceptual vocabulary of which continues to change and expand on the basis of research and reflection to provide more well-founded systematic accounts of cognition and communication. Along with Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), whom he did not know, Peirce is regarded as one of the founders of contemporary semiotics.

Peirce set forth the idea that every thought or *Sign* that registers in the consciousness of an individual human being should be regarded as involving an indivisible triadic relationship, the three aspects of which include: (1) a *Sign* (that is, a *perception* or *thought*), (2) an *Object* (that is, a *conception* of the perception), and (3) an *Interpretant* (that is, an effect in the mind of a perceiver according to which the Sign is conceptualized as an Object). According to this model, two or more individuals, upon perceiving the same Sign, may conceptualize it differently (as an Object), owing to differences in their respective “habits of mind” (that is, their Interpretants). However, two other individuals may habitually conceptualize that Sign in largely the same way (that is, “be of one mind”) if they are of the same community, owing to their having had experiences in common. Extending this idea, it is important to note that a single individual might actually be a member of many different types of communities (for example, communities predicated on gender, ethnicity, nationality, language, or profession); thus his/her conceptualization of a given Sign may differ in some ways (and not in others) from that of another individual.

Furthermore, the ways in which individual human beings conceptualize particular Signs are not static. Peirce maintained that Signs, our conceptions of them (that is, as Objects), and our own “habits of mind” (that is, Interpretants) are continuously changing. It is through the “action, or influence” (1931–1935, 5.484) of Signs upon one another, which Peirce termed *semiosis*, that they change. Any given perception (as a Sign) may be conceptualized differently (as an Object) owing to its effect (Interpretant) on the same, continually changing individual over the course of that individual’s lifetime. Notably, when an individual first consciously perceives a given Sign, it may be regarded as new *information*, as it has much new data to yield. However, as he/she encounters and reflects on the same Sign over a period of time, meeting it in a variety of social contexts, the Sign might become more *meaningful*, more well understood, and more well integrated into habitual patterns of belief, but also likely to yield less and less new information with each encounter.

This sketch of Peirce’s semiotic is far from complete. Indeed, Peirce developed an elaborate typology of different types of Signs and Sign relationships that can be used for more detailed analysis of conceptualization and communication, and familiarity with his phenomenology adds still more nuances to his semiotic model. Still, this brief account may give the reader an inkling of how Peirce’s semiotic can be used to address differences in conceptualization among individuals of different cultural backgrounds.
A Pragmatic Conception of “Music”

Peirce’s pragmatism provides a conceptual basis for addressing the question of how different forms of musical practice (or “musics”) can be said to have human meaning and value. The diverse forms of musical practice manifested historically in different world societies can be considered in Peirce’s pragmatic sense (that is, on the basis of their effects) as a diverse cluster of community-specific behaviors involving sound, many of which serve those who meaningfully participate in them as means of psychological and social balancing relative to the worldview they respectively manifest. Stated in another way, many of the different forms of musical practice undertaken within different communities can be regarded as pragmatic means by which their members address psychological and social differences and tensions while simultaneously being collectively unified in ways generally consistent with the worldview they share. This view is generally supported by the work of researchers in neurobiology, cultural anthropology, and political science (Goble 1999).

Notably, a particular instance of musical practice may be of one of two general types, depending on the effect it has on the community within which it is undertaken. Some musical practices tend to bring about the psychophysiological reconciliation of individuals to the worldview (or conception of reality) already collectively shared by the community within which it takes place. Other forms of musical practice tend to make manifest a new conception of reality, the characteristics of which may have been latent in the “collective mind” of a community. In both cases, the members of the community are typically unified psychosocially in accord with a shared conception of reality via their engagement in a musical practice; this accounts for the broader cultural effects of musical practice. Notably, the vocabulary of semiotics can be used to analyze different forms of musical practice and their resulting sound artifacts as Signs manifesting aspects of the worldview of those from whom they stem.

While the effects of musical practice described above tend to be readily evident in culturally homogeneous, traditional societies, numerous historical factors have contributed to obscuring recognition in developed nations of the common effects of different cultural groups’ forms of musical practice. Among these factors, the advent and growth of culturally pluralistic, democratic types of societies; the emergence of and the confidence placed in the scientific method and its challenge to long-standing religious worldviews; and the invention and proliferation of printing, recording, and broadcast technologies (plus the attendant reification and marketing of music) have especially contributed to obscuring the association of particular forms of musical practice with the specific communities or cultural groups from which they stem (Goble 1999). Nevertheless, the vast majority of people living in pluralistic, democratic nations, like people in traditional societies, continue to engage in some way with a form of musical practice that reflects their community-particular values and their culturally distinctive patterns of cognition, primarily for reasons having to do with its psychosocially equilibrating—or balancing—effects.

Given this pragmatic conception of different cultural forms of musical practice, we can see that music education in the schools of pluralistic, democratic, and
technologically developed societies is a highly complex undertaking. Indeed, a single musical example or “cultural sound artifact” (as a Sign) may be conceptualized (as an Object) according to the varied effects it has in the minds of students in a given classroom (Interpretants) in myriad ways, depending on their respective cultural backgrounds, the relationships among their respective communities, the ways they conceptualize “musical practice” (for example, as religious activity, artistic creation, or entertainment), the value and importance they ascribe to it, the degree to which they value schooling, and numerous other factors.

A Pragmatic Response

With this background on Peirce’s pragmatism and semiotic, plus the foregoing explanation of how they might be used to describe the human phenomenon “music,” we can now turn to the issues of change agency in music as framed in Ideal #3 of The MayDay Group, considering these issues from Peirce’s pragmatic perspective. The ideal is stated as follows:

Since human musical actions create, sustain, and reshape musical cultures, music educators can and should formally channel this cultural process, influencing the directions in which it develops and the individual and collective human values it serves. (MayDay Group 1997; pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume.)

Notably, the foundational premise of this ideal, that “human musical actions create, sustain, and reshape musical cultures,” is generally in agreement with the pragmatic perspective on music I described in the preceding section of this paper. Indeed, to undertake or participate in musical action is inevitably to engage in a form of “sonic semiosis,” in which, depending on the nature of the musical practice, one has the possibility of contributing to the sustenance of an existing cultural group, bringing about its reshaping or creating a new one.

The assertion that follows, that “music educators can and should formally channel this cultural process, influencing the directions in which it develops and the individual and collective human values it serves,” requires further exploration and comment. This assertion could likely be taken to suggest that its authors wish to empower music educators to promote particular human values (and thus, perhaps, not others) in their “formal channeling of cultural process.” Such an assertion, left unqualified, could leave readers with the notion that its authors wish to advance the music teacher as an arbiter of cultural value, an instructional leader who may support the musical practices of one or more cultural groups (say, communities of musicians who are highly technically innovative), while discounting those of others (say, more reflective, “religious” musical communities).

However, the following paragraph advocates that teachers guide and expand the musical initiatives, alternatives, and levels of musical excellence of their students, going beyond what is otherwise already available outside of school, helping musical cultures to continue their respective developments, while building bridges for students to other musical expressions of culture (pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume).
The “formal channeling” advocated by the authors is thus best understood as positioning the teacher as a relatively impartial mediator, one who helps students to make fair and culturally accurate interpretations of musical phenomena and to actively engage in musical semiosis in ways appropriate to those cultural traditions from which the different forms of music introduced in the class stem. Viewed through the lens of pragmatism, such facilitation of students’ cultural awareness and musical practice can be seen as an important way of contributing to their psychosocial health and their social understanding.

Certain issues arise when one begins to regard music teachers as change agents, and using Peirce’s concepts to answer the related questions raised by the authors of the MayDay Group ideals (1997; pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume) will help to clarify them.

How can music teachers be more accountable for increasing the likelihood that their students will value musical participation throughout their lives?

Before addressing the issue of accountability, it seems appropriate to consider first the question of what music teachers might do to “increase the likelihood that their students will value musical participation throughout their lives.” The usual (and pragmatically correct) answer to this question is that by enabling students to perform or otherwise engage meaningfully (and thus come to develop a sense of personal connection with a community) via a form of music that they can call their own during their youth, they will be more likely to remain musically active—and thus to value musical practice—throughout their lives. Conversely, individuals who do not have opportunity to develop such musical skills and engage meaningfully with music in their youth are less likely to make time for exploring such possibilities in their adult lives.

However, it is also important to consider that if students who do not develop such a sense of personal connection in their youth are enabled to understand the personal, social, and political importance of different forms of musical practice to those who undertake them, they may also be more likely to value and respect musical practices (their own and others’) as important forms of human engagement throughout their lives. Conversely, individuals who have never learned about, say, the musical practices of different communities, the use of music in state societies to promote nationalistic identity and solidarity, or the use of music belonging to particular communities for the purpose of targeting specific audiences in advertising will likely be less able to think critically about other ways in which different forms of musical practice impact their own lives and the lives of others.

Now, the question of how music teachers might be more accountable for increasing students’ valuing of musical participation throughout their lives raises semiotic questions of its own, as it brings consideration of multiple groups and their values into the conversation. Perhaps the most important question is: To whom should music educators be held accountable in this regard? Some possibilities might include parents, other music educators, school administrators, and the government of the society or state of which they are a part—or even the students themselves. However, since each of these groups typically has special interests and ways of holding
music educators accountable at present (in various ways), as well as protocols and traditions of its own for gathering such information, answering this question would require a more extensive semiotic analysis than there is room for here.

**What can music teachers do to improve the individual, family, and society through the musical alternatives, initiatives, and choices made available and advanced through the school music curriculum?**

From a pragmatic perspective, the word “improve” in this question may seem problematic. After all, one’s perspective on whether musical alternatives, initiatives, and choices advanced via a school music curriculum do anything to “improve” one’s life would seem to be largely relative to one’s cultural background and beliefs. Indeed, the members of any cultural group are quite likely to regard engagement with their own music as a means of personal, familial, and societal betterment, simply because they personally find such benefit in the values manifested in their own forms of musical practice; the value of the music of others is, for them, less certain.

However, a growing body of research in recent years has suggested that musical practices themselves may contribute to human cognitive development, so it may soon be possible to argue that all individuals are actually “improved” via active participation in some form of musical practice. At the same time, democracy has now largely been embraced as the most socially equitable and beneficial form of government worldwide, so it is possible to argue that experiencing and coming to understand the musical practices and beliefs of different cultural groups—and thus developing greater intercultural awareness, sympathy, and tolerance—is likely to “improve” the quality of one’s own life and one’s society. Since musical diversity is a characteristic of culturally pluralistic nations, anything that helps students to understand different cultural forms of music as those with whom they originated experience them has the potential to foster a more knowledgeable and more tolerant society, one in which different forms of musical practice are seen as contributing to the well-being of its constituent individuals and communities. From this standpoint, the more widely differing musical practices the student can be introduced to meaningfully (that is, in a way that fosters sympathetic understanding of the personal and societal meanings they carry), the better.

Beyond this, however, by providing musically engaged students with a broader array of musical practices and ideas, music teachers can enable them, where possible and appropriate, to enrich and enhance the existing musical practices of their families and their communities, to facilitate musical choice making within them, and possibly even to mitigate socially destructive beliefs alive within their traditions (for example, racism, genderism). In this additional sense, music teachers may indeed improve the individual, family, and society through the musical alternatives, initiatives, and choices made available and advanced through the school music curriculum.

**What strategies can be developed to promote, improve, and encourage the musical traditions of particular segments of society and, at the same time, help individuals**
become sensitive to and more successful within musical cultures other than the ones in which they grew up?

First of all, it is important to note that, as with the initial statement of Ideal #3, the suggestion that music educators should undertake efforts to “promote, improve, and encourage the musical practices of particular segments of society” might seem to carry with it an implicit suggestion that the musical practices of other segments of society should not be advanced. However, as with the Ideal, the words that follow in this question point toward a greater inclusiveness. I have suggested elsewhere that to meet the contrasting goals of providing students with an experience of the personal importance of musical practice and fostering their understanding of its importance as a global phenomenon, the music education curriculum of any given school might begin with an exploration of the musical practices alive in the communities surrounding that school (of which the students are a part), and that the curriculum could then be expanded (in ever-widening concentric circles) to include musical practices beyond these communities as students progress from elementary through secondary school (Goble 1999, 456–461). Such a curriculum would serve to develop in students both a personal sense of music’s importance and a growing awareness of the diversity of musical practices and the complexity of musical meanings in the world.

Indeed, helping students to become knowledgeable about, sensitive to, and more socially conversant and capable within communities other than the ones with which they have grown up would seem to be one of the primary roles of music education in a democratic society. As I have indicated above, pragmatist philosophy and semiotics are helpful conceptual tools that could be used for accounting for and describing the personal and social meanings that different cultural forms of music manifest for those who engage in them (and others).

How can the profession undertake a sustained campaign to reenergize musical life in society, and thus to expand the contributions of music to life?

Before addressing the matter of undertaking a “sustained campaign,” it seems appropriate to consider the central assumption of this question—that is, that “musical life in society” is in need of being reenergized. Is this assumption valid? When one considers the high level at which people are engaged musically in most societies on virtually all continents at present, the answer would seem to be No. In fact, the tremendous amount of involvement in amateur and professional musical performance in various cultural traditions, engagement in musical creation and improvisation, listening to musical recordings, attendance at concerts, participation in community musical groups and events, and engagement in religious practices involving music throughout the world indicates that “musical life” is quite well energized in most societies at present.

Furthermore, the emergence of new technologies, such as live webcasting, satellite radio, and mp3 players, has done a tremendous amount to energize musical interests broadly, and karaoke machines and the website YouTube have done much to enliven musical amateurism in recent decades. Indeed, the emergence of new
software alone (for example, Finale®, GarageBand®, Guitar Hero®) has greatly expanded opportunities for musical engagement at a remarkably high level even among persons (in numerous cultural traditions) who have had no previous instruction in developing musical performance skills.

Thus, from a pragmatist perspective, a better question to ask might be: What is it that might actually be in need of reenergizing? Perhaps it is the institution of music education itself, which has—at certain times and places—tended to inhibit public recognition of the personal and social importance of certain forms of musical practice. Indeed, owing to a number of historical factors, some music educators have tended to focus their instruction on the replication and polished performance of musical works from a limited group of traditions, rather than considering the broader personal and social effects of different cultural forms of musical practice. However, once one considers different musical practices from a pragmatic perspective, as efficacious personal and social behaviors that are manifested differently in different cultural contexts, one can see that the participatory musical practices of different cultural groups all constitute “energized musical life.”

Given this state of affairs, what may actually be needed is a “sustained campaign” to re-focus music education in a manner consistent with a pragmatic conception of musical practices such as I have described above. Once attention is turned toward consideration of the personal and social effects of particular forms of musical practice, the role and importance of music education in general education will be much clearer to students and all concerned. How might such a campaign be undertaken? Many members of the MayDay Group, with their pragmatic orientations and their focus on critical inquiry, their shared actions stemming from the group’s Ideals, and their growing influence among music teacher educators, seem to be demonstrating just that.

Notes
1. While there has been an apparently newfound and growing interest in Peirce among social scientists in recent years, Peirce’s writings actually had considerable influence on the development of sociology as a science in Europe and the United States. For an account of this development, see Kilpinen (2000).
2. These three aspects are derived from categories in Peirce’s phenomenology. See Peirce 1931–1935, 2.274. Note that the word “Interpretant” does not denote an individual person as an “Interpreter,” but rather an effect in the mind of a perceiver. Peirce wrote, “I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former.” (Peirce 1977, 80–81.)
3. Peirce 1931–1935, 5.400. Notably, Peirce’s conception of the sign prevents any analytical conceptions drawn from his philosophy from tending toward idealism or toward an ungrounded, purely subjective idealism. (For purposes of clarity, I have followed Peirce’s own frequent practice of capitalizing the words Sign, Object, and Interpretant when referring to the interrelated aspects of a sign, but I have not capitalized the word sign when referring to the totality. Note that Peirce himself was not consistent in this usage.)
4. He initially developed 10 major classes of signs, but later postulated 59,049 different classes.
5. For a more thorough explication of this assertion, see Goble 1999.
6. A more detailed account of such “Apollonian” and “Dionysian” forms of musical practice may be found in Goble 1999, 121–48, 190–92.
7. One important recent resource on music and human cognition research is Peretz and Zattore (2003).

References

Three Saturdays each year I attend the voice auditions of high school seniors seeking admission to the School of Music at University of Wisconsin-Madison. In this essay, I use my observations about these auditions to explore how current conceptions of university-level school music, what The MayDay Group’s fourth action ideal calls “institutionally mediated expressions of musical culture,” systematically advantage some applicants while disadvantaging others (MayDay Group 1997, pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume). Stringent and restrictive notions of what constitutes musical competence, together with narrow definitions of legitimate musical knowledge, shut out potential teachers from already underrepresented culture groups and are tying the hands of teacher educators at a time when greater diversity, both perspectival and corporeal, is needed in the music teaching pool. I will discuss the equity implications of two trends in auditions: (1) increased performance “excellence” that has significantly raised the standards for admission to voice studios in the School of Music, and (2) an ongoing pattern of epistemic specificity that severely limits the kinds of musical performances that are considered acceptable. Rather than simply offering a critique of the narrowness of this university’s canon, I heed Michel Foucault’s admonition to question the tactical productivity of discourse, which he states can be accomplished by examining the “reciprocal effects of power and knowledge” that the discourse ensures (Foucault 1978/1990, 102).¹ Focusing on discourses about bodies and music, I argue that in the auditions, the construction of musical difference, which is an effect of power and is accomplished by the materialization of categories or styles of music, plays a role in the systematic inclusion or exclusion of people, whose bodies already have been sorted and ordered through a process of differencing that materializes bodies as raced. Expanding on education theorist Thomas Popkewitz’s assertion (1998, 2)
that strategies of dividing and differentiating lead to the disqualifying of students,\(^2\) I argue that sorting and ordering rely on a process of categorization I call “binning.” The music auditions illustrate how multiple processes of binning—some applying to bodies, others to music—work symbiotically and productively. Finally, claiming that the auditions both demonstrate and participate in what critical race theorist Gloria Ladson-Billings calls the full social funding of race,\(^3\) I maintain that more attention needs to be paid in music education to ending the exclusion of people hailing from a host of culture groups.

This paper is not a critique of my valued colleagues in the voice area. Rather, it is an analysis of the larger systems of reasoning that help knit school music into a homogeneous whole characterized by striking similarities between this institution and nearly every other school of music in the United States.

**An Access Conundrum**

The Saturday auditions are part of the second of three admissions hurdles that our music education students need to clear, some students being eliminated at each hurdle. First, students must be admitted to the university at large, where the average American College Testing (ACT) score is 28; second, to the School of Music, where the audition plays a major role; and finally, two years later, to the music education program. Thus, the pool of students from which the music education faculty can draw is established several years before our area admits students.

Over the years that I have observed the auditions, I have noticed several changes. First, the applicants’ knowledge of singing and the quality of their performances (and I will discuss quality a bit later) have risen meteorically. Unfortunately, there has not been a parallel upswing in scholarship funding or in the number of available spaces in voice studios; my university, like most public institutions, has undergone severe retrenchment in the past decade. Consequently, most of the students who audition will be denied admission, even though many of them sing well. In 2003–2004, a typical year, 73 students applied for undergraduate admission in voice, either as performance or as music education majors. The voice area only has space for approximately 10 undergraduates, however.

Second, because the performance caliber of the applicants has risen, students who have not already studied voice privately prior to auditioning have little chance of being admitted. In other words, the school music offered in K-12 settings does not, in itself, sufficiently prepare students who aspire to attend this university.

Third, the music education students who are admitted are first-rate performers according to the criteria established by this institution, on a par with their peers who seek degrees in performance. This university does not have a music education track where lower performance standards apply. Amid these changes, one constant has been an epistemic specificity that severely limits the styles of music considered suitable for performance at an audition.

Thus, the undergraduates with whom I work are an elite lot. In addition to their musical training and skills, they have the broad-based cultural capital that enabled
them to achieve the high ACT scores required for admission to this university. Nevertheless, this pattern of change and constants presents some troubling equity issues.

One of these issues is an access conundrum. As recently as a generation ago, the unwritten rule that undergraduate music students need many years of prior private study did not typically apply to vocalists. Past wisdom claimed that the voice did not begin to mature until late adolescence and private study for younger students was deemed of limited value if the voice was not ready. In the absence of the private-study rule, having sung in the high school choir could suffice and having potential rather than displaying actual mastery could be grounds for admission to voice studios, even at prestigious schools.

The shift toward requisite early private training in voice indicates that more so than in the past, the possibility of becoming a public school vocal music teacher, a relatively modest aspiration in the musical world, hinges on early access to privilege and affluence, at least if a student’s goal is to attend a relatively prestigious school of music. Affluence has long affected access to private colleges and universities, but the access conundrum is increasingly evident at public institutions as well. These phenomena may also indicate that a tracked system exists in music teacher education, which prepares students in programs at prestigious schools for work with elite groups of K-12 students, while the undergraduates attending less “rigorous” schools likely will be channeled into jobs where they will serve vastly different groups of children.4

The changes in applicants’ musical knowledge and the increased technical quality of audition performances, I argue, are effects of a widening affluence gap in the United States. Families that can afford to provide their young children with a range of privately enhanced educational opportunities are, in effect, raising the admissions bar at my institution and so far, my university has not responded sufficiently to this challenge. Because the affluence gap has a racial pattern, this access conundrum has racial implications, too. Under these circumstances, the current admissions process becomes a racially discriminatory practice that exacerbates persistent race-equity problems.

The Other Music

One of the unchanged aspects of the auditions and the undergraduate program they precede is the emphasis on music from the European/American high art bel canto tradition. Information about auditions, provided to voice applicants on the School of Music’s website, clearly spells out the repertoire requirements: “Two art songs to be sung by memory. (Do not audition with jazz, pop, rock, folk or other musical theatre repertoire.)”5 Thus, knowing and loving any kind of music is not sufficient; only one musical language is permitted. The repertoire requirements are forthright in their specificity about what will or will not be valued, and my university makes no pretense of welcoming diverse musical genres, styles, or experiences. The voice area is not unique in its expectations, which resemble those of the instrumental areas
at this university, and I suspect that the epistemic assumptions fueling decisions here are similar to those at nearly every other “reputable” school of music in the United States.

The domain of acceptable, however, whether the objects in question are bodies or musics, is defined, in part, by an alterity, by what some scholars have called “the Other,” or by what Judith Butler calls a zone of abjection to which bodies that do not matter are relegated (Butler, 3). The zone of abject music, created and reinforced by the audition list, is enormous, encompassing nearly all of the music heard, performed, and loved on this planet.

As has been the case at every school of music I have known, some of our students quietly and sometimes surreptitiously engage in the musical pleasures not valued by our institution, and faculty members tend to look the other way just as long as the other music does not interfere with the “real” business of university music making. Many of us who have taught music in the public schools know that the other music we learned and enjoyed, and the musical multilingualism it has taught us, were valuable assets in the classroom, and so I have at least two worries about the narrow monolingualism of the school music that shapes music teacher preparation. First, I am concerned that students who do not speak the primary musical language will never be admitted to schools of music such as mine, even though they are excellent musicians according to a different set of standards and could offer significant gifts to K-12 students. This exclusion affects not only the cultural diversity of the music teaching population but also the ability of K-12 programs to provide what Ladson-Billings (1995, 3) calls culturally relevant pedagogy and content. My second concern is that universities such as mine may be failing to adequately educate the students who speak only the privileged musical language. Unless they change once they get a job, these students, in their desire to be good teachers, are likely to perpetuate a musical monolingualism that will foster a vast cultural divide between themselves and many of their students.

Skeptics may argue that the audition list is color blind because the rules apply regardless of the race or ethnicity of the applicants; they may claim that specifying acceptable genres helps all students “choose the right song,” to borrow a phrase from the popular television singing contest, “American Idol.” They may counter that racism laces the assumption that people deemed non-White either cannot or are not interested in singing European/American high art music, and they may point out that the repertoire specifications also have ramifications for some White applicants. For example, broadway musicals and country music, which primarily appeal to White audiences, also fall outside of the boundaries of acceptability.

Understanding how the audition repertoire list accomplishes de facto racial and ethnic discrimination begins with the recognition that racial exclusion and domination can be achieved “without making any explicit reference to race at all” (Omi and Winant 1993, 7). Even though the audition specifications do not explicitly refer to race, they discount genres having deep roots in non-White musical traditions and, more importantly, reject the styles and genres that non-White people in the United States currently are more likely to enjoy. This rejection is bundled with approval of musics more likely to be enjoyed by White people, if anyone prefers
them anymore. I base this assertion on results of a recent study prepared for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) by Lee Mizell, which indicates that music preferences in the United States show racial and ethnic patterns; using two broad racial categories—Whites and non-Whites—Mizell (2005) concluded that “Whites tend to be more likely than non-Whites to prefer just about every genre except blues/R&B, ethnic/traditional, hymns/gospel, jazz, rap/hip-hop, and reggae. In these cases, the opposite is true.” The data also indicate that classical/chamber music is one of the categories Whites are significantly more likely to enjoy than non-Whites (Mizell 2005, 26). Finally, several types of music typically taught in schools of music and K-12 settings are among the least preferred of all categories of music examined, and there were not significant differences, by race, in this pattern of low interest. For example, only 9 percent of respondents regardless of race reported liking choral music, 10 percent liked opera, and 12 percent liked listening to marching bands (Mizell 2005, 6).

Why music preferences exhibit racial and ethnic patterns is a question beyond the scope of this essay; however, when music preferences fall along racial or ethnic lines, the exclusion of specific styles of music becomes not merely an issue of what gets left out, but more significantly, to paraphrase education theorist Michael Apple, who gets left out as a consequence of the cultural politics of knowledge (1979, 7). The sorting and ordering of music also helps materialize abject bodies, the excluded people who perform and enjoy the excluded music. If people who were deemed non-White in the NEA study are more likely to enjoy specific styles and genres, then the exclusion of those styles from the list of acceptable audition music reduces the likelihood that students from such a pool will apply and be accepted to university programs.

Listening for Affirmations of Whiteness

When I described the voice auditions to Ladson-Billings, she invited me to consider what the audition committee is looking and listening for. Her question can be answered on several levels. First, it wants to hear “quality,” which is defined conventionally in terms of repertoire; merely selecting a piece of classical high art music is not sufficient, however. In addition, the work must be “embodied,” that is, performed according to a set of fairly strict performance-practice rules. Specific visions of correct tone quality, diction, body comportment, and even attire shape perceptions of whether the committee is hearing a good performance. The committee evaluates rhythmic and melodic “quality,” defined as strict adherence to the notated page, and it wants to hear a “musical” performance, a nebulous expectation that probably means expressivity. Borrowing a concept that has emerged in the language arts area, the judges want to see and hear the musical counterpart of so-called standard English.

Quality performance may be genre and culture specific, however, and when faculty committees apply the standards articulated above to evaluate auditions, they are
listening for cultural capital; more significantly, they are listening for affirmations of Whiteness. Not just any Whiteness will do, either; art song with a country twang will not cut it.

Building the Bins: Racing Bodies, Styling Music

**Listening for Difference: The Funding of Race**

Fifteen years ago I would have concluded my argument by asserting that inequity occurs because specific categories of people do or do not like particular styles of music and arguing that the epistemic specificity of the audition requirements accomplishes de facto racial discrimination. As important as these assertions may be, postmodern theory compels me to take another step and look at the materialization of difference—the construction of categories—as one of the technologies that helps effect major dominations and foster inequities.

There are at least two interrelated processes of categorization occurring in the auditions, one concerning bodies and the other, musics. The first process involves the materialization of bodies as raced. As many race theorists have argued, race is a social construction, and the materialization of bodies as raced relies on a discourse of difference. Butler’s theorization of sexual politics, specifically her assertion that sex is a performative “regulatory ideal” rather than a “simple fact or static condition of a body,” can similarly be applied to the construct of race (1993, 1–2). Regardless of whether the realm is race, sex, or music, the materialization of difference is predicated on the creation or materialization of categories. I call the categories that help materialize difference “bins,” and the inequitable but systematic strategies of dividing and differentiating students, described by Popkewitz, rely on such bins (1998, 2). Binning, that is, the creation of bins, whether it occurs prior to or is materialized by the very act of sorting, is integral to sorting and ordering, and binning relies on sets of criteria that help to distinguish the contents of one bin from another. Establishing bins, naming them, determining the number of bins that will apply (for example, whether the two bins—White and non-White—of the NEA study or the several appearing on US census documents), creating the criteria that will distinguish one bin from another, determining whether the bins will be discrete, and deciding how to proceed when bodies do not clearly fit into established bins are acts of power. Although the boundaries of bins may be fuzzy, ever shifting, and time- and place-specific, the acts of binning and sorting seem to be omnipresent pedal points in the process of ordering that creates and maintains racial inequity.

**Listening for Difference: The Funding of Musical Style**

Like bodies, music often is binned. For example, the training of musicians in undergraduate courses often includes exercises to teach musicians how to hear, replicate,
and create the similarities and differences that distinguish one musical style from another. Students are expected to identify the style, genre, or even the probable composer of unfamiliar works (for example, Romantic not Baroque, Beethoven not Schubert, late Beethoven not early, symphony not concerto, second movement not first, and so on).

In addition, music bins are present in stores selling recordings, the recordings having been sorted by style, composer, performer, or combinations thereof. Decisions about where to place new releases are based on a process of binning that helps establish which similarities and differences are salient and which are not. If the criteria articulating difference were changed, a re-sorting probably would occur, and if they were changed again, another shuffling would result. In other words, there is nothing inevitable or immutable about the binning process that materializes musical style. Borrowing Butler’s terminology, style is a regulatory ideal.

The binning issues that I described earlier in relation to race also apply to music, as does the assertion that the binning process is related to power. Thus, the materialization of style, especially when it is harnessed to an ordering of the resultant style bins, has a usefulness beyond that of merely helping students to hear and perform music. Extending Ruth Gustafson’s assertion that the “good” ear is a White ear, I add that the “good” ear is discriminatory on multiple levels.

Thus, multiple processes of binning work collaboratively in the university audits; the categorization process that creates style operates in consort with a racing and ordering of bodies such that exclusion can be accomplished without ever uttering the word “race.” The styling of music stands in for the racing of bodies; the ordering of styles that follows the binning and sorting, in effect, orders bodies as well, relegating not only the excluded music but also the bodies that love it, to a zone of abjection.

Can We Renovate or Is It Time to Move?

Questioning the status quo in undergraduate school music, particularly the narrowness of the canon, is not new nor has school music on the K-12 level been exempt from such critique. In 1967, the Tanglewood Symposium articulated concerns about the cultural exclusivity of the K-12 music curriculum; the initiatives that followed in the wake of Tanglewood focused largely on curricular content and on enlarging the canon. Using Christine Sleeter and Carl Grant’s concept of social reconstructionist multiculturalism, in 1991 I proposed broader radical changes that encompassed revisions in epistemic assumptions, as well as a rethinking of how music is taught, who should teach it, and the purposes of music education in K-12 schools. By and large, these calls for equity-based reform have gone unheeded, regardless of the source or of whether they have focused on undergraduate or K-12 music education. The implications of such entrenchment are enormous for teacher training, however, especially because colleges and universities constitute the only available pipeline to K-12 music teaching.
Frustrated by how little attention has been given to equity in the decades since Tanglewood and concerned that music education has moved even farther away from the equity goals I value, I ask a dangerous and disruptive question: can we renovate or is it time to move? In other words, given the firmly entrenched systems of reasoning about school music at the undergraduate level and the apparent lack of incentive for change, should schools of music get out of the business of training music teachers?

I have thought about this question while watching “American Idol” and have compared the television program’s selection processes to those of the School of Music. “American Idol” clearly is more successful in attracting and retaining a racially and ethnically diverse array of musicians than are the university’s voice auditions, but the two selection processes display similarities, nevertheless. Judges in both cases look for specific styles and performance practices; in addition, racial politics are at work, the corporeal diversity of the “American Idol” finalists notwithstanding. The “Idol” is selected, in large part, by the viewers who can afford to buy votes for their favorite singers. The dreams, hopes, and fears of these viewers are tapped and constructed by watching the show. In several instances in recent years, the racialization of these dreams, hopes, and fears has been evident in the program’s outcome. Thus, as I have considered an intellectual or physical move for music education, watching “American Idol” has reminded me that there is no place to hide, no space unmarred by the continued full social funding of race.

School music tends to systematically exclude too many people and if, as Michael Omi and Howard Winant claim, racial domination can be perpetuated by denying the “continuing significance of race” (Omi and Winant 1993, 3) then one starting point for more inclusivity is open and thoughtful discussion about how race is socially funded in the ideas, beliefs, and practices that give school music form and substance. Race has rarely been mentioned in past discussions of undergraduate school music; this silence needs to come to an end. If music scholars and teachers recognize that categories of difference—racial and ethnic categories, in particular—are dynamic social constructs integrally connected to relations of power; that Whiteness is materialized, in part, by the creation of other categories, which establish and reinforce its boundaries; that difference is invoked as part of a process of sorting and ordering that systematically advantages some groups of people while disadvantaging others; then we have a framework for exploring how school music funds race. The audition process I have described is but one example of pervasive and insidious racial politics.

I recognize that whenever the concept of race is invoked, including in this paper, a donation is made to its funding. The same can be said about the concept of style, which, as I pointed out earlier, helped accomplish racial exclusion without explicitly invoking race. However, never to speak of these things because doing so further funds them takes scholars and teachers out of important conversations. Ignoring or dismissing ongoing processes of binning, sorting, and ordering does little to stop them. As I have said elsewhere, my project as a postmodern scholar concerned about equity is to denaturalize taken-for-granted constructs such as
race, sex, and gender while *simultaneously* working to reduce or eliminate their damaging effects (Koza 2005). 22

With the goal in mind of enfolding and affirming all students, I return to Ladson-Billings’ question, “What is the committee listening for?” Earlier, I stated it listens for affirmations of Whiteness. I invite all music educators, especially those who identify as White, to continue to listen carefully for Whiteness, *not to affirm it*, but to recognize its institutional presence, understand its technologies, and thereby work toward defunding it. Not only is it important that music educators talk substantively about race in discussions of school music, but also that we explore multiple ways of thinking and talking about music, learning, teaching, and quality.

Substantive discussions of race can help interrogate the explicit and implicit purposes of school music. Acknowledging the entrenched presence of racial politics may lead to a different, less cosmopolitan understanding of multicultural music education, one more closely attuned to equity. Viewing the exclusivity of school music as an expression of the continued funding of race can open the door to different explanations for resistance to change as well as different avenues for movement.

In the long term, the social funding of race is a costly, bankrupting project for everyone. Its universally impoverishing effects weaken and jeopardize school music programs, the people in them, and the people they shut out.

Notes

10. Ibid., 26.
11. Ibid., 6.
13. For an insightful discussion of racialized body politics in music education, see Ruth Gustafson, “Merry Throngs and Street Gangs: The Fabrication of Whiteness and the Worthy
References


Chapter 8
My Music, Their Music, and the Irrelevance of Music Education

Daniel Cavicchi

In the late 1980s, researchers in the Music in Daily Life Project at the State University of New York at Buffalo set out to interview people about music in their lives.\(^1\) No prescriptions were put on who could be interviewed, and the interview format was open-ended, beginning simply with the question, “What is music about for you?” Among the 150 people who participated was a cross section of the population of Buffalo: children and elders; men and women; students, artists, at-home parents, and blue- and white-collar workers; and Whites and people of color. On the whole, it was one of the first studies of its kind in the United States, providing a wide snapshot of American music—not as an historical genre to be learned, or as a professional lifestyle to ogle, but as a diverse and changing set of practices in people’s everyday lives squeezed between, and often given meaning by, family obligations, life crises, work deadlines, and school chores.

What surprised the researchers the most, as they examined and discussed tapes and transcripts of the interviews, was the new and complex world they had encountered. “Music,” as it was revealed by the interviewees, repeatedly defied traditional and institutionalized definitions promoted by colleges, schools, churches, and even the music industry. People’s descriptions of their musical lives encompassed a variety of overlapping behaviors (including those typically considered nonmusical); frequently involved mixing and movement between established genres; and did not correlate neatly according to race, gender, socioeconomic status, and other cultural markers. The Music in Daily Life Group eventually came to refer to what they had found as evidence of “idioculture,” a term pointing to the ways in which each person had, in practice, developed a whole and unique understanding of how to be musical in the world.

Disconnection between institutionalized and practiced understandings of music was most apparent in interviews with school-age children and teens. A student named May, for example, talked about music in her life in terms of two different

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worlds. In one, recently developed in high school, she practiced violin eight hours a day and traveled every weekend to the Juilliard School of Music in New York City, where she eschewed Paganini and worked hard to convey the emotion in Mozart’s concertos. In the other, developed as a child, she listened to opera, New Wave, classical, and jazz; made mix tapes; danced to the radio; hummed to the “TV themes” in her head; and sang gospel songs. Attempting to explain how she changed from middle school to her time at Juilliard, she said, “In middle school, I really liked the Rolling Stones and the Who. I really liked them, but then all of a sudden . . . .” She stopped and then added,

I’m actually glad I learned that music because I think that now . . . like one day I got up in the “commons,” the cafeteria, and started playing, this was right before my competition at Carnegie Hall, and I didn’t want to feel pressured when I got on stage and saw thousands of people. I had to get my anxiety out in front of the school, and afterward someone said, “Well, can you play Grateful Dead rock from America?” and I said, “Yeah,” and I started playing it.2

May’s use of the Grateful Dead to “get . . . anxiety out” before a Juilliard competition nicely contrasted the two worlds of her musical experience; in one, she attempted to display her mastery of the violin and, in the other, she used music to interact with her peers, manage her emotions, and get through a difficult situation. May’s descriptions of her musical experiences at Juilliard were detailed and abstract. She explained that she was “not too social” and that is why she “lean[ed] toward music”; in fact, she said that the violin “is the only thing I can put all of my emotions into and I don’t have to express myself.” However, she casually described musical experiences outside of school that were quite varied, social, and pragmatic. When she listened to music, it was often with friends in the car; when she danced, it was at parties or in front of the mirror to cheer herself up when she was depressed; when she sang gospel, it was a way to “glorify the Lord” and get ready for playing; and when she thought about her father, it was by amusingly recalling him mock-conducting symphonies.

Juilliard is a conservatory, meant to prepare the world’s future concert musicians, so May’s focus on vocational training in describing her experiences there is not surprising. But the place of Juilliard in May’s wider musical experience serves as a potent example of the peculiar kind of separation between music in school and music outside of school. The musical activities and behaviors that students take for granted as they go about their lives in the modern world are suddenly rather meaningless when they enter the music classroom and vice versa. That May several times complained that “a lot of people are ignorant of what I do” is indicative of the ways in which her schooled musical ideologies and practices existed apart from her engagement in everyday musical folkways.3

It’s become commonplace nowadays to cite the ways in which colleges and schools favor an elitist and narrow focus on Western art music between 1750 and 1900. The complaint is chiefly about genre and often elicits calls for inclusion—of non-Western musics, or, increasingly, of selected popular or vernacular musics. Indeed, inclusion and diversity have formed the bedrock of ethnomusicology’s mission since the 1950s, and the field has made great strides in adding the rest of the
world to the standard music curriculum. But I would contend that thinking in terms of genre is itself part of music education’s isolation; the bifurcation of music in daily life and music education is rooted more deeply in conflicting ideas about musicality. Music institutions promote a means of “being musical” which is quite narrowly defined when compared to the musical actions and experiences of most people as they wake, commute, work, shop, relax, and otherwise pass the time in a complex, modern society.

Institutionalized musicality is often limited to formal works, or texts, composed by especially gifted artists and performed by skilled musicians trained to capture the essence of the composer’s intentions. I use terms like “formal” and “essence” purposely, for the value of this definition of music lies in the assumptions of ontology. Music is understood as a material thing that exists in itself; meaning is created only when musicians and listeners expose themselves to the complex unfolding of a work’s structure. While this sort of thinking is reproduced by other institutions of music outside of education, like the music industry (which, through sheet music and recordings, does in fact make music into a “thing” that can be transferred whole from one person to another), or by copyright law (which treats music exclusively in terms of closed and original works), it nevertheless ignores the ways in which music exists alternately, at the mundane experiential level of people’s daily lives, as a set of practices, from singing with friends to blasting James Brown while cleaning the house. In everyday musicality, music doesn’t have any tangible effect or meaning “in itself”; it only becomes significant and meaningful when people “do” it. Even among Springsteen fans, among whom I conducted fieldwork for several years, reverence for a song gives way when it comes to that song’s meaning, which is refracted by multiple, changing, and sometimes contradictory uses in particular contexts. At first glance, fans are entirely focused on musical works, but longer and deeper study reveals that it is their listening, singing, memorizing, and arguing, not the music “in itself,” that is most meaningful for fans in their lives. Music is a tool for living.

Related to the reification of music in many colleges and schools is a narrow focus on composition and performance. If music is a thing, then how that thing is created becomes of paramount importance for explaining its beauty and power. Despite the significant role of music appreciation in the history of music education, the field today is primarily about teaching students the joys of physically making music. A survey of the web sites of college and university music departments across the United States will confirm this bias in favor of performance: with few exceptions, departments of music require at least two semesters of ensemble experience and/or keyboard proficiency, and programs often describe their mission in terms of musicianship, including photographs of their concert facilities and people playing instruments, either with master teachers in a studio or on stage before an audience. “Making music” does, of course, entail composition and performance, but institutionalized musicality abstracts these behaviors out of a network of complexly interdependent actions that also include instrument making, recording, producing, marketing, distributing, hearing, dancing, teaching, studying, reviewing, and consuming.
If institutionalized musicality is often unilateral, about *giving something to* the world, everyday musicality is multilateral, shaped more by *experience* in a network of social relationships. Jason Toynbee’s idea of “social authorship” addresses this notion of musicality by defining musical creativity as the outcome of particular combinations of people, power relations, and accepted practices or “possibles.” I would even go beyond his conception of authorship to argue that “making music” is never simply about producing sound but more broadly about *making sound meaningful*, a process that Steven Feld (1994), Ola Stockfelt (1997), Peter Rabinowitz (Rabinowitz and Reise 1994), Tia DeNora (2000), Simon Frith (1996), and others have shown to involve listeners, as much as composers and performers, in different contexts. At any rate, in a world where music’s meaning can and often does move far a field from what a composer or performer intends, and where listeners often outnumber players and singers, the emphasis of institutions of musical education on the primacy of the work or the performer is an extraordinary feat of defiance.

There are several reasons why this continuing bifurcation of everyday musicality and institutionalized musicality is a significant obstacle for the future of music education.

1. **Risk of Alienation.** Reaching students is, of course, always a problem for educators; learning is hard and sometimes unpleasant work, and every generation of teachers has to contend with their students’ boredom, cynicism, and resistance. However, unlike, say, geometry, which is often entirely new to students and begs legitimate inquiries about its relevance to life outside school, music is already known in powerful and affirming ways. Students are downloading songs, memorizing lyrics, covering their bedroom walls with posters of bands, singing and dancing at concerts, and playing guitar or drums—in other words, engaging frequently in what they see as meaningful musical behavior. When “music” class turns out not to include any of those behaviors but rather involves learning simplified Native American songs, or putting on a production of “Pirates of Penzance,” it comes off as highly antiquated and ignorant about what music is really about. Music teachers, simply in attempting to teach the district curriculum and affirm the truth of “good music,” challenge the legitimacy of their students’ deeply felt musical experiences and therefore—whether they intend to or not—begin from the position of a threat.

2. **Discouragement of Intellectual Curiosity.** A number of students embrace school music activities like instrument lessons and ensemble playing; that’s why school music exists at all. But many students also find school music unwelcoming. I first learned this when I naively attempted to study what I thought was music as an avid undergraduate listener; because I was reluctant to play an instrument, I found that many courses were not open to me and that I could not fully involve myself in the intellectual culture of the discipline. I took some music appreciation courses but instead cultivated my love of music through record collecting. Thomas Regelski (2004) has pointed out that music educators have not done research on the effectiveness of music programs in shaping students’ musi-
cal lives outside of school. But I would suggest that some evidence lies in the extremely low numbers of music majors in college, which hover around 2% of the total student population (CMS 2003). Based on the interest, time, and energy most teenagers devote to music in their daily lives, music, as an academic field, should potentially be much bigger and more influential than it is. Rather than focus on those who have succeeded in a given school music program, it might be wise to think about those who have *not* succeeded but wanted to, those it has turned away at the gates.

3. **Confusing Discourse About Musicality.** Musical institutions have an ideological power that is disproportionate to the number of people engaged in their species of musical activity. As a result, institutionalized musicality has influenced popular perception without changing behavior, so that people acting musically do not believe that they are actually doing so. That I could not get any of my fellow colleagues in graduate school to even discuss music in a colloquium because they “had no training,” and that Americans consider themselves “not very musical” simply because they don’t play an instrument or can’t “hold a tune”\(^1\) is evidence of how the school emphasis on performance has affected people’s understanding of how they fit into the musical life of their society. But self-deprecation has not stopped those same people from buying, listening, dancing, and—often alone, often in the car—singing, all with great enthusiasm. What is it that they are doing if it is not music? Could it be possible that they are in fact musical, except in ways that are not officially recognized? This all creates a very odd situation for those who study musical behavior in the United States—when you ask ordinary people (that is, not music professionals) to talk about their musical lives, most of them initially respond with incredulity, protesting that they “don’t know anything about music.” Then they talk for two hours about all sorts of activities and feelings that apparently have no name.

4. **Weakened Political Position.** On a curricular level, the bifurcation of everyday musicality and institutionalized musicality weakens the significance of music education. One reason that we are constantly having to “save the music” (to use the phrase popularized in the United States by music video station VH-1)\(^2\) is that the music taught in schools is not the music that people recognize as part of their everyday lives, and so it is not generally considered integral to society and worth funding. School orchestras and marching bands can be impressive, but they are a type of musical behavior that is specialized (few marching bands exist outside of high school and college football games anymore) and extraneous (the everyday musical life of concerts, dancing, and listening survives just the same with or without school music programs). At the disciplinary level, the diaspora of nontraditional music scholars across the disciplines of American studies, communications, English, history, and sociology has seriously diluted the potential power of music as a scholarly subject. Save for the few conference events focused on gathering diverse academic perspectives on music, including the “Border Crossings” conference at the University of Ottawa in 1995 and the “Musical Intersections” conference in Toronto in November 2000, people
studying music in separate disciplines rarely acknowledge one another and therefore are unable to take advantage of their common interests for forwarding knowledge, obtaining grants, and lobbying for recognition.

Of course, bifurcation may not necessarily be a problem at all. If music education is supposed to function as a meaningful alternative to the hyped commercial music culture that so pervades our society, then it might be appropriate for music instruction to appear a bit foreign to the uneducated. In many ways, that was the point of public schooling in the first place: Horace Mann first envisioned public education as an antidote to the divisive class system of industrial capitalism in antebellum America, providing shared experiences and values that people could not find anywhere else (Mann 1848/2004). It is plausible to view music education in the same way, balancing the divided niche cultures of commercial music with an alternate form of aesthetic knowledge that speaks to a wider, shared, human creativity.

Unfortunately, this view depends on a couple of debatable assumptions. First is the supposition that the commercialized, everyday, musical life of a community has less merit than institutionalized music education as a promoter of cherished human values. This is a Modernist assumption that comes from ideology rather than empirical data; there is increasing ethnographic evidence that commercial musical life serves important social and existential functions, including shaping of identity, building community, and creating meaning. Even if one accepts commercial musical life as a “wasteland,” the assumption that it can be effectively counteracted with the offering of an alternative culture through schools falsely assumes much about the power of education. Mann’s vision for public schools in Massachusetts sought an ideal that has never actually been achieved; in fact, as the work of Jean Anyon and Jonathan Kozol have shown, public schools have reproduced the very class divisions Mann envisioned them erasing. Finally, it depends on a radically summative educational model in which teachers introduce and transfer already realized ideas (“music is done this way, not that way”) into students’ heads. The shift toward student-centered learning in education theory has moved away from this sort of thinking toward more formative models, in which education not about inculcating specific or “right” ideas but enabling students to make their own decisions about what the right ideas might be, giving students the necessary skills to function in a complex society and capably face problems and issues that have yet to exist.

Institutionalization is a social necessity, promoting, as sociologists Karen Christensen and David Levinson explain, “rule bound and standardized behavior patterns… that allow people to meet biological, psychological, or social needs” (2003, 668). Its benefits include a codification of shared values and a promotion of collective identity, which are desirable for the cohesion of communities and larger society. Recent attempts to establish museums dedicated to popular music, like The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in Cleveland or Experience Music Project in Seattle, are a testament to such benefits. While it may seem odd to put leather jackets worn by punk rockers in glass display cases, such museums are attempting to recognize the enduring role of popular music in people’s lives and using the presence of a significant building and public programming to legitimate that shared experience. Such
collective identity isn’t perfect, of course; in a complex society, social institutions necessarily exist in tension. As Erik Doxtader argues, institutions “develop by enacting shared identity through necessarily exclusive norms of representation.... While the ability of institutions to represent human experience services the end of collective action coordination, this process necessarily depends on partisan definitions of common interest” (1995, 185). Not everyone agrees with what is displayed in a museum, whether it is the testimony of Japanese victims of the atomic bomb in the Enola Gay exhibit or the absence of U2 in an exhibit on the history of rock ‘n’ roll.

However, the case of institutionalized musicality, I think, reveals a set of problems that go beyond the usual disagreements about representation involved in modern institutionalization. One could make the case that the establishment of music education in the United States, beginning with the introduction of music in public schools in the 1830s and culminating in the founding of the first conservatories and music schools in the 1870s, was, from the beginning, based on a rather tenuous notion of shared identity prescribed by the moral and reformist qualities of classical music rather than lived musical conditions and values (which included enthusiasm for everything from blackface minstrelsy to player pianos) (Broyles 1992, Levine 1988, McCarthy, Chapter 3 of this volume).

Even if one accepts the representative-ness of institutionalized musicality in the nineteenth century, that musicality clearly became more and more isolated as everyday musical culture in the United States changed radically after the 1870s, thanks to the introduction of new music technologies such as the phonograph and radio, new musical cultures introduced by immigration and migration, and new behaviors cultivated by expanding urban consumerism. Institutions are always slow to change; after all, they exist in order to define and promote the traditions of a community. But institutions of music education have long been actively resistant to change. The recording industry has been in existence since the 1910s, urban blues and rock ‘n’ roll have been around since the 1940s, and MTV’s codification of music and fashion is over twenty years old now. Yet only rarely do the behaviors associated with modern, commercial, and popular music—from DJing and dance to power chords and social protest—make it onto the radar of school musicality, except as phenomena to ignore or even oppose.

The fact is that musical culture will be always bigger, more varied, and in more ways meaningful than formal institutions allow. Institutionalization, like the creation of academic fields, is serious business, and it requires a certain lethargy to allow society to fully work out what it wants and why. As Christensen and Levinson explain, institutions depend on given-ness: “Norms and roles develop as societies (or smaller units within societies) accept them as routine and proper, until eventually their existence and legitimacy is taken for granted” (2003, 669). But that given-ness required for an institution’s existence is also the source of a unique and unchecked power that may create potential abuses and problems. With music, we are faced with the situation in which lots of people are engaging in musical practices that they themselves do not deem “musical”; lots of people denying they have “musical” ability because they don’t fit into institutionalized culture; and lots of people claiming to be “tone deaf,” unable to dance, unable to say anything intelligent about
what they hear, not really “musical” like other people, and so on. At worst, institutionalized musicality has become a government-sponsored albatross that damages rather than creates, inhibits rather than promotes, people’s understanding of the culture in which they live. We need to recognize and check the ways in which lethargy can combine with the inherent power of social institutions to close down, weaken, or malign changing and meaningful experiences outside its defined sphere of acceptability.

How do we do that? As Gerald Graff (1992) has pointed out, the typical solution has always been to add new programs, new faculty, to appease those “left out.” The increased presence of jazz studies or ethnomusicology on campuses across the United States is an example of this means of dealing with feelings of alienation among some members of the music community. But I would agree with Graff that this sort of solution is only temporary and doesn’t do much to help students understand and connect their classroom experiences, some of which promote contradictory ideas and expectations, or to think about how any of it applies to their lives. A better way to check elitism and close the bifurcation of students’ musical experience might be to make institutionalization less “given,” to stop hiding curriculum controversies from students, and instead use controversy itself—and the passion it generates—as educational tools.

What music education needs, frankly, is a pedagogical shake-up on the level of canon debates in literary studies in the 1980s or the crisis of “culture” in anthropology over the past several decades. The forgotten debates between scholars and practitioners in the founding of the College Music Society are an interesting and provocative place to start.¹⁵ Why were there such divisions? Do they still exist? What do they mean for understanding music? Pop music scholars need to hash things out with their classical music colleagues and involve students in the debate. Student performers and listeners need to compare notes about what happens when they participate in the same performance or about how they understand the same work. Students need to learn and translate between the different discourses of instrument building, composing, performing, marketing, dancing, and fandom. Such an approach is not about cultivating “avocational” music making or “professional” music making (as stated in the MayDay Group’s Action Ideal Number Four), but rather an active engagement with what is meant by “music-making” in the first place.

Few of us are in a position to wholly challenge the bifurcated musicality created by institutions; but with one class at a time we can plant the seeds of change. For example, in one course I teach regularly for college undergraduates, I require students to conduct fieldwork for a semester in what they consider a musical community. There are no requirements about the type of music or community studied, but throughout we focus on the aesthetic, psychological, and social functions of the music they encounter. During a recent semester, we learned shape-note singing, debated the worth of cover bands, experienced a “noise music” performance (see Hegarty 2007), learned about the politics of contradance, and analyzed experimental hip-hop among other things. Students don’t learn sets of musical performance skills that would be considered “basic” in most college-level music programs today,
but they deeply engage different kinds of musicality and also weigh their function and value.

Of course, shaping a music curriculum around open encounters with diverse conceptions of “music-making” at the primary or secondary level may not be possible or desirable, given the age and maturity of a given group of students; the professional pressures of having to meet mandated learning objectives, as well as state and national standards; and the needs of particular communities, the members of which, after all, may have a vested interest in promoting one kind of musicking over another. But even introducing lessons or brief exercises in the K-12 music classroom that frame musicality as an issue rather than a given, and that clearly communicate a valuing of students’ own musical practices, would be a good start at making sure that the glacial process of institutional change is at least moving in a direction that is inclusive rather than exclusive.

In the end, all I know is that this sort of approach, one that doesn’t dictate but encourages exploration and one that does not isolate but truly embraces the varieties of musical experience, creates more student initiative and excitement than I typically see as a teacher. Comments like “I’ve never thought about music like this before” or “I’ve never learned so much” are common. Disbelief, unfortunately, is also frequent. Every semester, someone asks me, “We can really do this? This counts?” For me, such questioning indicates the ongoing gap between students’ everyday musical lives and formal music education. But the revelation that institutions can seriously address everyday musicking is a start toward change. To students who ask “This counts?” I just say, “It ought to” and hope they spread the message.

Notes

1. The Music in Daily Life Project was centered at the State University of New York at Buffalo between 1984 and 1990. I joined as a researcher in 1988 and eventually became an editor for the project; a selection of the interviews was published in Crafts, Cavicchi, and Keil 1993.
2. The complete text of May’s interview can be found in Crafts, Cavicchi, and Keil (1993), 55–60.
3. As is the fact that someone at the pre-eminent music school in the United States actually used the phrase, “Grateful Dead rock from America,” which belies an ignorance of the ordinary discourse of popular music.
5. For useful outline of how the “work” came to dominate traditional musicology, see Lydia Goehr 1992.
6. This is the primary motivation for Christopher Small’s call for abandoning the term “music” for “musicking.” See Small 1998.
7. “Performance,” as commonly understood by those in institutions of music learning, is itself narrowly defined in terms of the rendering of a musical work for the benefit of an audience. The exploration of “performance” as a wider category of human behavior, by, that is, Victor Turner and William Beeman in anthropology, Richard Bauman and Barbara Kirschenblatt-Gimblett in folklore, and Richard Schechner in theater studies, is not widely acknowledged in traditional musicology.
8. For an analysis of the primacy of performers in a music school, see Bruno Nettl’s discussion of the “society of musicians” at a university music school in Nettl 1995, 43–81. See also Kingsbury 1988.
10. The same was true when I started to apply for jobs as an assistant professor; while my research and writing were entirely about music, because I had no “performance tapes” and was not qualified to “lead the university wind ensemble,” I had little chance of finding work in a music department.
11. I have encountered this complaint regularly in my fieldwork with music listeners; see the “Preface” to Cavicchi 1998, vii–ix.
12. The VH-1 Save the Music Foundation, established by popular music video station VH-1, is dedicated to “restoring music programs in cities across the country,” mainly through the purchase of musical instruments for districts suffering from budget cuts. The organization’s website is at http://www.vh1.com/partners/save_the_music/home.html.
15. See the history essays on the College Music Society Web Page (www.music.org/membership/hisotry/Annalstable.html). I don’t think it is a coincidence that a similar controversy erupted in the founding of ethnomusicology, pitting the followers of Alan Merriam’s focus on scholarship versus Mantle Hood’s advocacy of “bimusicality.” It remains a fundamental and unresolved division about how to best understand music.

References


There can be no doubt that we live in a “connected” world, that isolation is neither good nor sustainable, and that music education continues to counter that trend at the peril of its viability. We need to break through the assumptions of self-containment and self-sufficiency to other disciplines\(^1\) that can illuminate what music educators are called upon to accomplish. A thorough treatment of this issue is a good idea.

Before we get too far afield in disciplines beyond musicology, however, we have some work to do closer to home—on how we employ text-based musicology (encompassing, basically, music analysis and history) to parse the musical meanings of materials we intend students to learn. Most music teacher education programs are attached in various ways to the assumption that the conservatory model of performance study and a quasi-linguistic analytical model of music analysis are sufficient to the task of gaining access to musical meanings. Space does not permit me to go beyond that problem in this essay. However, I shall pull in ideas from disciplines outside musicology to support this view.

The purpose of this essay is to provide arguments about how we think about music in support of the notion that music educators should seek connections outside their traditional boundaries, of why the dominant model of study and research in music and music education should change, and of why music teachers and musicians need to be less insular in their relations with other disciplines. We can help students grasp music’s true power and significance if we break through the theoretical boundaries that encompass the established notions of traditional musicology—the notions that music is autonomous and purely musical. The practicalities of breaking out, however, require intellectual courage and a critical approach.

In order to provide these arguments, it is important to do two things. One is to examine the most powerful contemporary reason that lies behind the dominant model of study and research in music and music education. In other words, in countering its limitations, it is important to understand the most important motivation for the model’s intellectual and pragmatic narrowness. The second is to explain the

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character of music’s connection to other cultural and social phenomena, something that is overlooked (or rejected) by the dominant model in music, but revealed by other disciplines. For, without this understanding, it will in the end be unclear as to why music educators need to broaden their range of professional and general knowledge in order to be more effective as teachers.

This second purpose is important because of the way in which music communicates and evokes in people the kind of experiences that do appear to be quite distinctive, unlike that of any other form of human communication and expression; on the surface, then, stressing its connections to other forms of experience appears to be a risk to music’s particular character and the kinds of experiences to which it gives rise. The degree to which this is the case is certainly open to debate. However, it seems reasonable to assert that, at least in Western cultures, the feature of music that makes it recognizable and accepted as music is the use of sound in a purely structural and nondenotative and nonreferential manner. While much music, and particularly popular music, contains words in the form of lyrics or libretti that invoke the external world of objects, people, ideas, and concepts, it is the defining, nonlinguistic use of sound in music—structural, nondenotative and nonreferential—that distinguishes music from language. By contrast, the use of sound in language is based upon reference outside it to objects, people, ideas, and concepts, and it is this that characterizes language as language in the minds of people and that distinguishes it from music. Add to this that many other forms of human communication and expression seem to be based on a denotative and referential capacity—as in forms of visual representation—and the feeling that music is something apart from other forms of human communication and expression becomes understandable.

The line that distinguishes music from other forms of human communication and expression cannot, of course, be quite so easily drawn. Abstract art is nondenotative and nonreferential in its appeal and can—in a certain sense—be thought of as purely structural. Further, there are forms of literature that, while using words, very seriously weaken or eradicate an appeal to the denotative and referential and play, through words, on the more musical aspects of sound as sound. In this context, it is worth recalling the nineteenth-century French poet Paul Verlaine’s credo of “la musique avant toute chose” (in poetry, “music before everything”). If music is truly distinctive, then, this distinctiveness lies in a combination of the sonic, the nondenotative, and the nonreferential, where words, if used, are declaimed in a manner that far transcends their normal articulation in language and that serves an intrinsically musical logic.

It is because the nondenotative and the nonreferential do not seem to figure in other forms of human communication and expression, or figure in a less fundamental way than they do in music, that music’s distinctive character has been quite jealously guarded by musicologists and music aestheticians. To admit that music has some connection to other forms of experience—forms of experience, it is tacitly assumed, in which the nondenotative and nonreferential are not fundamental or do not figure—is, for them, to risk draining music of its constitutive and defining characteristics, in short, of its “essence.”
This has in the past led to the argument that the meaning of music lies exclusively within its sonic structures. This argument is tautological: music is its own meaning. Leonard B. Meyer took issue with it in his groundbreaking book, *Emotion and Meaning in Music*, in criticizing the position of those he characterized as “absolutists”:

The absolutists have contended that the meaning of music lies specifically, and some would assert exclusively, in the musical processes themselves. For them, musical meaning is non-designative. But in what sense these processes are meaningful... they have been unable to state with either clarity or precision... This failure has led some critics to assert that musical meaning is a thing apart, different is some unexplained way from all other kinds of meaning. This is an evasion of the real issue. (Meyer 1956, 33)

The problem with this “absolutist” position is that of confusing a symbol that has no referent in the world of objects, people, ideas, and concepts with one that is a closed system. Music is not a closed system; however, it is capable of invoking the world outside it without referring to objects, people, ideas, and concepts. It is this distinction that facilitated the influential theories of Meyer and Suzanne Langer on the issue of musical meaning. Meyer located musical significance in “psychological constants” (1973, 14), while Langer located this significance in “psychological laws of ‘rightness’” (Langer 1942, 240). Put simply, music was taken to appeal autonomously and directly to the autonomous awareness of the individual. This appeal was assumed to be purely structural in character. That is, since all music was taken to originate in the minds of people, and since all human minds were assumed to possess similar psychological characteristics, it was concluded that there existed a certain conformity of structure between all music and all minds.

Because music was taken to appeal autonomously, directly, and in a purely structural manner to the autonomous awareness of the individual, it was once more felt that this quite distinctive form of human experience should be kept safe from intruding external and situated elements that might drain it off its supposedly abstract and universal “essence.” One such element was explication through language, whose basic appeal was to the world of objects, people, ideas, and concepts. The other was the idea that music was in some meaningful way related to this very same external world. This sense of keeping the “musical experience” safe from contamination through explicit examination became apparent early in the development of musicology following World War II, and is evidenced in the writings of leading musicologists of the time. In 1962, Arthur Mendel observed that “music-historians are interested in musical works... as objects of delight” (Mendel 1962, 4). He concluded, however, that although the “direct relation of the music-historian to the work is necessary, it is certainly not sufficient for explanation.” It must remain, he said, “unanalyzable” (16). In other words, although a love and appreciation of the direct and powerful experiences that music can evoke should be the starting point for scholarly work on music, they should not themselves constitute the object of study for musicologists. Claude Palisca was of the same opinion in arguing that music aesthetics was not a legitimate area of inquiry for scholars of music. “We cannot forget,” he argued, “that musical aesthetics is not musical scholarship; it is musical experience and musical theory converging upon a philosophical problem.
Aesthetics does not rest upon documentary or similar evidence, but on philosophical and psychological principles tested by experience” (Palisca 1963, 110).

No scholar of music would argue that “the musical experience” should not be the starting point for musical scholarship. Indeed, David Gramit has more recently observed that “the musical experience” attracts “statements of allegiance that cut across the boundaries of otherwise conflicting musicological camps” (Gramit 2000, 38). However, the overwhelming trend within musicology since the writings of Mendel and Palisca has been to keep the “musical experience” off limits as an object of inquiry. This trend was the subject of some perceptive remarks by the feminist musicologist Susan McClary toward the end of the twentieth century. McClary confesses, “I was drawn to music because it is the most compelling cultural form I know.” She entered musicology because she “believed that it would be dedicated (at least in part) to explaining how music manages to create such effects.” Musicology granted her access “to an astonishing cultural legacy: musical repertoires from all of history and the entire globe, repertoires of extraordinary beauty, power, and formal sophistication.” Yet McClary soon discovered:

Musicology fastidiously declares issues of musical signification to be off-limits to those engaged in legitimate scholarship. It has seized disciplinary control over the study of music and has prohibited the asking of even the most fundamental questions concerning meaning. Something terribly important is being hidden away by the profession, and I have always wanted to know why. (McClary 1991, 4)

An answer to this question becomes apparent in considering the character of a musicology different to that encountered by McClary. Gramit argues that this kind of musicology, a critical musicology, “neither denies the relevance of intense involvement with music nor presumes it as a foundational experience.” Precisely because this experience is real, continues Gramit, “it is... socially constructed, an object of inquiry rather than a postulate.” As a consequence, says Gramit, a critical musicology “begins with an acknowledgment that... every encounter with music is historical through and through.” Both the experience and the music on which it is based are social constructs and there cannot, as a consequence, be any relationship with music that is “pure” or unmediated by social processes. Therefore, every encounter with music is

... contingent on culturally constructed concepts, values, and expectations that are bound up not only with an individual’s society, but also with an individual’s place within society, as determined by economic structures, gender roles, class values, and host of other categories, of which we are aware to a greater or lesser degree. In this sense, regardless of the repertoire under consideration, there is no direct, unmediated contact with a musical object, for neither listening subject nor heard object are so purely and unproblematically constituted. A critical musicology thus both recognizes the intense experience we call aesthetic and explores its historical contingency, a double perspective of involvement and detachment... (2000, 34–35)

In a well-known exchange between musicologists Gary Tomlinson and Lawrence Kramer, Tomlinson proposes that, in line with this double perspective of involvement and detachment,
... we might begin to interrogate our love for the music we study. This is not to say that we should try to stop loving it... It is instead to urge that we dredge up our usual impassioned musical involvements from the hidden realm of untouchable premise that they tend to inhabit, and that we make them a dynamic force—to be reckoned with, challenged, rejected, indulged in, whatever—within our study. (1993, 24)

This, for Kramer, becomes a dangerous undertaking. For Kramer, a concern with contingency necessarily involves a distancing from the immediacy of an engagement with music. What would happen, Kramer asks, “if we gave up listening with the kind of deep engagement, the heightened perception and sense of identification, that both grounds and impels criticism?” He answers, “the materiality of the music, the dynamic sensuous fullness that arguably offers a major site of resistance to ideological pressures, would be put at risk” (1993, 27). Kramer is here rendering as mutually exclusive “the musical experience” and the elements conceived as being external to music, which situate music and its apprehension as events that are culturally and socially constituted. The latter is seen as an ideological threat to the former. In Kramer’s view, “Tomlinson in effect asks for... the dispersal into context of what we usually grasp as the immediacy of music” (1993, 27). The “essence” of music, its autonomy and “purity,” is put at risk.

Kramer’s view is one previously espoused by a number of scholars in the French-language tradition of poststructuralism. Prominent among these was Roland Barthes, who argued that music “speaks, it declaims, it redoubles its voice: It speaks but says nothing, because as soon as it is musical, speech—or instrumental substitute—is no longer linguistic, but corporeal; it only says, and nothing else: my body is put into a state of speech: quasi parlando” (Barthes 1985a, 304). For this reason, speech about music subjects music to ideology, compromising its purity:

As soon as someone speaks about music—or a specific music—as a value in itself, or on the contrary—though this is the same thing—as a value for everyone—that is, as soon as we are told that we must love all music—we feel a kind of ideological cope falling over the most precious substance of evaluation, music: this is “commentary.” (1985b, 279)²

This view seems somewhat ironic, given the propensity of poststructuralism and its antecedents in the French-language tradition of linguistic and cultural theory to lay bare the ideological predispositions of artifacts in all other forms of human communication and expression.

It is this perceived risk of the dispersal of music’s “essence” into a context of ideology that explains, as Susan McClary puts it, why “something terribly important is being hidden away by the profession” of musicology. However, this risk is only perceived—not real. First, the tacit assumption that the nondenotative and non-referential are not fundamental to or do not figure importantly in forms of human expression and communication other than music is just that, a tacit assumption that bears critical examination. If critical examination shows that other forms of human expression and communication are to an important degree nondenotative and non-referential, then the risk to music in relating to them reduces, if not evaporates. Second, if music is capable of invoking the world outside it without referring to objects, people, ideas, and concepts, then, on the face of it, there seems no reason why this
capability should be restricted to the autonomous awareness of the individual, an awareness that is presumed to be independent of the social and cultural forces that to a significant degree constitute it. Is it the case, in other words, that social and cultural realities are not importantly structural in character? Finally, is it really the case that social and cultural mediation of necessity reduces the immediacy of “the musical experience”? Cannot the concrete directness of “the musical experience” be constituted socially in its intrinsic characteristics?

An important argument in support of these ideas has been supplied by Mark Johnson in his book, *The Body in the Mind* (1987). Johnson shows that the basis of language—that which is fundamental to what language communicates as opposed to how it communicates (denotatively and referentially)—is importantly nondenotative and nonreferential. He says:

I am perfectly happy with talk of the conceptual/propositional content of an utterance, but only insofar as we are aware that this propositional content is possible only by virtue of a complex web of nonpropositional schematic structures that emerge from our bodily experience. Once meaning is understood in this broader, enriched manner, it will become evident that the structure of rationality is much richer than any set of abstract logical patterns completely independent of the patterns of our physical interactions in and with our environment. (5)

Johnson’s arguments can be put in context by noting that people have a location in the material environment as a consequence of bodily placement, and can only ultimately operate on this environment through their bodies. To the extent that people have a sense of their location in the environment, and a sense of the significance of this location in relation to the material world (including other people), they thus have it through their bodies. It can as a consequence be argued that senses of the world and of individual identity and significance in the world must be rooted in the body. The process of grasping the character of the connections between embodiment on the one hand and experience, feeling, rationality, and imagination on the other rests on what Johnson terms a “geography of human experience.” Such a geography, says Johnson, “seeks to identify the chief contours (structures) and connections that our experience and understanding exhibit. It... explores the emergence of comprehensible form and organization in our experiences and the means we have of making sense of it” (1987, xxxvii). “Any adequate account of meaning and rationality,” concludes Johnson, “must give a central place to embodied and imaginative structures of understanding by which we grasp our world” (1987, xiii).

Through imagination, continues Johnson, we constitute the “structures that organize our mental representations” within the constraints proffered by the external world as well as the materiality of our bodies. These structures, argues Johnson, are “embodied schemata.” As such they “are not propositional,” neither are they “rich, concrete images of mental pictures” (1987, 23, italics original). They are “structures that organize our mental representations at a level more general and abstract than that at which we form particular mental images” (1987, 23–24). Johnson is talking about language as invoking a fundamentally nondenotative and nonreferential world in what it communicates; as always invoking the logic of grounded, social situations as internalized within the individual, and, through the material connectedness
of bodies and their physical environments, of invoking experiences that—although socially mediated in their very constitution—are direct and concrete in character.

Johnson could equally as well be talking about the world invoked by the sound fundamental to music. Sound brings the world into people from all directions, simultaneously and dynamically. While it is frequently possible to locate the source of a sound, it is a fundamental experiential characteristic of sound that it lifts off the surface of its material source to occupy and give life to the space not only between the source and the listener, but also around the listener. It is experienced as a phenomenon that encompasses and touches the listener in a cocoon-like fashion. Sound reminds people that there is a world of depth that is external to them, which surrounds them, and which touches them simultaneously from all directions. Sound is, in addition, the only major medium of communication that can vibrate perceptibly within the body. The sound of the human voice could not be amplified and projected were it not for chambers or resonators of air inside the body (the lungs, the sinus passages, and the mouth), which vibrate in sympathy with the human voice. Equally, the sound of the human voice could not be amplified were it not for the objects of the external world, objects whose configurations, textures, and movements mold and shape the sound of the voice as it comes into people from all directions simultaneously.

Consequently, the human experience of sound involves, in addition to the sympathetic vibrations of the eardrums, the sympathetic vibration of the resonators of the body. Sound, shaped and resonating with the properties of the internal and external configurations, textures, and movements of the objects of the external world, can thus be felt in addition to being heard. Sound enters the body and is in the body. Not only does sound reveal the internal properties of inanimate material sources and the order of their relationships to the material world around them, but it also reveals the inner, physiological life of individuals in terms of the way the internal configurations, textures, and movements of their bodies affect the quality of sound production. Sound is ideally suited to revealing and connecting the internal and external worlds. It provides an ideal metaphor for embodied schemata and the dynamics that lead to the formation of schemata.

Sound is the medium of music (Wicke 1989 and 1990). As applied to music, the concept of the medium has two distinguishing characteristics. First, it conceptualizes the use of sounds in music as being of a purely structural character consistent with music’s evocation of a world that is fundamentally nondenotative. This world is powerfully material and corporeal in character. Second, while the medium conceptualizes sounds in music as being structured and structuring (that is, structured by people, and structuring in providing the sonic grounds for the construction of meanings), sounds do not determine meanings. They only make them possible through a mediating role. The medium is merely the sounds of music. Music arises as the process of interaction between the sounds of music and individual people. The connection between sounds and people is a concrete, tangible, and direct one that remains to a degree capable of being negotiated, where its precise characteristics are concerned. The kinds of meanings that people invest in the sounds of music are grounded in forms of structured and structuring awareness—embodied schemata structured by
the sounds of music and structuring the sounds of music. For this reason, the meanings people invest in the sounds of music must have a certain character that renders them amenable or suitable for such investment. The character of “the musical experience” is thus constrained and to a degree explained by the fact that only certain kinds of meanings are “musical” meanings (this is because of the specifically corporeal and structural character of the connection between people and the sounds of music), and by the fact that only a certain range of meanings can be invested successfully with any particular medium. As Barthes and other poststructuralist scholars have argued, “the musical experience” is direct, concrete, immediate, nondenotative, and nonreferential. However, in contrast to the arguments of poststructuralists and of many musicologists, “the musical experience” is also mediated, invoking a socially and culturally constituted world that is structural in character.

The world to which Johnson refers is not, then, peculiar to language alone. Embodied schemata underlie all human expression and communication. Music is distinctive in its capacity to invoke this world in a direct, concrete, and immediate fashion, with no intrinsic need to be mediated by the denotative and the referential (although, of course, mediated socially and culturally in its very constitution). Music is not, therefore, the pristine cultural form that needs to be protected from the penetrating glare of all other ideological forms. Music is central and fundamental to the mediation of the affective world, a world that, in turn—and as Johnson so persuasively argues—is fundamental to all forms of human awareness, expression, and communication. This argument is elaborated further by Johnson in his most recent book, *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (2007). Music therefore provides a basic ground for apprehending the world in all its multisensory complexity, a point made by Wicke in his arguments concerning sound as the medium of music.

It is important for those who teach music to understand this connection of music to other cultural and social phenomena because only then, in the classroom, will music’s full affective, cultural, and social potency be revealed. Contrary to the dominant model of study and research in music and music education that takes for granted music’s autonomy from life—its supposed purity—other disciplines demonstrate instead that music connects powerfully to all other forms of human awareness, expression, and communication. Music’s true power and significance cannot therefore be grasped by students if music teachers are insular in their approach in regarding music as autonomous and purely musical.

The practicalities of countering this insularity are daunting, however. There can be no easy remedies based on a shopping list of other important disciplines to consult, or on a list of prescriptive measures that accrediting, certifying, and professional organizations should institute in order to broaden the professional and general knowledge of music teachers and their professors. One thing is sure: such measures will not be effective unless they are based on a secure understanding of the character of music as a fundamentally important form of human expression and communication.

However, these are theoretical arguments. What do they mean in practical terms? They mean that music educators and students need to work with forms of music
where the socially constituted power and significance of the music is readily apparent—or can be made readily apparent—to teachers and students alike. There is no simple prescription or script for doing this. However, it is possible to draw on the work of two authors where the power and significance of the music with which they have engaged has been made readily apparent to indicate the kinds of directions that may be followed by music educators persuaded by these arguments.

Illustrations of how music serves to constitute social life and is therefore socially powerful and significant are provided in Tia DeNora’s book *Music in Everyday Life* (DeNora 2000). It is about the power of music. It explores the proposition that music is capable of creating and influencing moods, emotions, and the ability to concentrate, and is capable also of establishing a basis for individual and collective action. It explores the proposition that music acts powerfully on the body, not just as an external presence, but also as a constitutive agent that serves to form and activate the body in particular ways in particular situations. By joining these two major strands of exploration, the book proposes that music, by acting as a resource and progenitor of individual agency, operates as a force for social ordering at the level of collectivities as well as that of individual behavior.

The book is rich in fieldwork and examples, including those drawn from aerobics classes and the retail sector. Three examples serve to illustrate the points DeNora is making. First, music can act as a force for personal integration. One woman interviewed by DeNora confided:

> I was feeling very stressed this morning because we’re in the throes of moving house... so I actively decided to put on Schubert’s *Impromptus* because they were my father’s favourite... and I thought... about half an hour before I come up here [to her place of paid work], I’ll just listen to them... I needed it... It was only ten minutes of so, you know (2000, 16).

This woman’s confidence provides a telling illustration of the manner in which classical music is frequently used in an everyday situation. More dramatically, music can be a force in therapeutic situations for drawing out personality and identity. DeNora reports a situation involving Gary “who is unable to see or speak in words.” Gary “exhibits distress in the form of shrieks and screams when taken to (no doubt frightening) public places such as shops, and sometimes he bites or scratches other people if they come too close.” Gary was referred by a local health authority for music therapy. DeNora’s observation at this point is telling. Music therapy she says is “often used as a ‘last resort’ for clients when previous, more conventional, therapeutic strategies have been tried and failed” (2000, 14–15):

> Gary is sitting in the music room with his carer, waiting for the music therapy session to begin. He is very still. His child’s body is knotted up, his head bent over, his legs are crossed. As the music therapist begins to play, Gary shouts, and rocks backwards and forward in his chair. The therapist responds to whatever noises he makes, imitating them but also modulating them into softer, more “musical” forms. The therapist then picks up a drum and bangs out a steady beat in sync with Gary’s cries. She begins to sing, “Gary is rocking,” after which Gary’s rocking becomes so intense that his carer has to hold on to Gary’s chair... The therapist then holds the drum closer to Gary and he takes her hand (the first time he had ever done so). He then uses her hand as a beater, and bangs the drum with it. Later, the therapist returns to the piano and plays a low-pitched, “eastern”-sounding (pentatonic)
melody. Gary is still rocking, but gently now. His noises are gentler too. At the end of the session he is smiling. . . (DeNora 2000, 15).

The social power of music can also be used in the service of commerce. As a brochure from a background music company claims:

Creating a happy and relaxed environment through the imaginative use of music is a vital element in securing maximum turnover and ensuring that your business has optimal appeal. Used correctly, music can influence customer buying behaviour by creating or enhancing the image, mood and style you wish to achieve (DeNora 2000, 18).

The manager of Euphoria, an independently owned store retailing trendy disco clothes and street wear to men predominantly in their twenties, commented that “you don’t want anything too ‘soulful’—certainly no classical, but not even jazz” (DeNora 2000, 136–37). DeNora reports that the store sticks to drum-and-bass and club numbers.

Music’s social power has perhaps been best summarized by John Blacking 30 years ago in his book How Musical Is Man? “The rules of musical behavior,” argues Blacking, “are not arbitrary cultural conventions, and techniques of music are not like developments in technology.” Blacking continues: “musical behaviour reflects varying degrees of consciousness of social forces, and the structures and functions of music are related to basic human drives and to the. . . need to maintain a balance between them” (1973, 100). Much in How Musical Is Man? is drawn from Blacking’s fieldwork with the Venda of South Africa. Blacking suggests that:

The Venda make music when their stomachs are full because, consciously or unconsciously, they sense the forces of separation inherent in the satisfaction of self-preservation, and they are driven to restore the balance with exceptionally cooperative and exploratory behaviour. Thus forces in culture and society would be expressed in humanly organized sound, because the chief function of music in society and culture is to promote soundly organized humanity by enhancing human consciousness (1973, 101).

The power of music can act as a force for thought as well as action. As Blacking concludes:

If there are forms intrinsic to music and dance that are not modeled on language, we may look beyond the “language” of dancing, for instance, to the dances of language and thought. As conscious movement is in our thinking, so thinking may come from movement, and especially shared, or conceptual, thought from communal movement. And just as the ultimate aim of dancing is to be able to move without thinking, to be danced, so the ultimate achievement in thinking is to be moved to think, to be thought. . . Essentially it is a form of unconscious cerebration, a movement of the body. We are moved into thinking. Body and mind are one (Blacking 1977, 22–23).

If students and music educators are to engage with the worlds of music, then the work of these two authors indicate, if you will, “paths of imagination” that can be put to work in the classroom by drawing on the musical worlds of educators and students, or on carefully selected materials that, while falling outside the direct musical experience and engagements of students and educators, illustrate abundantly (as in the case of Blacking’s work) music’s social power and significance.
Notes

1. For simplicity’s sake, I shall take “discipline” to mean a body of knowledge, ideas, and procedures, which has a term or “title” used by those acquainted with it. This body has coalesced because those within the discipline have focused their concern on a rather discrete set of problems and have developed methods for dealing with them. Psychology, biology, political science, linguistics, etc., are disciplines. Musicology is another, encompassing music analysis and history.

2. The word “cope” here refers to a priest’s cloak, with the attendant implications of religious-like sacralization.

References


Chapter 10
Becoming Intellectually Fearless

Anthony J. Palmer

In order to be effective, music educators must establish and maintain contact with ideas and people from other disciplines. (MayDay Group 1997, pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume)

Music education is an important segment of the larger picture of education. And education is only a part, albeit fundamental and necessary, of the larger sociocultural and sociopolitical realities of contemporary life. To navigate the exigencies of today’s world, locally and globally, a new type of individual is required in the schools. Now, more than ever, we need new “renaissance” men and women. The present analysis examines implications of a broadened preparation for entering the music classroom, a cross-disciplinary approach to education.

The complexity of contemporary life demands an effective understanding of several disciplines; this increases knowledge that can free one from ideological narrowness. By attempting to view reality from multiple perspectives, one can see the larger picture, the connective tissue, and the nexus of seemingly disparate parts. Although each academic discipline has its viewpoints, and even ideologies, there is an advantage to studying various disciplines with the purpose of integrating the data. The chances of gaining insights to the human condition are thus significantly expanded, and, when carried into the classroom, serve to intensify the educational process. It is to these larger questions that integration is necessary. To paraphrase American physicist Murray Gell-Mann (2003):

One can study many fields separately: philosophy, any of the sciences, sociology, anthropology, economics, etc., but the answers to the large questions cannot be gotten by any single field. All must be studied together in a cross-disciplinary fashion to produce answers. The sum is truly greater than the parts.

The urgency to expand one’s outlook is especially pertinent today. The world could not be more confusing than at this juncture at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Only by understanding the crosscurrents of fact, distortions, and vested

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interests can students be led to become part of future solutions to our present uncertainties about truth and reality. It is chiefly on the young, before they become dulled to the wiles of hidden agendas and deceptions, that we must place responsibility to create a better world for themselves and the human species.

**Unity of Knowledge**

Yes, the world and the global human community appear to be a chaotic mess. However, underlying all existence—animate and inanimate—are some fundamental rules of organization. I do not wish to suggest that reductionism is a valid analytical approach, but one can reasonably make the assumption that if we are of the same basic substance, stars and human beings alike, a basic set of laws should govern all existence. Richard Feynman, another American physicist, makes this point:

> The internal machinery of life, the chemistry of the parts, is something beautiful. And it turns out that all life is interconnected with all other life. . . . It has been discovered that all the world is made of the same atoms, that the stars are of the same stuff as ourselves (1998, 11–12).

Biologist and naturalist Edward O. Wilson agrees, but insists that science be utilized to unite all knowledge.

> The greatest enterprise of the mind has always been and always will be the attempted linkage of the sciences and the humanities. The ongoing fragmentation of knowledge and resulting chaos in philosophy are not reflections of the real world but artifacts of scholarship. The propositions of the original Enlightenment are increasingly favored by objective evidence, especially from the natural sciences (1998, 8).

Parallel to Wilson’s is author and medical doctor Leonard Shlain’s view that ultimately the artist and the physicist both define the nature of reality (1993, 15–16). Tyler Volck (1994) suggests that certain underlying patterns exist at both macro- and microlevels, and when a pattern is “so wide-flung that it appears throughout the spectrum of reality,” then we are dealing with what he calls “metapatterns” that find their existence “in clouds, rivers, and planets; in cells, organisms, and ecosystems; in art, architecture, and politics” (viii–ix).

There are those who believe that life has an emergent-properties aspect that alters future form, and ultimately not only seeks unity but greater complexity. Ken Wilber, author on psychology, ecology, and mysticism, believes in a holonic world that strives for greater complexity. He writes that material processes “tend under their own power to escape chaos by transforming it into a higher and more structured order—commonly called ‘order out of chaos’” (1995, 13–14).

Willis Harman is considered the father of the new age movement and a metaphysical futurist. He sees a twentieth-first century where more of the subjective experience in the human community will begin to contribute to the fund of knowledge, to the primary problem of “how we know.” He criticizes modern society for rejecting any knowledge beyond reductionistic science, as a mistake that prevents the fullness of understanding:
The mistake of modern society has been to assume that, ultimately, reductionistic “scientific” causes should explain everything. One should not expect reductionistic scientific causality to comprise an adequate worldview—ever. The context of reductionistic science is the desire to gain control through manipulation of the physical environment. Our problems arise when we change the context and attempt to elevate that kind of science to the level of a worldview. That is when we generate conflicts like “free will versus determinism” and “science versus religion.” The question of whether we could have a more adequate science with a different epistemology remains” (1998, 112).

Morris Berman, humanist cultural critic, decries the Cartesian divide that he believes is still very much present in the science of Western culture. He pleads for a “reenchantment” of the world through a holistic and unified consciousness, and envisions a future where fact and value are once again united (1981, 277 ff.). Despite differences in approach, experts from a variety of disciplines obviously share a belief in the unity of existence. The usual lines of demarcation are illusory; the boundaries of knowledge set up by specialists in the various fields are suppositious. Given the usual restrictions on academic geographies, the student-scholar is apt to accept the fabricated walls of disciplinary separation as inviolable and untouchable.

An academic discipline is a way of both defining and protecting one’s terrain. One fruitful path permitting transcendence of these seemingly rigid borders is to find connections, parallels, and harmony in all experience, both cognitive-academic and personal-subjective. Music depends on numerous disciplines and extra-musical cognitive demands to fully understand its place and function in human culture: philosophy and aesthetics, acoustics, sociology, psychology, history and its contexts, and neurology, to name a few. Music in education adds to this complexity. That music may be a bridge to different realms of human experience suggests the importance of an approach to music and music education that is broad and deep, fed by the knowledge that the educator obtains by studying a wide spectrum of disciplines in a unified and cohesive manner.

**Comparative Processes**

It is a truism that education exists in a boiling cauldron of social argument. Music education is deeply involved in the bouillabaisse of contemporary disputation. The music education professional has some options from which to choose. One is for teachers to make sense of a society beset by antagonisms and enmity by broadening their intellectual backgrounds to the greatest extent possible. The other is to avoid engagement and to hide from the vicissitudes of life through isolation, by finding the most protected habitat possible, either physical or psychological. The former is possible and desirable; the latter is a fool’s errand.

The very essence of being a teacher should be to be intellectually fearless. For the music educator, a cloistered existence is anathema to the vistas that educators need to bring into the classroom through critical examination. Unless students are connected to the larger world outside the classroom, their studies become
abstractions that have no apparent application. It becomes imperative for the teacher-guide to develop a reliable compass lest the journey be confusing, boring, fruitless, and empty of meaning for students as well: purposeful searching is preferable to aimless wandering. A journey beset by confusion is less fruitful than one enlivened by serendipity.

I describe four paths in particular to enhance such purposeful searching. These are detailed as follows: pattern, time and space, biology and culture, and dualities. By examining data from these viewpoints, relationships can be seen that may otherwise be obscured.

**Pattern**

Look for pattern. Volk, previously referred to, finds metapatterns in all existence, both physical and organic. He writes of spheres, sheets and tubes, borders, binaries, centers, and other organizing principles. Volk observes a synergy of things and relations.

People, like animals, traverse wide stretches of landscape between points of resource concentrations. People may even make diagrams of such networks of nodes and paths. The aboriginal artists of Australia have refined such diagrams to a high art, as well as a sacred knowing. Their networks of concentric roundels and connecting tubes, often much like the geometric patterns of Fuller’s geodesic domes, are road maps for both the physical and metaphysical. In their metaphysical aspects the roundels are dreamings, great events in the mythic past, where, for instance, Wichetty grubs emerged. Both levels, the physical and the mythic, are served by the same pattern: circles linked by lines (1994, 39–40).

“Reality” is a mental construct derived from the perception of physical phenomena by an individual mind. It is fair to say that human reality, while based in the physical nature of the brain, is a perceptual phenomenon designed by subjective contributions of both inner and outer worlds.

Shlain, also referred to earlier, sees physicists and artists, seeming opposites, as occupying the same mental universe in their search for truth. He asserts that,

> [d]espite each discipline’s similar charge, there is in the artist’s vision a peculiar prescience that precedes the physicist’s equations. Artists have mysteriously incorporated into their works features of a physical description of the world that science later discovers (1993, 18).

He shows distinct connections between artists (including composers as well) and physicists and how their parallel ideas interact on the same fundamental truths, based on pattern.

Borders are one of Volk’s metapatterns (1994, Chapter 3). Borders exist for both physical reality and mental constructions. The cells of our bodies have well-defined borders to ward off foreign bodies. Volk states that “[b]orders function as bulwarks against forces of disruption” (1994, 52). However, even those are occasionally penetrated, as with disease.
Metapatterns can furnish another way to examine what is directly before our eyes and ears. Applying the principle of borders to music, we speak of numerous aspects of music but seldom connect music to something larger, something intrinsic to all phenomena. At least one example can show, in my view, that borders are an essential part of everything human beings construct or express, albeit differently according to culture. A comparison will illustrate.

In the first instance, consider the theme of the fourth movement of Beethoven’s *Symphony Number 9*.

The perception of this excerpt relies on musical information already known, a necessary prelude to defining mental borders.

The first border, a tonal construction, is set by the first measure designating an aural fence around D Major, which is confirmed on the ninth beat. A major key in Western musical conventions implies a complex of tones that have built-in tensions, particularly between the Tonic and the Dominant. Although we might accept a modern use of distantly related keys to be suddenly thrust into the musical fabric, in Beethoven’s time that would not have been a normal part of the progressions. Thus, there is a mental border around the tones that comprise D major, and we would take a G# major chord as a jarring intrusion in a D major passage in this period of music.

The second border, emphasizing the temporal to reinforce the tonal, is set at the end of measure 4 when the appoggiatura extended by a half beat slows the progression of the melody ending for a moment (a partial border in the overall scheme) on E, the fifth of the dominant chord. The next four measures end in the same rhythmic way, but the emphasis is returned to the Tonic, a point of rest. We find borders in all aspects of music in this fashion; otherwise, aural phenomena become an indecipherable stream of sound.

Borders and their patterns exist in other dimensions, as for example in the social, ethnic, religious, gender, and more elusive psychological areas. Frequently these areas open seemingly impervious borders into porous boundaries that interpenetrate and coalesce with other areas. To illustrate, we can take the two examples above—the Classical tradition of Beethoven and classical music of North India—and compare their underlying religious and cultural structures, that is, their cosmogonies. Christianity lies at the base of the Western belief system, while Indian ideation is based on long-standing tenets of Hinduism. Although both systems are quite complex, for our purposes of comparison, we can look mainly at the view of an afterlife and its extensions into social and cultural mores. We can only lay down some generalities in this brief exploration.
The Christian Belief System

Christianity, stemming from Judaism, is a monotheistic and historical religion, that is, there is one God and at a particular time he created the world and all that is in it. Genesis lays out the beginnings in precise order. The future, to many adherents, is planned in the Book of Revelations. The Christian view also espouses the idea of a single temporal existence that transcends bodily reality to an eternal life of the spirit or soul granted by the grace of God. Even with a highly subjective practice of the faith, much can be objectified to achieve the ultimate and desirable state of existence. To demonstrate, one achieves immortality by practices in the here and now: periodic church attendance, good works, administering to the poor, tithing, prayer, love of one’s neighbors (the Golden Rule), and other sacraments such as baptism and communion (celebration of the Lord’s supper).

Christianity became infused with Greek philosophy through Platonic and Aristotelian thought, incorporated in Alexandria, Egypt, once a great center of learning, by St. Clement and Origen in the first two Christian centuries. Particularly with the approach of Aristotle in basing interpretation of phenomena on observation, the Enlightenment became inevitable, in which objectivism—an emphasis on external reality—and scientific process became paramount. After Newton (1643–1727), reality was expressed largely in quantities rather than in subjective terms.

By the onset of the Western Classical period, such objectivist ideas were perfectly compatible with the musical expression of the time, defined, explicit, and confirmed in performance by certain parameters. Let me describe a contemporary version of this expression, strongly exhibiting a series of events built on the Western concept of linear time.8

The concert begins at 8 p.m.; the lights dim and the concertmaster tunes; the lights dim further and the conductor appears to applause to which he/she bows in acknowledgement, while simultaneously the orchestra stands to accept plaudits for their coming performance; the conductor then turns and begins the piece; there are specific numbers of sections with brief pauses following the decidedly final chords of each section; and the final movement ends with a definite cutoff by the conductor to which the audience responds with applause and occasional verbal exclamations. The conductor accepts the applause and acknowledges specific members of the orchestra as well as the orchestra as a whole and, in the case of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, the soloists who play a major role are given their due; the chorus is saluted, whose conductor is also brought to the stage. A high number of returns to the stage of the conductor and soloists signal a successful performance.

This all-too familiar pattern has social implications as well. Dress and demeanor are part of the expected behavior of the audience, a covert reference to Christian mores that stem from the early Puritan founding of the country. Silence during the playing of the music is demanded, and should someone violate that parameter the shushing begins immediately. The intermissions are de rigueur with accompanying champagne, wines, coffee, etc., and the usual chitter-chatter. Although dress requirements change with place and event, more formal attire is expected than that worn to a coffee shop. These various facets of a Western concert are so ingrained as to
escape attention of even the most astute observer, but they are all part of the patterns of culture and social mores.

The music is reflective of a highly structured social pattern. The Classical symphony is a four-movement work. Its strongly thematic form is precise in that the sonata allegro, usually of the first movement, contains an exposition, a development, and a recapitulation. Key relationships are carefully designed, as is the temporal organization of each movement. In a symphony in C major, one can expect a circle of related keys to play a prominent role, for example, keys of the dominant, the relative minor, and the subdominant, and each of these provides the center for their related keys. The first movement is frequently in duple meter and fast, the second movement is slow and possibly in duple meter also, while the third movement is a triple meter minuet or its derivations in moderate tempo, and the fourth movement concludes at a more rapid pace probably in duple meter. These are the broad outlines and all reflect a carefully drawn plan.

Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony began to break that mold significantly by adding a chorus to the symphony and making other harmonic and temporal changes from previously established forms. In short, it crossed, erased, and clouded delimiting borders in favor of porous boundaries that evolved in importantly new and creative directions.

**Hindu Beliefs**

The Hindu world, in contrast, is cyclic—created, preserved, and dissolved—and recreated to renew the cycle. Hindu conceptions have devised quite complex cycles within cycles, each with a specific sense of temporal lengths that follow certain ratios, as in the case of the maha yuga cycle (4,320,000 human years) divided according to a ratio of 4:3:2:1. Likewise, reincarnation until liberated from rebirth preserves the cyclic process in the individual. Christians rely on absolution of transgressions; for the Hindu, karma—the law of cause and effect—forms the principal rule of behavior. Each person determines their destiny through their actions. The soul reincarnates through several cycles until all the karmas have been resolved.

Hinduism is inclusive. Christianity is exclusive, its rejection of other beliefs perfectly highlighted in the Japanese expulsion of missionary fathers in 1587. Hinduism is only nominally monotheistic, believing in a Supreme Being and Transcendent Absolute, while simultaneously including communion with devas and Gods (the Vedic gods number in the tens, Brahma is the god of creation accompanied by his consort Saraswathi; Lord Vishnu, whose navel produced Brahma, and his consort Lakshmi; and Siva [Shiva] the god of destruction are just a few of the Hindu panoply). While Christians overtly express their relationship through prayer, individually and collectively, silent and proclaimed, Hindu practice relies on quiet meditation as a primary means of communing with the divine.

Examine now the performance of an Indian ensemble. In comparison to the Western concert, borders are less easily defined. First, there is no discernable border
(think of the defined frame of a painting) where lighting indicates a beginning of a concert and final acknowledgement of applause signals its end. In the Indian concert, the sitarist and accompanying musicians are seemingly tuning their instruments, but often there is not a break where they stop, wait for the audience to quiet and then begin their first piece. Since the art is improvisational, the performance may go on for an exceptionally long time. There finally is closure, but, to an outsider, the cues (borders) along the way are less obvious. Rather than a precise number of players in the Western orchestra, several of whom play the same part within an explicit orchestration of instruments and an accurate rendering of a score of which each player has a highly detailed notated part, the Indian counterpart has generally three players, each of whom plays without a written notation, and improvises the musical expression based on a preexistent skeleton called the raga. The ragas, unlike Western scales, are not absolute in pitch, and microtonal fluctuations form an important part of the individual artist’s expression. The performance takes place in a less formal setting and comes out of a belief system predicated on a quite different cosmogony. The audience participates by tapping out the rhythmic beats. Hindu belief suggests that life is transient (Indian) and permanence (Western) is illusory.

The raga, the melodic mode of Indian music, is tied to seasons and times of day. Its fundamental source is nature, both cosmic and microcosmic. The form of a performance is expressed through an increasingly faster rendition, beginning with the alaap, a meditative and creative expression of the raga characterized by simplicity. Its purpose is to evoke feelings, both human and spiritual. Following the alaap is the gat where the temporal cycles—tala—of complex asymmetrical units begin to unfold through the tabla, a pair of small drums. Underlying the improvisations of the sitar and tabla, the tambura furnishes a drone with the fundamental tone of the universe. The cyclic nature of Hindu belief is reflected in the rhythmic cycles of the tala. Transiency and unpredictability of life is expressed through improvisation as a fundamental organizing principle; the raga is the general outline of the music just as our lives revolve around basic human psychophysical capabilities but do not determine contextual events.

While these explications of Christianity and Hinduism are necessarily brief and sketchy, several of the qualities show a distinctly different approach to life and how those beliefs are reflected in the music. These are the kinds of patterns to be observed to enrich an otherwise narrow focus on music alone. They are found in all physical and mental constructions. Patterns in personal and social spheres are echoed as well in every other aspect of human experience. These mental demarcations that we create are better conceived as being in a porous, creative, and holistic relationship. Thus the borders—that is, the boundaries, between teacher and student, between student and student, and between student and subject matter—are all to be understood and handled judiciously according to the needs of the individual and the educational process. Explorative teachers and students are self-didactic and influence each other to the extent of their interaction. Additionally, the effective teacher will be alert to utilizing data from a multiplicity of sources that bear on education, generally and specifically.
Time and Space

To think of time—of all that retrospection!
To think of to-day, and the ages continued henceforward!

Have you guess’d you yourself would not continue?
Have you dreaded these earth-beetles?
Have you fear’d the future would be nothing to you?

Walt Whitman (1900, 197)

Walt Whitman points to an important psychological state, a feature of every psyche, that time is on everyone’s mind. An exhaustive explication of time, and its companion, space, is not needed to realize how much our perceptions and interpretations of these dimensions affect our judgments. Our ontological awareness is permeated by thoughts of time and sense of space both in the routines of our daily lives and in our philosophical groundings. Moreover, one can readily see that these aspects of reality cannot be separated. To illustrate, all sonic activity takes place within spatial dimensions, significantly affecting our interpretation of events. Most famous in twentieth century science and philosophy is Einstein’s insight showing that two events observed from different locations result in two interpretations. Truly, time is of the essence. From the Bhagavad-Gita, the Old Testament, Greek philosophers, and early Christianity, the nature of time has been variously interpreted.10 Space, what can also be called place, has had equally mixed views, particularly those bound up with a place beyond place, as some location of the hereafter. Time and space were interpreted by Newton as fixed points on a geometric line that exists without reference to anything external. Newton’s mechanical universe and his “arrow of time” were upset by Einstein’s theory of relativity. Within decades, Einstein’s ideas were challenged by other physicists working in string theory, suggesting that Einstein’s proposed four dimensions now number at least ten and that time travel is theoretically possible.11

The same re-definition of space and time occurred in the arts, changing as views of reality changed. Cultural differences also determine interpretations. For example, a comparison of Asian and Western space is illustrative.

Space to a Westerner was an abstract nothingness; it did not affect the objects moving about in it. Because space was the very essence of null, nothing could ever come forth out of it. Western artists before the 1880s worked diligently to fill up all the empty space on a canvas with representations of “things,” including sky, water, mountains, and figures. Empty space was taboo to a Western artist because art was supposed to be a “something,” and space according to Euclid was a “nothing.”

In the predominant Eastern philosophies, however, empty space was the void. In Zen teachings, this plenum contained within it the pregnant possibility of everything. From this invisible cornucopia issued forth all that was substance. The large empty spaces contained within an Asian work of art are a representation of this idea. In contrast to a homogeneous Euclidean space that never changes, the Eastern view suggests that space evolves. In the one, space is dead and inert, in the other it has organic characteristics (Shlain 1993, 160).

Music has its changing definition of time as well. Gregorian chant was a free-floating form dependent on textual emphases producing irregular stresses. More
metrical arrangements followed in the medieval period. Up to the twentieth century, Western time was based on the division of a pulse and all durations were directly related to a single unit. Sub-Saharan African music, by contrast, adds smaller units to create a sense of continuity among the parts. Westerners find it difficult to determine patterns from this polymetric music; they do not hear a downbeat in the Western sense. During the twentieth century, numerous approaches were taken—from aleatoric processes to highly serialized units. Traditional Japanese shakuhachi\textsuperscript{12} music belied the more regular pulses of gagaku\textsuperscript{13}, although even there, certain beats are stretched on occasion with the whole of the piece displayed in a tripartite form in which each section is played at a faster tempo.

Different cultures define time and temporal events in very different ways. Anthropologist Edward T. Hall speaks of monochronic time (one event at a time in consecutive order) and polychronic time (much simultaneous activity) and suggests that misunderstandings developed between the Germans and the French because of their differing interpretations of time (1983, Chapter 3). Time and space are so fundamental to the human experience that we often fail to take note of their significance. It behooves the novice music educator to become intimately acquainted with how each has been viewed in historical dimensions as well as across disciplines and cultures.

On a practical level, when the music educator is alert to acoustical space and its effect on time, numerous problems can be solved. There is a principle that applies to all music. Understanding, for example, the spaces in which Renaissance composers like Palestrina and Sweelinck were originally performed enhances the interpretative sensitivities required to perform that music today. With modern technology, however, space is somewhat obliterated as a broad acoustic property. Simultaneous performance through broadcast and digital means is now available to produce a worldwide concert to which the total population has access.

Time, on a personal level, is a complex assortment of interpretations according to individual dispositions: how old we are as time passes over the years; time spent in worthwhile endeavors versus wasted time; and time as experienced in listening to music. Only when the music educator more fully understands the role these dimensions play in our lives will music’s qualities be understood in its fullest as extensions of larger philosophical interpretations.

\section*{Biology and Culture}

We exist as organisms and members of the human species, yet we are individuals who are part of a collective called a culture. Changes in culture are not synonymous with changes in basic human makeup. It is important to distinguish between the two and to understand that basic human makeup results from a slow evolutionary process directly related to longevity of the human species. Given a quite lengthy process of generational change by comparison to other mammals, hundreds if not thousands of years must be subject to environmental changes before the gene pool shows alteration. Cognitive scientist Steven Pinker considers the argument in the nature-nurture debate, leaning toward the side that favors abilities generated through
evolution, an immensely elongated process: “[J]ust because the world we know is a construct of our brain, that does not mean it is an arbitrary construct—a phantasm created by expectations or the social context” (2002, 199).

On the other hand, changes in culture can occur overnight depending on the shaping stimulus. Drawing largely on the writings of Richard Dawkins, an English evolutionary biologist, Susan Blackmore (1999) shows how quickly society can change as she equates memes as cultural carriers analogous to genes in the physiological world. Memes spread quickly. As Blackmore describes the necessary conditions, the skill of generalized imitation means that humans can invent new behaviours of almost unlimited kinds and copy them on to each other. If we define memes as transmitted by imitation then whatever is passed on by this copying process is a meme. Memes fulfill the role of replicator because they exhibit all three of the necessary conditions, that is, heredity (the form and details of the behaviour are copied), variation (they are copied with errors, embellishments or other variations), and selection (only some behaviours are successfully copied). This is a true evolutionary process (1999, 50–51).

The music educator must know what comprises humanity in its physical and mental makeup. And one must keep abreast of the quickly occurring changes in human behavior. Globalization has made the world increasingly monocultural; by contrast, as the role of the nation-state diminishes, the need to identify with a group increases tribalisms and ethnicities. The human condition requires group identities; these stress differences that distinguish one’s group and thus one’s self from those in other groups. If the music educator is not adept at negotiating changes, and if cultural differences are not understood, teaching effectiveness is hampered and in some cases is seriously curtailed. Within the multicultural societies common throughout the Western and developed world today, it is fundamentally imperative that teachers be doubly sensitive to cultural differences.

Moreover, as the varieties of ethnic cultures enrich the fabric of the society, music is one of the artifacts of identity that is brought to the nation. Ethnic musics and other cultural artifacts cannot be ignored; doing so insures that borders preventing communication will only become more impermeable. The multicultural imperative demands that teachers generally, and music teachers specifically, treat their students as doctors treat their patients, that is, the patient—or student—is treated according to the unique needs of each individual, rather than according to a one-size-fits-all mold. That the newly arrived must assimilate new learning does not negate the need to offer a helping hand across what otherwise might be a widening cultural divide. Thus, we learn from each other and broaden our own outlook on life. The opportunity of our age is that we continually expand our understanding of the human condition to advance the cause of the species as a whole.

Dualities

Perhaps something in our genetic makeup leads us to have difficulty escaping from either-or choices, while ignoring alternative solutions. Too frequently such dualities obscure reality. Can something be universal and relative at the same time? Is nature not also subject to nurture? Usually, dualities are simply two facets of the same
phenomenon. The choice is usually not one or the other, if one understands that a property or phenomenon can have two or more qualities at once.

A major question of duality concerns mind and body. A study of philosophy reveals an extensive history of this duality, beginning with Plato and running through Rene Descartes (seventeenth century) and the eighteenth century philosophers John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. Descartes seems to be the most well-known representative of the mind-body duality, but neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1994) argues that reason is not separate from emotions and feelings, that the neuronal substrate is a totality that contains all human experience, both mental and physical. Author and psychologist Daniel Goleman (1995) reinforces the view that nothing is decided by reason without a feeling component.

The music educator who is well founded in philosophical discourse is better equipped to deal with current controversies facing society and, hence, its schools. Questions of sacred music in the schools, the arguments between evolutionists and creationists, sex education, and other major issues debated in contemporary life, all affect schools because ferment in the public sphere typically results in ferment in schools.14 As a result, some parents have strong views that can effect how music programs are conducted and administered. Their children are representatives of their philosophy of life, whether well thought out or simply absorbed through experience. Religious views often play a major role in how they believe their children should be educated. If music education takes its role seriously as part of the larger fabric of education, then music teachers will be well prepared to contribute to such discussions.

### Intellectual Fearlessness

Unless thwarted, we have a natural desire to understand the world we inhabit; in fact, it may be a psychological necessity. Our own existence is enhanced when we also have knowledge of human characteristics and how we interpret natural and psychic phenomena.15 Since Darwin, we generally recognize that we are an extension of the natural world—evolutionary products of billions of years on Planet Earth, and still amazed and puzzled by our metaconsciousness (awareness of being aware). Without understanding the world, our place within it, and what we are as one of the organisms that occupy the Universe, we lack sufficient insight to what it means to be human.

Because we live in a world of constant change, the more we know about our planet and its inhabitants, chiefly the human species, the more we can utilize our own capabilities in understanding our place in the vast complexities of life. As educators, we have the potential to leave a legacy to the younger generations, which forms the platform of an expanded understanding of life, much beyond teaching simply the fundamentals of music and its performance. Nevertheless, the arts are an essential part of what it means to be human; they answer basic questions of human existence by delving into significant aspects of life that otherwise cannot be spoken.
The world has never been in the predicament that the beginning of the twenty-first century brings: namely, that we have the wherewithal to destroy the planet and its species. The music educator has the opportunity to play a role in finding answers to the numerous conflicts that exist in the American and world society. The one preparation that will aid in that contribution is a broad cross-disciplinary approach to one’s education.

Notes

1. “ideology: 1. system of social beliefs: a closely organized system of beliefs, values, and ideas forming the basis of a social, economic, or political philosophy or program . . . 2. meaningful belief system: a set of beliefs, values, and opinions that shapes the way a person or a group such as a social class thinks, acts, and understands the world” (Soukhanov 1999). Examining phenomena from a sociopolitical agenda, for example, tends to distort the true nature of that being viewed. Another example: The Boston Globe of July 9, 2004, announced that The Union of Concerned Scientists now has 4000 signatories including 48 Nobel Laureates on a statement criticizing the Bush Administration of using ideology instead of science to make medical and environmental decisions.

2. Reductionism is a complex term requiring contextual definition, for example, ontological, methodological, and theoretical. Suffice it to say that reductionism is a process of condensing all mental and physical phenomena to a single essence or substance. In the case of ideas, it remains to be seen whether there is a unitary principle that lies at the basis of all existence. After all, Einstein, following his first great discovery early in his life, spent the rest of his years searching for such a unitary principle.

3. Tyler Volk is interesting, particularly because of his background that gives him a broader world view than others more focused on a single discipline. Volk has a bachelor’s degree in architecture in addition to his graduate work in science.

4. “Holon” is a term coined by Arthur Koestler to describe a unit that is a whole for its subparts, but that itself is a subpart of a larger whole. A “holonic world,” then, recognizes the continuing process of structures becoming more complex, which then increases the number of levels and subparts. See Koestler (1967) and also http://www.panarchy.org/koestler/holon.1969.html and http://www.worldtrans.org/essay/holarchies.html.

5. The major newspapers frequently carry news stories on charter schools and privatization, standards and accountability, and evolution and creationism, about which there is much disagreement.

6. For a fuller explanation, see http://blackboard.lincoln.ac.uk/bbcswebdav/users/dmeyerdinkgrafe/archive/palmer.html.

7. Cosmogony and cosmology refer to theories of the origin of the universe. However, cosmogony refers to the belief system of a people about their origins, whereas cosmology suggests a scientific study of the entire universe. Examples of cosmogony are found in the Hindu Mahabhrata and Ramayana; the Japanese Kojiki and Nihongi; Native American stories on their origins, for example, “How the world was made”; and the Judaic Old Testament, the Pentateuch.

8. Isaac Newton conceived of time as absolute compared to relative time. Absolute time passes uniformly despite what is happening in the world; one event, no matter the duration, follows another, from which we obtain a linear sense of events spread across time. Thus, the Western concept was well ingrained in the culture after Newton.

9. The Japanese converts to Christianity were instructed to reject Shinto and Buddhist beliefs to the chagrin of the shogun Hideyoshi. Persuaded by Buddhist priests because of the loss of adherents to Christianity, the shogun persecuted many of the 300,000 Christians. The
Twenty-six Martyrs of Japan were canonized in 1862 for their martyrdom, a mass execution on wooden crosses in Nagasaki in 1597. Persecution intensified in subsequent decades.

10. An example of different ideas of time can be found at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~jrlucas/time RELIGION.html.


12. Shakuhachi is the end blown bamboo flute that plays music typically without sense of a downbeat or regular pulse.

13. Gagaku is the court and shrine ensemble of Japan. The introduction of a piece features an improvisatory sense of rhythm with less definite pulse, but continues with a definite beat following the introduction. Even here, however, the fourth beat of the generally duple meter is frequently stretched beyond the normal duration. Gagaku instrumental pieces are frequently in three sections called jo-ha-kyû indicating a successively faster rendition for each section.

14. See Ravitch 2000. This is an excellent history of education in the United States and should be read by all those dealing with educational policy.

15. Jared Diamond states: “Every human society has felt a deep need to make sense of its origins, and has answered that need with its own story of the Creation” (1993, 16).

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Chapter 11
An Expanded Research Agenda for Music Education

Richard Colwell

In the conduct of any research, the critical question is “Does the proposed study address an important issue?” Importance is a human construct, a fact understood by critical theorists although not always used by them in establishing priorities, as their agenda sets its own levels of precedence. In all academic research the range of topics is wide, as is the weight of the questions selected; however, the issues that are seriously addressed and carefully pursued are more restricted. The range of research topics conducted in music education is wide; the range of issues seriously addressed and disseminated is more restricted. In music education, the issues are at the practical and theoretical level and seldom address the larger issues in education and the political framework that supports education. This chapter is organized to offer one strategy for broadening the questions addressed in music education research, that strategy being to consider the ideas from critical theory. I focus on research policy (which uses many of the strategies of research in philosophy) and use visual arts as my example of policy issues, those that arise when a discipline attempts to broaden its purview in line with constructivism and critical theory. Some of the questions considered here require reflective thinking, on which critical theory lays some stress. However, reflective thinking by itself is not research; whereas the focus of research is on knowledge and the focus of reflective thinking is on interpretation of knowledge.

Critical theorists attempt to affect political decisions at the highest level while simultaneously seeking to get their message to those not being well served by agencies charged with providing support. Are these concerns simply too big for us to have any effect? The critical theorist offers hope though encouraging unity and action. Critical theory lends its importance to the research community in its central tenet of skepticism of all positivist results. It not only asks what difference a change will make, but also asks why we are doing what we’re doing. Language can be limiting. In research and philosophy, close attention must be paid to the words used; how the words are used focuses the mind. Careful use of words assists the
researcher and the scholar to focus, to interpret, and to critique findings. Language is also liberating when used with grace and imagination; words constitute the basis of literature, an art form that uses the power of words to express events, ideas, feelings, and meaning as well as data, context, and personalities. Language is crucial to understanding—and also misunderstanding—philosophy, policy, and research.

Is Critical Theory a Fad?

The reform movement and the growing influence of neoconservative ideology in education bear witness to the increased importance and influence of political and commercial forces at all levels; these, in turn, have led to an analysis of the role (power) of parents, schools, professional organizations, advocates, and state and federal governments in establishing curriculum and educational policy.

Critical theory is a complex theory, and it has been twisted and pulled and misinterpreted along the way to support the ideas and prejudices of its adherents. Let me give two examples that also illustrate the importance of language. Praxis is an important concept in critical theory. Praxis can be defined as an activity by which individuals create culture and society, and thereby become more conscious human beings. Paolo Freire defines praxis simply as “mindful reflection” (Lea 2004, 124). Praxis is often used, however, to mean practice in the simplest Deweyan sense (see Preface and Introduction, this volume). Postmodernists cite the work of Lev Vygotsky and his Zone of Proximal Development. This “zone” is not created with help from an adult or a teacher. It is, rather, the “area of immature, but maturing processes . . . first used in the context of assessing cognitive development” (Gredler and Shields 2004, 22). Vygotsky did not advocate bringing everyday activities into the classroom, nor did he discuss inquiry or the ways that human activity serves as an impetus to learning (21). He focused on precision in thinking. For some, Jürgen Habermas is a model critical theorist because of his lucid arguments about the role of power in education and politics and for his efforts to find ways to attain a better society and culture. His dedication to reason, ethics and moral philosophy, and rational thinking make him attractive for philosophers of many stripes; but, in actuality, he extends modernism rather than initiating ideas supportive of postmodernist thinking. Critical theory’s fundamental premises can be applied under both a modern and a postmodern philosophy, but without more careful scholarship the use of critical theory to expand research will be difficult.

Both Henry Giroux and bell hooks suggest that intellectuals in schools and universities are in the best position to develop a pedagogy of critique, to articulate the values of dominated groups, to amplify stories of subordinated experience, and to be models for solidarity in a resistance movement (Boyce 1996, 2). The tone of education for these two thinkers requires thorough questioning, then thinking, followed by doing through which education can then produce social transformation. They would create new forms of knowledge through more interdisciplinary knowledge, less emphasis on individual disciplines, and more inclusion of popular culture in
the curriculum, moves designed to reduce the divide between the culture of the elite and that of the “other.” One major question for us who work in the arts is that discussed by participants in the University of Virginia’s Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, April 2004. That question is

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, art was often put forward as a form of redemptive activity that could replace the fallen meta-narratives of Christianity and socialism. Romantics in both centuries saw in art a realm of expression and influence that was fundamentally different from the coercion of political force and the perceived narrowness of religious devotion. As we begin the twenty-first century, however, much of this optimism has faded. Art seems powerless to effect social change; artists and academics make smaller and smaller claims for what art can do to promote the vitality of a liberal society. Audiences, meanwhile, are disenchanted by the increasing abstraction of art, and artists often either distance themselves further from their audiences or surrender their art to becoming simply another form of capitalist enterprise (IN Sight 2004, 1).

Why have the arts lost so much cultural capital? Why is music’s considerable value made available for all students but not always required? How does music add to or enrich human life? What roles, if any, do music teachers have in the power issues of education or the societal issues that are affected by the quality of thinking in the United States?

Our research requires clarity of the boundaries and responsibilities of music education in the ideal American culture, for without boundaries it is difficult to focus the required beam of attention. It is not clear that music education is really a discipline and can mount a research agenda. Following the lead of “education” would be a mistake, in that the field of education has not established itself as a valid discipline. Similarly, music education in its position as a minor member in the School of Music has been at a disadvantage in establishing clear and valid boundaries for itself as a discipline, and for research.

Music Education Research

The present research focus in music education is principally the content of music, and secondarily, pedagogical content knowledge. The first of these is beyond the training and expertise of the music educator; the breadth of extant, worthy music is already such that it requires specialists in multiple areas to create significant research findings. The focus in music education research must require that researchers shift to problems of greater educational significance and pursue those problems with greater care and discipline. Once better research produces a body of respected and significant findings, we will have a base to serve as the foundation for criticism of new and old theories, paradigms, practices, and interpretations. In some areas of music education, new ground must be plowed. Skills in research criticism must become more widespread, possessed by a sizeable and recognized coterie. Do all institutions have clear policies on what constitutes graduate level work and are these consistent for all institutions?
Are doctoral students to be our only source of research activity? Doctoral students in music education rarely receive adequate training in research strategies, and, judging by the quality of the reviews appearing in publications and dissertations, receive little instruction in research criticism. Lee Shulman states, “One critical characteristic of professions is that members both monitor their own ranks and take responsibility for preparing and assessing the quality of all members of the profession” (2004, 6).

Few doctoral advisors are truly competent researchers and those who often do not, or cannot, devote adequate time to supervising talented students. In the sciences, students are research apprentices for years in a lengthy graduate program. In music education, training consists of little more than the period of “the dissertation,” often consisting of a few informal meetings with the research advisor. Few dissertations reflect doctoral level coursework or experience in ad hoc research. Research should be conducted not merely to describe but to ground theory and inform practice. If the first question is whether the research should be qualitative or quantitative (or some other variety), the researcher is not properly equipped to consider the importance of the question.

Policy

It is difficult to determine why music educators have been uninterested in policy research, as policy affects the power structure of the profession. All of us encounter policy on a daily basis. Policies are more nearly like rules than laws, as policy is based on values, ideas, and hopes. Just as there are good and bad ideas, there are good and less good policies. Policies shape research, decisions, and outcomes, and affect the source of power. Policies vary in importance ranging from no running in the halls and no cell phones in the concert hall to no graduation without passing all state competency examinations. We are familiar with tax policy and have opinions as to whether it is fair and contributes to the type of society we desire. The introduction of magnet schools is a result of policy; funding Head Start is a policy decision; and the importance and frequency of music instruction is determined by policy. It is more common to employ evaluation strategies in connection with policy than to conduct research paradigms. A case study over multiple years, however, can provide both research and evaluation data germane to making final decisions. (Policy decisions do not always correspond to research data: smaller classes produced better achievement scores in Tennessee, but they were not sufficiently better to justify increased funding.)

There are myriad questions in music education whose answers could change policy, create policy, or clarify present policy. How can we recruit better candidates? How can the accreditation system be improved? Do we need teachers so extensively trained in music? What are the profession’s survival issues? What are the weaknesses in our present arguments for change? Why are we as teacher educators such toadies to MENC policies? Is producing music more important than connecting
music to other programs within and outside the school? What should be our policy toward private foundations establishing arts policy for the United States? What indicators, if any, do we have that the traditional purposes of music instruction have not been weakened by the many asides, including critical theory? Numerous elements in the present “reform” movement also call for policy decisions. At present, the argument for our potential to make society better appears to be stronger for music as a liberal art than music as a separate discipline.

Research

The relationship of policy to research is often unrecognized and unacknowledged, but the relationship is usually present. Topic selection is a political and philosophical (valuing) act; current viewpoints that predominate, current values that guide action, and current interpretations of events—these stem from policy and are reflected in research focus. (Does the availability of avenues of dissemination affect the research that is conducted or even the problems selected?) Any research must uncover the power arrangements of its own structure before the results can assist in the understanding of the issues addressed. In the spirit of critical theory, all research, to be credible, must begin with announcing the biases—notions of how people behave and think, that stem from ethnography. Numerous studies are being pursued today in the spirit, but not the substance, of ethnography. Researchers are eager to select a group situation and give it careful study so as to describe it accurately and (perhaps) in depth. This tactic often goes under the name of ethnography but is actually case study and nothing more. Ethnography requires immersion for at least six months in a culture, and often longer. If such an immersion over time does not occur, the researcher may be using ethnographic techniques but is not conducting an ethnographic study. Reliability of these studies occurs through recognizing similar patterns of thought and behavior, rather than through repeated ethnographies.

Interestingly, the psychometric research designs of the past and present research community were designed to remove politics from educational decisions, but they have been unmasked by critical theory with the argument that our educational research findings have been a means of control and have limited the benefits of education for particular students.

The aspects of psychological designs that neutralize humans are shunned by critical theory, as the political influences are not clear and neither are the voices of those suffering from the injustices of the educational system. Positivism in all of its forms is a common foe of critical pedagogues. Even naming, ordering, and classifying are acts that establish power relationships in both research designs and in how education is structured. Michelle Fine and Patti Lather, two eloquent spokeswomen for critical theory, deliberately use confusing language when they suggest that something more is needed than new research designs, namely ideological and material changes (Fine, 1994, 5). Fine's research paradigms are ventriloquy,
voices, and activism. She believes that anonymity is necessary for truth-telling and that paradigm is ventriloquy. Voices means to listen carefully to the stories of the disadvantaged—disadvantaged students are often clear about the inadequacies of their schools. Activism parallels the ideas of Maxine Greene that we need to conceive a world that has not yet even been imagined (1995, 30). Patti Lather (1994) speaks of ironic, catalytic, and rhizomatic validity. By catalytic validity, she insists the researcher must unjam the closed truths of the past; ironic validity pertains to how the middle class views poverty today; and rhizomatic validity is a “journey among intersections, nodes, and regionalizations through a multicentered complexity.” (45). Broadening the research agenda will require us to proceed carefully and thoughtfully.

Glorianne Leck goes so far as to suggest that even to do educational research is to continue to perform labor that perpetuates reified and money-defined power relations, a belief in cause and effect, and a modernist notion of teaching and learning as productive labor (1994, 80). Daphne Patai suggests that the only scholarship that anyone should conduct is that of the political activist—critical theory’s nexus (1994, 68). From these comments it seems that research is to provide hints on improving issues of homelessness, starvation, addiction, violence, material goods, health care, and the need for caring, love, self-esteem, nutrition, and the struggle for meaningfulness in work and life. These activists are suggesting that we have so long conducted educational research following prescribed procedures that we have forgotten its real purpose.

**How to Proceed?**

Who are the experts in teacher education? If the answer is the teacher in the classroom who can be an activist for change, then the goal of every teacher certification program must be to provide adequate research skills. Is it time to admit that reflection is important but that self-reflection alone does not produce better research? The teacher is the one most likely to assist disenfranchised groups to participate more fully in the decision-making process purported to be characteristic of American democracy.

**Can We Benefit from an Example of Change?**

Visual art is presently wrestling with the role of visual culture in contemporary society using the argument that it is time to move the emphasis from the traditional fine arts disciplines toward a broader range of visual arts and cultural issues (Freeman and Stuhur 2004). The employed artist is not painting on canvases but involved with magazine advertisements, computer graphics for television, comics, and other commercial interests of capitalism. Popular culture in the United States is a commercial venture with its life determined by its material promise. Visual culture includes fine
art, advertising, cartoons, folk art, television and other performance arts, housing and apparel design, mall and amusement park design, and other forms of visual productions and communication. Visual culture is the totality of humanly designed images and artifacts that shape our existence (Freeman and Stuhr 2004, 816). The focus of visual art is on the power of representation, how cultural identities are shaped. Little visual experience is excluded—if a museum displays it, “it” must be art. The media are presumed to be the powerful agents for many of society’s values: the media combine music, theater, and dance in presenting visual messages; hence, the schools should integrate. The media might send a message dealing with protecting the environment, promoting human rights, and projecting world poverty, messages not prominent in those areas of aesthetics, spirituality, and ideology that have been characteristic of the philosophy of art education. (Of interest to researchers is that the National Research Council’s 2002 Scientific Research in Education discusses human beliefs, values, and volition in terms of their effect on the research design and not their effect on the subjects [84–87].) These visual arts proponents maintain that postmodern artists deliberately confound the construction of meaning (Freeman and Stuhr 2004, 820), suggesting that a search for meaning in great works of art is no longer a primary objective for art educators. The elements and principles of design—line, shape, color, balance, contrast, and focus—may be unique to art, but they are no longer of educational importance. They have been replaced by the visual message. The role of imagination will receive less emphasis in a curriculum of visual culture. The art classroom will be organized with the student determining topics, research activities, constructing projects, and setting criteria for assessment.

A. D. Efland (2004) wishes to moderate visual culture to include high art just as one thinks of high science. (In music, it is today’s college wind ensemble conductors who are most interested in high art, as their sole focus for more than a decade has been to perform only high art literature. They form consortia to pool resources to commission high art composers to compose works for the college wind ensemble.) Efland has noted that art education research seldom asks about aesthetic consideration of works, questions such as how the form of the object functions to produce meaning or how well it works are rarely encountered (2004, 235). Artwork has meaning when it can be connected with something else, other artworks, ideas, and events (Parsons 2002, 30).

Visual culture in its best configuration would shift the focus from interpretation and judgment of artworks to questions about the social systems that produced them. Even here, however, there would be resistance to acknowledging a work of art’s artistic value (something objected to by Efland); rather the work would be discussed in terms of its political dimension. (Postmodernism rejects most hierarchies and would not accept aesthetic values arrived at through informed criticism; the greater concern is for the opinions of a mass audience.) Knight, Keifer-Boyd, and Amburgy argue that, from their perspective, power is the central feature of visual culture (2004, 271).

Elliot Eisner addressed these issues as early as 2001 in the article “Should We Create New Aims for Art Education?” in which he wrote,
There is a segment of our membership who apparently believe that art is dead and that creating, talking, writing, and teaching about art is no longer socially relevant. They would have us substitute the study of visual culture for the creation and study of art (9).

He states, “the argument that getting rid of all of the baggage of the past to meet the real needs of students of the twenty-first century has not met the test and we could, instead, integrate parts of visual culture into art courses” (9).

In the general music classroom power is exercised in many ways—state textbook adoption confines teachers to the material available; state and city curriculum guides exert their power. But most curricular power today lies in the voluntary national standards and a raft of publications by MENC, which instruct teachers how to teach for these pre-established objectives and for set levels of competency. (The contrary point of view is suggested by Burton [2004], who suggests that national standards have had a small effect on classroom practices including the arts [555].) Critical theorists would approach curriculum research, not from the standpoint of content, style, or genre, but of gender, colonialism, class, race, and more. The process is more important than the expected outcome.

Expanded Research

Research knowledge is a kind of power when knowledge as a social construct is linked to norms and values, and when the research outcomes support modes of critique that serve special interests—economic, political, educational, or advocacy. Some forward thinkers reject an emphasis on aesthetics; yet the existentialist Maxine Green stresses the importance of the aesthetic experience, as do the critical theory advocates in their teacher education text *Teaching for Aesthetic Experience: The Art of Learning* (Diaz and McKenna 2004). Kincheloe (2004) argues that incorporating critical theory into teacher education is extremely difficult due to restrictions in the present required program (101). But music education research is like a vehicle with the motor idling in neutral—there is some activity, but no resulting movement in a clear direction. To move this vehicle along requires agreement on music education’s focus and on the importance of musical skills, and a base of scholarship from which to proceed, a base that reflects its uniqueness. Quality research will have to probe for responses involving the search for values and meanings that address issues in terms of The MayDay Group’s proposed, expanded agenda (pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume).

Critical pedagogy advocates research in the classroom; yet the acceptable outcomes of effective instruction in the classroom encompass a very wide range of possibilities, suggesting that a better boundary is needed for required and elective music. Critical pedagogy’s emphasis on dialogue runs counter to present research results that indicate that both student and teacher talk in the rehearsal room interferes with efficacious teaching/learning. Language is so crucial for many aspects of the research process (although not all research in music needs to be language based) that the highest priority for researchers may be to improve our use and understanding of
language; further, this improvement is crucial if, to that is, The MayDay Group’s agenda for a “radical” change in research is to occur. Unsophisticated researchers designing and interpreting research will not reveal our deepest beliefs in the power of music to express who we are as human beings. Some quality research will have to probe for responses involving our search for values and meanings that address issues in terms of the proposed agenda. There must be meaning for multiple audiences, not meaning for those who commissioned the research. We are not likely to progress if our research studies consist of mailing a survey to all Nebraska band directors to determine the literature in this year’s folders, or in doing superficial case studies not rooted in theory and that, therefore, don’t contribute to theory or break new ground. Our professional organizations must be more careful in the materials published, materials that often make careless use of current terms such as “authentic assessment,” “creativity,” “interdisciplinary,” and many others. Superficial and uninformed use of such terms is truly harmful, as it distorts and conceals the use that term can have in careful thinking. Among the most misused terms is “research.” What constitutes research must be clear to those who use its findings, and even more clear to those who undertake the discipline of “doing” research; without better thinking, results from important questions will be muddled together with the trivia.

Note

1. Constructivism is a broad topic. The emphasis for research focuses on social constructivism.

References


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Chapter 12
Ecological Validity and Impact: Key Challenges for Music Education Research

Graham F. Welch

The research and theoretical bases for music education must simultaneously be refined and radically broadened both in terms of their theoretical interest and practical relevance.

(Action for Change, pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume.)

Introduction

In order simultaneously to refine and broaden the research and theoretical bases for music education, as well as ensuring their practical relevance, I believe that we have to address two key challenges: ecological validity and impact. These are in a symbiotic relationship. If our research is to have professional impact, it has to be ecologically valid; if it has such validity, it is in a better position to have impact. Research endeavors are likely to be better placed to effect change if we locate them in real-world situations (which is not as easy as it might seem) or ensure that they have an appropriate applicability to such situations. However, the real world is messy, untidy, not always (if ever) predictable, and is often context and person sensitive. Such sensitivity is evidenced in the challenge to the certainties that underlay positivistic empiricism by the diversity of procedures and outcomes evident in much qualitative research (for example, Denzin and Lincoln 2005). We recognize that “truth,” in terms of musical behaviors, is a contested concept precisely because “music” and its associated manifestations are the products of individual minds operating in particular sociocultural contexts. Furthermore, an increasing and necessary proliferation of specialist areas of knowledge suggests that it becomes unlikely that any one individual can have an all-encompassing insight into musical behavior and learning. Recent and ongoing neuropsychobiological research into musical behavior (such as Peretz and Zatorre 2003), for example, demonstrates a species wide universality of neurological structures for the processing of acoustic phenomena, including music.

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Nevertheless, we are only at the beginnings of that particular research journey in understanding the implications of such enquiry for music pedagogy, particularly in relation to our local contexts. So “real world” in this context means that we, as researchers, have to make every effort to ensure that we have understood fully all the facets of the thing that we wish to research as part of our research journey. Arguably, one of the prime reasons for so many submitted music research-based articles being rejected on a daily basis by the world’s leading journals (up to 75% in some cases) is that expert reviewers are not convinced that the submitting authors have covered all the bases, either in the design or in the execution of their research.

Accordingly, I suggest that the ecological validity and impact of music education research will continue to be limited, unless three basic challenges are addressed. These relate to (i) multivoicedness, (ii) culture, and (iii) understanding the reality of our bodymind reality in relation to the nature of effective music teaching.

The Challenge of Multivoicedness

A one-day research workshop sponsored by the European Science Foundation (ESF 2002) brought together internationally recognized experts from across the European Union, who were interested in the child and adolescent voice. Three overarching areas of specialist research expertise were present: clinical-medical, perceptual-acoustic, and psychological-educational. These umbrella groupings reflected particular emphases in the professional lives of the participant experts, which derived from their work in either clinical settings (for example, as surgeons or clinical phoniatricians), scientific research into the psychoacoustic aspects of voice (including electrical engineering, computer modeling, and general speech/voice science), or applied research into child voice in educational and therapeutic settings. Several findings emerged from the workshop. First, matters that appeared to be scientific “certainties” in the understandings of relative nonspecialists within the group were often regarded with greater circumspection and hedged with more caveats by those with a deeper, specialist knowledge. Second, it became clear that child and adolescent voice behavior could be conceptualized as a “continuum,” in which classification categories ranged from “abnormal” to “normal” to “supranormal.” Yet, within and between these categories, there was considerable variation in the robustness and extensiveness of existing data sets, often because weaknesses were perceived in such data or because data were lacking. In turn, these variations impacted on definitions; thus the boundaries between the three groupings (abnormal, normal, and supranormal) were (and continue to be) fuzzy and not well defined. As one example, the onset of puberty with its concomitant period of voice change (“mutation”) for both males and females raises particular challenges in our definitions of “normal” and “abnormal,” of what counts as voice function and dysfunction. Different phases of voice change are often characterized by inaccurate vocal pitch matching, increased breathiness, vocal tiredness, and reduced pitch and intensity ranges in adolescent singers. Outside the period of adolescent voice
change, such vocal behaviors may be indicative of some form of “dysfunction.” But within this “mutational” period, one possibility is for these to be regarded as “normal.” This, in turn, creates particular challenges in our ability to diagnose vocal health “dysfunction” during this period of adolescent voice change (Williams et al. 2005), not least because there is relatively little research data of any kind on the adolescent female voice compared to its male counterpart. Furthermore, the diagnosis of voice disorder is also likely to be related to (a) the type of voice assessment protocol being used locally (with at least three different official protocols in use in European voice clinics, for example), (b) variations in the perceptions of voice quality at the level of the individual clinician (cf., Krieman and Gerratt 1998, Bele 2004), (c) variations in definition of voice disorder (Martin and Miller 2003), and (d) variation in the perceived nature of appropriate treatment (Rinta and Welch 2008).

At the workshop, it was only when all the child voice experts were gathered together in the same room that the fuller picture—with all its uncertainties—emerged.

From the above, we can conclude that areas of specialization (and subspecialization) are designed to provide particular, deep, but (of necessity) only partial insight into the phenomena of human behavior. The customary “ways of knowing” that characterize any one of these specialties are both a strength and a weakness in understanding the whole. It is only when such diverse perspectives and “evidence” become combined that a fuller picture emerges and becomes sustainable. Consequently, a “multivoicedness” (in the widest sense) approach in addressing the diverse nature of reality is an established feature of the best practice in voice clinics, such as in the United States and (more recently) Europe. In such clinics, everyone who has contact with the voice “client/patient” (and not just the senior staff members) is seen as being able to make a valuable contribution to a broader understanding of the clients and their vocal behavior (as “function” or “dysfunction”). Each person’s role in the clinic facilitates a different relationship with the voice client. The receptionist, nurse, speech therapist, voice technician, and ear-nose-throat surgeon each have a particular “view” of the patient and their needs, and it is a combination of these “views” that is seen to provide the most effective basis for subsequent treatment.

Multivoicedness is also a characteristic of effective research. This may be formalized into a particular research approach, such as demonstrated by “activity theory” (Engeström 2001, Ryder 2004) in which “object-orientedness” explores the relationships between an individual’s actions, needs and the community, as mediated by cultural artifacts, and conventions and division of labor. Other, simpler examples are found in the concept of “triangulation” in the gathering and weighing of evidence, the designation of research participants as “co-researchers” in some forms of action research, as well as in the diversity of perspectives offered through a combination of qualitative and quantitative research approaches within a particular project—a “multi-methods” approach. While there will always be ontological and epistemological imperatives for fostering the best possible match between a research question or hypothesis and a chosen research methodology, our research activity will be strengthened if we provide opportunities for multivoiced perspectives within our chosen research strategy. This is not to say that the lone researcher is incapable of
generating valuable insights on their own, but rather to argue that individuals will have put themselves in a stronger position to generate such valuable insights if they are able to take a variety of informed perspectives into their research focus, including talking to experts in fields that are associated with their topic (see Chapter 5, this volume). This is more than the “triangulation” of different perspectives from within the research focus, such as from various participants, but consulting experts who have critical insight into the ontological and epistemological nature of concepts that are considered to be integral to the individual’s research.

The Challenge of Culture

In 2001, the British Educational Research Association (BERA) published an academic “map” of research literatures that impacted on music education. In this “map,” an introduction led into a series of linked overviews, focusing first on research concerned with individual musical development, then on the potential impact of musical learning on social group membership and schooling, and concluding with an ethnomusicological perspective of the wider musical community, followed by a brief coda. These writings were based on the perspective of (primarily) UK-based researchers as part of a UK government-funded initiative to generate greater synergies between the worlds of research, policy and educational practice. The purpose of the “map” was to: (i) provide a summative overview of the (then) current breadth and depth of available research knowledge for actual and potential users; and (ii) create a research development agenda that embraced indicators of possible research priorities for the immediate future. This UK-focused “map” became the catalyst for a subsequent special edition of the journal Psychology of Music (Welch and Hallam 2004 [Volume 32, 3]). The special edition was designed to contrast the earlier UK-based overview with selected perspectives of music education research that had been undertaken in Australia, South America (Brazil and Argentina), Scandinavia, Germany, Hong Kong China, and the United States.

When juxtaposed in this manner, it becomes clear that, at any given moment in time, different research traditions coexist. Furthermore, our different research cultures are also subject to modification over time, as is demonstrated by shifts in the prime foci of the activities of a particular country’s music education research community. In Australia, for example, Stevens and McPherson (2004) note that the research priorities during the 1930s–1970s were on class music teaching and curriculum development. However, there was a much broader research agenda from the 1980s onwards in which instrumental teaching, curriculum evaluation, and creativity were also significant topics. In contrast, music education research in Brazil and Argentina is reported to have had a relatively short history, being mainly developed since the 1980s with a strong European and North American influence (Hentschke and Martinez 2004). Each of these South American countries has had its own priorities: Brazilian researchers have been interested in the concept of assessment (for example, listening, performance, and choral), musical development, compo-
sition, the use of new technologies, and informal music learning, while Argentinean researchers have found the psychology of music field to be a powerful impetus for their studies, such as in cognition, development, performance, singing, teaching and learning, and the education of the professional musician.

Whereas the UK “map” suggested the relative domination (at least until recently) of empirical research, researchers in Scandinavia have been equally interested in historical and theoretical research (Jørgensen 2004), including research into music teacher education (a topic that is relatively under-researched, for example, in the United Kingdom, although more in evidence in the United States). Furthermore, much Scandinavian music education research has been based in “academies of music,” whereas the majority of published UK research has been based in university departments of education or psychology. Similarly, until the last 15 years or so, German researchers have been primarily university based, resulting in an academic rather than a practice-based focus to their research (Gruhn 2004). This distinction between “academic” (that is, theory) and “practice” reflects a common phasing in German (music) teacher preparation. University-based subject study has traditionally been given an initial (high) priority, and this has been followed customarily by an extended period of separate classroom-based practice, prior to formal teacher qualification (Viebahn 2003). In Germany, music perception was a major initial focus, as exemplified by the groundbreaking mid-nineteenth century studies in physiological psychology of Hermann von Helmholtz and contemporaries. It is only recently that there has been a greater emphasis on qualitative studies across a wider range of topics, such as in early music learning, multiculturalism, and the place of music in schools and society.

Hong Kong, China, presents us with another research contrast. Since the constitutional and administrative changes of 1997, there has been greater interest in Chinese (traditional) musics (Cheung 2004). Nevertheless, the “one country, two systems” philosophy is reflected in the relative dominance of Western musics in Hong Kong school practice and higher education (as in mainland China, cf. Welch 2008), mainly because preservice music teachers are more likely to have a stronger background in the study and use of Western rather than Chinese instruments, even though they may also be keen listeners of Cantonese popular music. In the past, music was not strongly prioritized in the Hong Kong school curriculum. Consequently, research into music education has only become established during the past decade. The dominant culture is more achievement- and teacher-oriented than in the West, with creative music making being reported as relatively under-represented within the curriculum. The cultural mix is further complicated by the widespread interest in (and use of) new technologies. These may provide increased access by teachers, pupils, and researchers to a wider range of examples of the available musical genres and promote a new range of research in this particular field.

The volume of research in the United States is relatively large compared to that of other countries, reflecting the size of its higher education and school systems. Nevertheless, the United States embraces much of the variety that is found elsewhere in the world (cf. Price 2004). Over time, there have been shifts, especially in the growth of research dissertations from the 1960s and the more recent increasing
appearance of qualitative research approaches within a predominantly quantitative research-focused culture (if judged by the content of many of the leading research journals, such as the *Journal of Research in Music Education* compared with the *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education* since their inception). There are large bodies of research into the postsecondary and elementary phases of education, with proportionately less on secondary (predominantly on vocal, string, and wind ensembles) and preschool.

An important outcome of any such “tour” of the world’s research traditions and practices is that it enables us to have clearer and empathic insights into the dominant thinking within our own research culture and to comprehend better our subjectivity in making sense of music education in our own local contexts. Hopefully, we should then be in a better position to effect change, should this be part of our mission, and to understand why certain musical “interventions” may be more or less effective. The increased migration of people and cultural imperatives across geographical boundaries also suggests that it is increasingly important to ensure that “culture” is addressed in our research activities. Examples of why music education and research need to be to sensitive to cultural diversity are found in England, which has seen an increase in the population of minority ethnic groups in the decade from 1991 to 2001 from 6 to 9%, with much larger numbers in the inner cities, particularly London. This changing cultural mix, representing additional numbers of people from South East Asia, the Pacific Rim, and Africa, has changed again since 2001 through immigration from former Eastern European states as part of the formal expansion of the European Community. In the 2001 national census, with regard to religious background, Muslims and Hindus represent 12% of the population of London. Such changes are by no means unique to the United Kingdom. It is essential, therefore, that research (following the “multivoicedness” concept, above), acknowledges, celebrates, and seeks to understand the impact of culture on the ways that we perceive music education.

**The Challenge of Understanding the Bodymind in Relation to Effective Music Teaching**

As suggested in the opening section, a large body of research has emerged over the past decade into the underlying neuropsychobiological nature of musical behavior. Music is seen as providing a unique insight into a more general understanding of the human brain’s structures, processes, and functions. For example, there have been at least three major compilations published since 2001 (Zatorre and Peretz 2001, Avanzini et al. 2003, Peretz and Zatorre 2003), as well as numerous research articles in the world’s leading scientific journals. Evidence of the entry of such research into the mainstream is reflected in introductory articles on the neuroscience of music, which have appeared on our newsstands in *Scientific American* (Altenmüller 2004, Weinberger 2004). This neuropsychobiological research agenda is broad and encompasses such macro- and micro-musical behaviors as music
listening, performance on a particular instrument, score reading, pitch (whether “absolute” or “relative”); perceptual processes related to timbre, consonance, dissonance and tonal structures; and research into the perception of musical “syntax,” temporal processing, and the effects of instrumental practice.

Collectively, this growing research literature suggests that there are various biases toward particular brain locations, or clusters of locations, in relation to specific musical behaviors. Hemispheric asymmetry is often evidenced, but complex musical behaviors involve different cortical and subcortical areas from different parts of the brain working collectively in neuronal networks (cf. Altenmüller 2003, Peretz and Coltheart 2003). The greater the complexity of the auditory information that needs to be processed, the larger the areas of neuronal networking that are required. In sung music, for example, language (“lyrics”) and music (“tunes”) are enacted by simultaneous cooperation between areas within the left and right cerebral hemispheres, respectively (Besson et al. 1998), with common cortical processing of the syntactical features of music and language (Maess et al. 2001) alongside an other-than-conscious ability to perceive underlying harmonic structures (Bigand et al. 2001). Moreover, research suggests significant shifts in the networked areas of the brain involved in music processing as a result of educational experiences (Schlaug 2006), such as from being taught to sing (Mithen and Parsons 2008). Similar, multisite networks are activated in other complex behaviors, such as the processing of complex visual images when watching a film (Bartels and Zeki 2004).

In particular, specific neural systems for music processing are linked with those for emotion, such as in the analysis of emotional expression in performance or in the generation of an emotional response as a listener.

Taken together, this research into an underlying neuropsychobiological reality is generating important implications for music education research and practice. As an example, the term “bodymind” (Pert 1986) is a concept that has been developed to reflect the underlying integrative reality of the nervous, endocrine, and immune systems (see Thurman and Welch (2000) for its application to the world of voice and singing). How we think and behave is intimately linked to how we feel and to our health and well-being, in general as well as in music.

Within this integration of key bodily systems, our engagement with the expressive arts usually has emotion as a central component. All the expressive arts evoke an empathic physiochemical reaction, whether for a producer or receiver, or both, typically labeled as “feelings” (Hodges 1996, Thurman 2000). Incoming information elicits a triggering of the brain’s perceptual and value-emotive categorization networks. These, in turn, trigger related physiochemical changes in other parts of the body (see Preti and Welch 2004). One outcome is that human emotive “communication” can take place through the arts without having recourse to the spoken or written word (Zeki 1999). This is a shared feature of our experience of music.

The interweaving of music with emotion has important consequences for music pedagogy. Our bodymind design means that the music teacher will bring strong emotional associations (whether conscious or not) to any music selected for a curriculum, while the students will also bring a range of powerful emotional
associations to the learning experiences under the umbrella of that curriculum. An essential contributing feature of the effectiveness of the learning-teaching process, therefore, is the relative match/mismatch between these emotional dispositions. These are likely to be reinforced and made explicit by aspects of musical identity (cf. MacDonald et al. 2002) in which age, role, and culture are central. Music is usually an essential part of everyone’s personal identity, by which they identify with membership of particular groups and not with others, such as is characteristic of the musical preferences of adolescents (Tarrant et al. 2002). “Whose music?” is a common challenge in music curriculum design. This is not just because of the challenges inherent in understanding the key features of any particular musical genre, but because each genre’s sonic design has an acoustic bias that is interwoven with positive and negative emotional associations and notions of self, such as identity.

Ongoing research in England, for example, has sought to understand why so many young people (around 93%) opt out of the formal music curriculum at the age of 14. These young people are not disengaging with music per se, but with a particular form of music, namely that which is represented in the school curriculum. This research is revealing a complex mosaic of musical identities in secondary schools that have powerful effects on whether or not any given individual is prepared to engage with “school music” (Saunders 2006). Alongside the small minority who feel fully connected to the school curriculum are others, for example, who see school music as “irrelevant,” or self-label themselves as “non-musical,” or who have status as a “musician” among their peers that is perceived to be threatened by the nature of school music activities, and/or who have strong identities with a “counter-culture.”

Similarly, research into the music curriculum engagement of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) pupils in one part of Inner London, where over one-third of the local population speak English as an additional language, has revealed huge variations in the numbers of young BME people opting to study music post-14. Participation rates range from 12 to 62%, depending on how closely the music curriculum is perceived to be aligned to the pupils’ own musical identities (Spence 2006). In all such cases from contemporary schooling, powerful emotions are engendered when adolescent self/group identity and music come together.

Consequently, the recent increase in psychological research into music and emotion (for example, Juslin and Sloboda 2001), therefore, is to be welcomed, as is the growth in sociopsychological research—research at the interface between psychology and sociology (for example, identity—MacDonald et al. 2002; communication—Miell et al. 2005)—and into sociopsychological aspects of musical performance, expertise, and practice (for example, Parncutt and McPherson 2002, Sawyer 2003, Williamson 2004, Davidson 2004, North and Hargreaves 2008). Each of these research developments brings important insights to how both musical behavior and development are facilitated or hindered by internal and external factors. More research is essential, however, if we are to understand how to apply these new insights in pedagogical contexts, including how to address the needs of individual learners within educational organizations that are designed around collective provision and groups (such as schools and their classes).
Conclusion

The interweaving of cognitive and emotive responses to musical engagement is an essential component of individual and group musical experiences. This bodymind reality is informed by individual and group biography and happens within particular sociocultural contexts in which musical behaviors may be observed. The rich complexity of the reality of musical experience, of what we bring to the musical moment and of how we make sense of it, as well as how it might be extended in a pedagogical sense, requires a sophisticated ontological and epistemological sensitivity, and one in which “culture” is also acknowledged. The most appropriate research methodology, therefore, should access this integrative complexity through the acknowledgement of a multivoiced research approach. We need to celebrate the unique as well as the generic if we are truly to understand and facilitate musical development at an individual level. The power of a research focus on individual “cases,” for example, is that they allow us to critique big theory and to understand more clearly the nature of variability and the concept of “normal.” Yet, we also need to have bigger theoretical constructs if we are to make sense of how different or special an individual is. Having a multivoiced approach should enable us to get closer to the essence of our research focus, namely to understand the past and present more clearly in order that we in a better position to promote change in the future.

Note

1. http://www.bera.ac.uk/publications/reviews.php. See also Welch and Adams (2003) “How is music learning celebrated and developed?” to be found at http://www.bera.ac.uk/publications/pureviews.php and which contains a more concise research-based text aimed at teachers, parents and policy makers.

References


The culminating issue in any professional framework for music teaching and learning involves complex questions concerning curriculum and instruction. Analyzing the concept of “curriculum” provides a foundation for building answers to some of these questions.

Curriculum is conceptualized in many ways. For example, traditionalists define curriculum as nothing more than a written plan. In contrast, contemporary theorists conceive curriculum in more complex terms, because the “what” of education cannot be realistically decided apart from the “why” and “who,” and because issues of “when” and “how” inevitably circle backward and forward to decisions about why, who, and what. Accordingly, at the other end of the spectrum, some theorists take the broad view that curriculum is “what is taught in school or what is intended to be learned” (Posner and Rudnitsky 1986, 7–8). In more detail, curriculum can be conceived as “the planned and guided learning experiences and intended learning outcomes, formulated through the systematic reconstruction of knowledge and experience, under the auspices of the school, for the learner’s continuous and willful growth in personal and social competence” (Tanner and Tanner 1975, 45).

Curriculum becomes even more complex when we realize that a fully informed, professional approach to curriculum development requires curriculum makers to decide key issues in relation to their knowledge and beliefs about alternative concepts of child and adolescent development, education, schooling, teaching, learning, assessment, and educational psychology (for example, behaviorism, cognitive theory), all of which include fundamental societal issues of diversity, democracy, equity, and social justice.

In music education, we must also consider curriculum making in relation to our beliefs about the nature and value of music making, listening, musical experience, creativity, and a long list of related artistic issues. This picture gets even more complicated when we realize that curriculum theorists have proposed many different approaches to curriculum development since Franklin Bobbitt established the field.
of curriculum studies in his book, *The Curriculum* (1918). Let us take a brief look now at some of the most common concepts of curriculum development.

**Concepts of Curriculum Development**

The technological approach, often called the Tyler rationale (after its author, Ralph Tyler), maintains that curriculum development should follow a four-step linear process: (a) state the objectives (or ends) of learning in specific terms; (b) select learning activities (or means) in relation to one’s objectives; (c) organize learning activities in relation to objectives; and (d) develop means of evaluation in relation to one’s objectives. In this view, it is essential that objectives describe the subject content that students should know and be able to do so that teachers can recognize such behavior when they see it. In this approach, curriculum designers select a type of organizing element (for example, behaviors, or verbal concepts) in order to sequence teaching and learning. Tyler’s aim was to offer a highly rationalized or “scientific” way of designing curricula to bring about changes in students’ behavior.

Because Tyler’s simple, linear procedure was straightforward, and because it fit the mechanistic notions of behavioral psychology (popular in the 1950s), his approach was widely adopted across subject disciplines, including music, in the middle of the twentieth century. Some curriculum theorists and music educators still advocate variations on the Tylerian approach.

One such variation on Tyler’s scheme emerged in the 1960s. Instead of beginning with behavioral objectives, some curriculum theorists began stating objectives in terms of verbal concepts about the “structure” of their subject domains or “disciplines.” The “structure-of-disciplines” approach to curriculum making (advocated by Jerome Bruner and Philip Phenix, and Bennett Reimer in music) was based on the assumption that every subject has a foundational pattern of elements that could be organized by means of verbal concepts. This idea had two other implications: (a) curricula ought to be sequenced according to verbal concepts about a subject’s “inherent structure” (for example, melody, harmony, rhythm, etc.) and (b) subject matter experts (not teachers) should take responsibility for deciding the structure of each subject and stating instructional objectives for teachers and students to follow. Many music curricula combine variations on Tyler’s formula with the “structure-of-disciplines” approach. Examples of the latter include general music texts for “aesthetic music education” that organize lessons and units in terms of verbal concepts about the so-called elements, processes, and styles of musical works.

In summary, many music education theorists in the past have been persuaded that the conservative, technical-rational procedures traditionally used in scholastic curriculum making are entirely appropriate for music curriculum development. Although there are several curriculum approaches toward the liberal end of the continuum, variations on “self-actualization” and “social constructivism” are gaining ground among curriculum developers, including music educators. Developing curricula for self-actualization evolves from mutual decision making among
students and teachers. Understandings are developed in relation to projects of interest: learning popular musics; composing; learning chamber music in small, informal, peer groups, with the help of teachers who take an informal approach, which might range across a continuum of possibilities, from a coaching stance to a completely open, hands-off teacher-student relationship. Broad goals (not atomistic behaviors) act as guides for teachers and students. The overall aim is to empower students to achieve self-growth, self-esteem, well-being, and enjoyment, now and throughout students’ lifelong musical engagements. Portfolio assessment may fit this mode of curriculum, which is designed locally, and with students.

Postmodern curriculum developers (sometimes called “social constructivists”) look to societal problems for what students need to investigate critically. The intent is to empower students as democratic citizens dedicated to solving problems of social equity and social justice. This approach emphasizes critical reflection, dialogue, student-community involvement, and the interrogation of all manner of “texts,” as this term is understood in the postmodern context. In this approach, no defined body of musical “knowledge” or musical engagements can be decided beforehand. No form of “testing” is legitimate because (for one thing) there is no one true answer to any problem, no one “right” source of universally valid knowledge. Today, a small but growing number of music educators are seeking ways to involve students in issues of democracy, equity, and social justice.

In theory, then, there are several different concepts of curriculum from which to choose, and many different ways to conceive, develop, and design curricula for every subject. Nowadays, however, this is not what happens in practice. Why?

**Curriculum the “Right” Way**

Many scholars suggest that America is currently in the grip of a business model of education and curriculum that draws upon the pseudoscientific, behavioral values of Tylerian curriculum development, and the input-output models of instructing-and-testing that follow from this orientation. America’s current preoccupation with educational reform, national standards, standardized tests, and No Child Left Behind (NCLB) are the contemporary equivalents of these top-down, managerial-behavioral approaches of bygone years, especially the 1950s.

Who could possibly disagree with (let alone oppose) something called “educational reform”? This is a noble agenda on the face of it. But its consequences have been devastating. For example, one study in 2004 reported that 26,000 of 93,000 public schools in the United States failed to make adequate yearly progress as defined by NCLB. In other words, NCLB assumes that measuring schools is equivalent to fixing them. Moreover, “reform” is mostly concerned with “training” students. NCLB-driven “reformers” are not concerned with “educating” in the sense of providing a balanced curriculum for the whole child. If they were, then they would employ holistic evaluations and provide appropriate funding for carrying out the edicts of NCLB.
As Richard Colwell (2004) emphasizes, “educational reform” is directed and powered by politicians and business leaders who put marketplace capitalism above all else. In other words, says Colwell, marketplace educators will fund schools and teachers if and only if teachers are preparing students “to compete successfully, not only for jobs in their own country, so better products are made and grown, but with competitors throughout the world” (2004, 18). This agrees with Michael Apple: “For all too many of the pundits, politicians, corporate leaders, and others, education is a business and should be treated no differently than any other business” (2001, 1–2).

Apple puts these themes in a broader context when he argues that America’s turn toward standardized curricula and testing is rooted in the fear of losing in international competition and a deep dread that “Western traditions” (for example, the English language, Western religions, and so forth) will be overwhelmed and lost if people from Latin American, Asia, and other non-Western cultures succeed in the global marketplace. Accordingly, he points out, conservative forces have been fairly successful in taking control of American education by boiling it down to simplistic issues of economic productivity, a “return” to more “rigorous standards,” and non-critical thinking. Indeed, when teachers and students are forced to spend more and more time on behavioristic “achievement standards,” teaching and learning will be much less creative and critically reflective.

In the minds of marketplace educators and conservative politicians, testing subject matter content is the key to winning control of the American curriculum and securing the long-term and short-term values and interests of American business (Colwell 2004, 18). In short, reformers are acting on a simple fact: what gets tested “rigorously” and what is good for business profit is what gets taught and valued in schools.

In summary, conservative business and political leaders want top-down control of American schools so they can control the future of the marketplace and protect “traditional” American values. In contrast, educational educators want control of the curriculum for the purpose of providing all children with a balanced curriculum for their complete development, which includes students’ academic, social, culture, physical, artistic, and emotional selves.

**Standards**

The call in the United States to develop National Content and Achievement Standards for each subject began in 1983 with the reform rhetoric of the report by the National Commission on Excellence in Education, “A Nation at Risk,” a development that sparked controversy in most subject areas, except music. On the broadest level, “there was no public debate in the U.S. about the value of the selected basic subjects and whether these competencies fostered in these subjects resulted in the best mix for American-style democracy” (Colwell 2004, 19). On another level, many subject specialists challenge the “standards” notion, which claims that each subject has a core set of competencies that can be measured “objectively” (recall
the similar but flawed premises of the structure-of-disciplines approach). An even more basic problem with content and achievement standards is that they do not address basic issues of democracy, equity, and social justice in society and education. In sum, realistic standards will only be developed intelligently, applied fairly, and assessed rationally if/when the American government decides to assist schools and support teachers in tangible ways.

National Music Standards

Arts educators were among the first to submit Content Standards to the U.S. Secretary of Education in 1994. “The School Music Program: A New Vision” was intended to be the American music education profession’s statement of Standards. This document was authored by a small group of like-minded colleagues at the top of the National Association for Music Education (called MENC then), who no doubt had the best hopes and intentions for their work and the profession’s future. However, for one thing, the MENC membership was not polled about the final product of the task force that wrote the Music Standards. Instead, the authors deferred to the dominant ideology of reform by reducing the rich nature of music and music education to a list of simply stated skills that could be evaluated via quasi-behavioral methods.

To investigate the process by which this document was created, Cathy Benedict interviewed seven original members of the task force for the National Music Standards about the writing process (2003, 8). The music task force had four major concerns about the Music Standards. They needed to be: (a) as simple as possible, (b) about content in the simplest sense of “what students should know and be able to do,” (c) measurable, and (d) politically uncontroversial. One member of the music task force explained that the leaders of MENC insisted on a united front due to the prevailing belief that the survival of American music education depends on speaking with one voice (Benedict 2003, 115). Note the heavy emphasis on keeping the Standards simple, measurable, and uncontroversial. This seriously minimalist approach to the complexity of music education raises a host of troubling issues. Accordingly, and compared to other fields, music education remains an immature and uneasy domain, largely because too many organizational leaders will not tolerate serious critical discourse that could lead to the kinds of deep curricular improvements that have occurred in other fields (for example, Math, English, and History).

In summary, the Music Standards suffer from several crucial weaknesses. First, because the Standards do not take a position on the rich and long-term values of music, there are no primary aims for teachers to pursue while teaching, only secondary targets (for example, singing in tune). Second, because the determination of content was driven by the unexamined mindset and motivation to measure musical achievement in terms of observable behaviors, the Music Standards are fundamentally positivistic. Accordingly, although it is possible to “measure” whether a child is (say) singing in tune, doing so tells us very little about assessing a child’s growth in musical understanding and nothing about the deeper benefits that musical
achievements may or may not contribute to the child’s life. In other words, without a critically reasoned foundation for music education, teachers are likely to (a) “teach” simplistic and incorrect notions of “what students should be able to do” (for example, “teaching singing” as technically accurate sound producing, with no concern for musical expression, let alone democratic engagement) and (b) “achieve” the contents of the Standards according to some type of measures (which are still not agreed upon even now, 15 years later), while children nonetheless remain lacking in musicianship and musical fulfillment.

The Standards movement represents conformity and compliance with the most conservative forces in American culture (past and present). In my view, music and music education should be free of such strictures so that music teaching can operate as a powerful force for individual creativity and empowerment. Indeed, there is a serious danger that judging children in relation to music achievement standards (as currently conceived) will drive a stake into the heart of what many music teachers want most: to foster students’ intrinsic motivation to learn music now and in the future. Moreover, and although the National Music Standards were never intended to be a philosophy or a curriculum for music education, this is what they have become for many states and counties across the United States. But again, as I emphasized above, what music educators need is not a point-form list of simple Standards; what teachers need, first and foremost, is a critically reasoned concept of the nature and value of music and music education, including a concept of what musical understanding is.

**Curriculum Making for Music Education**

During the last 20 years, leading scholars and teachers have proposed alternatives to the conventional and problematic notions of curriculum development. One of these is called “practical curriculum inquiry.” This approach has its roots in the writings of pragmatic philosophers (for example, Charles Sanders Peirce, George Herbert Mead, and John Dewey). How does practical curriculum making differ from today’s conservative, minimalistic, top-down procedures?

Traditional curriculum theory directs teachers to either follow or develop curricula by looking outside themselves and their situations. Teachers in all subjects have been told to test students in relation to a standard set of behaviors and state examinations. In contrast, advocates of practical curriculum development urge teachers to look to themselves and their own teaching circumstances. Practical curriculum making holds that the most important solutions to curriculum problems will not be found in lists of Standards or written lesson plans (although the latter are usually required by administrators, or valuable for novice teachers, experienced teachers seldom construct them or need them). Instead, solutions to serious curriculum issues lie in teachers’ critically reflective philosophical thinking about music and education and their specific teaching-learning situations. Practical curriculum (a) replaces the top-down, marketplace notion of teachers as curriculum “retailers and testers” with
an emphasis on teachers as reflective practitioners; (b) it emphasizes situated knowledge instead of the specification of acontextual objectives; and (c) it employs multidimensional forms of authentic assessment instead of behavioral measurements and standardized testing. So, in opposition to today’s Standards movement and NCLB doctrine, practical curriculum making places the teacher-as-reflective practitioner at the center of curriculum development. How?

**Curriculum Commonplaces**

Virtually all teaching-learning situations involve several related “curriculum commonplaces”: aims, knowledge, learners, teachers, teaching-learning processes, learning contexts, and evaluation.

These are commonplaces in the sense that they appear and reappear in all teaching-learning situations and in all discussions of curriculum making. A comprehensive curriculum must resolve the problems presented by each and by the interactions among them.

Commonplaces are open categories: they remain empty until “filled in” by each teacher’s critically reasoned beliefs, understandings, intentions, and actions. What a teacher believes and does in relation to the commonplaces before, during, and after each teaching-learning episode shape the educational experiences of learners in that specific teaching-learning situation. One word for “specific teaching-learning situation” is curriculum. A curriculum is something that teachers and learners experience in specific situations as a result of interactions between and among curriculum commonplaces.

**Praxial Curriculum Making**

In *Music Matters* (Elliott 1995), I offer a praxial philosophy of music education that addresses each of the curricular commonplaces presented above. By filling in each of the commonplaces with the central tenets of praxial philosophy, I also offer a praxial orientation to music curriculum development. (I say “central tenets” because, of course, I cannot detail the entire philosophy here.) The upshot of this orientation is an overall concept of the music curriculum-in-action.

1. **Aims**: The aims of music education come from one’s concept of the nature and human significance of music. In my view, music and music education have many values. Developing students’ musicianship and listenership by integrating listening, performing, improvising, composing, arranging, conducting, and moving enables students to participate in creating musical expressions of emotions; musical representations of people, places, and things; and musical expressions of personal and cultural values. This range of opportunities for musical expression and creativity offers students numerous ways of giving artistic and cultural form to their feeling, thinking, valuing, evaluating, and believing related to an extraordinarily wide range
of matters, for example, political, narrative, and ideological values. All such musical expressions, in turn, engage other listeners’ emotions, interests, and understandings.

Additionally, teaching and learning a variety of musical styles and works comprehensively (as music cultures) is an important form of intercultural education. Why? By teaching unfamiliar musics through active music making and listening, students engage in critical self-reflections and personal reconstructions of their relationships, assumptions, and preferences about other people, other cultures, and other ways of thinking and valuing. Inducting learners into unfamiliar musical practices through critical reflection links the central values of music education to the broader goals of education for democracy.

In and through doing all of the above, students can achieve enjoyment (or flow experiences), self-growth, self-knowledge (or constructive knowledge), and, through continuous involvements with music over time, self-esteem.

In *Music Matters* I propose that the most essential, long-term task facing our profession involves enrolling parents, colleagues, administrators, politicians, and others in the quest to make schools more educational and democratic. By “educational” I mean that schools should aim to develop students as people, not just job fillers. As many pragmatic philosophers have argued, education ought to be conceived for life as a whole, in the student’s present life and for the future, not just for one aspect of life, such as work, or schooling. Indeed, much more is involved in the full and beneficial development of children than the acquisition of work skills, National Standards, and academic knowledge. Human cultures past and present pursue a fairly common set of “life goals” or “life values” that include happiness, freedom, wellness, fellowship, enjoyment, peaceful coexistence, self-growth, and self-esteem for oneself and empathy for others.

If this is so, then music education should be in the core curriculum from kindergarten through secondary school because music education can enable students to achieve these life goals, which can arise from being involved with others in musical ways of life. In other words, music education is a unique and major source of many fundamental life goals. By actively supporting the aims of music education, school systems increase the likelihood that students will learn to make a life as well as a living, both inside and outside school.

Another main theme of my praxial philosophy concerns social diversity. Due to the multicultural nature of music as a diverse human practice, and because of the many kinds of social actions and transactions that take place in the music curriculum-as-practicum, school music programs can be a primary way for students to achieve self-identity and self-respect.

2. **Musical Understanding**: Musical understanding is a form of working understanding; it is an extraordinarily rich form of multilayered knowing that is situated culturally, historically, and contextually. Musical understanding is made up of musicianship and listenership (a concept I coined in *Music Matters*) that include many subsets of musical knowing and doing, including “cognitive emotions” and “mindful feelings” that inform and guide the practical-cultural actions of music making and listening. In short, all forms of making music (performing, improvising, composing, arranging, and conducting) depend upon and express themselves as
a multidimensional form of artistic understanding that depends on the interdependency of musicianship and listenership.

Musicianship and listenership are two sides of the same coin: That is, the types of knowledge required to make the music of a particular style-practice (to perform, improvise, compose, arrange, or conduct a certain kind of music) are the same types required for listening to that music. In *Music Matters* I explain the five kinds of such knowledge: procedural (informed action), formal (or verbal), informal (or experiential), impressionistic (or intuitive), and supervisory (or metacognitive) musical knowing.

Teaching for musical understanding means helping students develop rich, multidimensional forms of cognitive-affective-social-cultural knowing. Indeed, my praxial concept of musical understanding is not “cognitive” in the simplistic sense of isolated technical skills and verbal data processing. Far from it. For example, the social and situational nature of musical understanding, as I conceive it, is exemplified in the Dogomba musical community of Ghana, where, through their dancing, the community contributes to the several layers of rhythmic activity performed and improvised by Dogomba drummers. These musical performances, then, are concurrently personal and community events in the ethical and moral sense. One’s music-making and listening reveals one’s sense of musical and social ethics.

3. *Learners*: Musicianship is not something given “naturally” to some children and not to others. Musicianship is a form of thinking and knowing that is educable and applicable to all. Accordingly, all music students, whether they are in so-called general music programs, or a large ensemble setting, or something else (for example, a pop group, a taiko drum ensemble, a “new music” composition class, and a community music group of some kind) ought to be taught in the same way: as reflective musical practitioners. A music curriculum should be based on active, critically reflective music making of all kinds; on learning to listen in the contexts of music making of all kinds; on listening to recordings; on listening to live performances by students themselves; and on listening to guest artists and at concerts.

Because all music education programs share the same aims, all music education programs ought to provide the same basic conditions for achieving these aims: (a) authentic musical challenges (that is, musical pieces and projects of high quality) and (b) the musicianship-listenership needed to meet these challenges. What will differ between and among music education programs across grade levels, school regions (and so on) is not the essential content of the music curriculum (that is, musical understanding) but, rather, the kinds and levels of musical challenges inherent in the curriculum materials chosen for and with students. In addition, music programs will differ in the kinds of music-making media (for example, computers, wind instruments, choirs, and recreational instruments) again chosen for and with students.

4. *Learning Processes*: Music education is not only concerned with developing musicianship and musical creativity in the present. Equally essential is teaching students how to continue developing their musicianship in the future. This involves a kind of learning process that students can both engage in and learn how to employ themselves. I contend that the growth of musical understanding depends on
constructivist and social constructivist pedagogical principles (such as progressive musical problem solving, problem finding, and musical problem reduction) carried out in democratic and socially just learning contexts. Achieving competent musical understanding, and becoming musically creative, also involves learning to reflect critically on the creative musical potential of the musical ideas (interpretations, improvisations, etc.) one generates and selects.

Implicit in all these processes is the broader requirement that all music students be engaged in rich and challenging music-making projects in classroom situations that are deliberately organized as close approximations of real musical practices (which, of course, constantly evolve over time).

5. The Teacher: Music educators must possess both musical understanding and "educatorship." To teach music effectively, a teacher must possess, embody, and exemplify musical understanding. Children develop musicianship, but through the ethical and caring actions, words, advice, feedback, interactions, and transactions of musically proficient teachers.

Educatorship is a distinct form of procedural knowledge that, in turn, draws upon several other kinds of educational knowledge, including formal, informal, impressionistic, and supervisory educational knowledge.

6. Learning Context: The praxial curriculum-in-action centers on achieving self-growth and musical enjoyment from the thoughtful actions of music making and music listening of all kinds. Teachers and students work together to meet the musical challenges involved in authentic musical projects through reflective musical making of all kinds. Music listening is directed, first, to the music being made by students themselves. All music that students are learning to interpret and perform, improvise, compose, arrange, and conduct is approached as a "full course meal," that is, as a multidimensional challenge (Elliott 1995, 199–201) to be made artistically and listened for in all its relevant dimensions (interpretive, structural, expressive, representational, cultural, and ideological). In support of listening-in-context, carefully selected recordings must be introduced in direct relation to the musical practices students are being inducted into.

The praxial music curriculum is deliberately organized to engage learners in musical actions, interactions, and transactions with close approximations of real musical style-cultures. The praxial curriculum immerses students in music-making projects that require them to draw upon the standards, traditions, lore, landmark achievements, "languages," and creative strategies of the musical practices of which their projects are a part, and to work creatively inside and outside the boundaries of those practices. From this perspective, the music teaching-learning environment is itself a key element in the music education enterprise. The musical actions of learners are enabled and promoted by the interactive, goal-directed swirl of questions, issues, and knowledge that develop around students’ efforts as reflective musical practitioners.

By treating all music students (including general music students) as reflective musical practitioners, and by teaching all students how to find and solve musical problems in “conversation” with selected musical practices, music educators situate students’ musical thinking and knowing.
7. *Evaluation*: Educators today make an important distinction between two forms of assessment: formative and summative assessment. Formative assessment requires using a variety of cues and languages to give students constructive feedback about the quality of their efforts-in-the-moment. This casts music educators in the role of coaches who guide students by targeting their attention to key details of their musicing, by adjusting their acts of musicing and listening, and by cueing them to reflect critically about their musical actions.

In contrast, summative assessments or “achievement standards” usually require us to step back from our students efforts in order to examine, test, judge, and otherwise reduce their musicing and listening to brief, fragmented tests of isolated skills and facts that we can “describe” as numerical grades and/or brief verbal reports.

Achieving the aims of music education depends on formative assessment. Learners need constructive feedback about why, when, and how they are meeting musical challenges (or not). Formative feedback promotes self-growth, musical independence, mutuality, and enjoyment. Students also learn to assess their own musical thinking-in-action by learning what counts as novice, competent, proficient, and expert musical involvement, as they pursue these stages according to their own desires. To become knowledgeable and independent judges of musical quality and creativity, students need regular opportunities to reflect on the results of their musicianship and of their peers. Thus, assessment is the joint responsibility of teachers and students.

**Conclusion**

Much more needs to be said and done toward challenging efforts to perpetuate technological curriculum making in music education. In my view, our best prospects lie in developing curriculum approaches that integrate musical understanding, self-actualization, and social justice in and for music education. I have attempted to outline an example of this in the above discussion of praxial music education. However, I welcome the fact that several of my colleagues are working along similar lines, and that debates about our efforts are alive and vibrant in this volume.

Let me end with a positive word. When times get difficult in society and education, sustaining our efforts for transformations in music education depends on maintaining hope for more energetic democracies and better societies—a society that we can develop in principle and hold in our imaginations. My hope is that this small chapter will contribute to the larger movement called “Action for Change” that is struggling to sustain and transform music education in and for a better society.

**References**


Chapter 14
Placing Curriculum in Music

Sandra L. Stauffer

One of the purposes of The MayDay Group is to engage music educators and others in examination, critique, and reconceptualization of music education practices, including matters of curriculum. Generally, the word “curriculum” implies a course of study or the elements of a subject or domain. Study of curriculum may include analyses of the ways in which programs of study are constructed, examinations of goals, and interrogations of why and how curricular decisions are made. The MayDay Group, in its statement of action ideals, moves the conversation about curriculum toward consideration of social contexts, examination of institutional priorities, and critique of standards documents, among other concerns. The signatories of the original MayDay Group “action ideals” advise that curriculum “must be guided by a sound philosophical process,” which “should precede considerations of teaching and research techniques, methods, materials and assessment” (MayDay Group 1997, pp. xxxi–xxxvii, this volume).

These are reasonable and appropriate ideas about curriculum—ones that should provoke and engage. Yet the MayDay Group agenda, and others similar to it, has not yet taken hold in the imaginations of a broader spectrum of music educators, or as Malcolm Gladwell (2000) might put it, the conversation has not yet passed the tipping point from idea to movement. Why? I suggest in this essay that our philosophical approaches tend to reify both music and practice; that the “what,” “how,” and “why” questions of curriculum, however important or redefined by postmodern discourse, tend toward abstraction; and that these two things together distance practitioners from the intent and spirit of the conversation. I suggest that foregrounding two different categories of questions—“who” and “where”—may be not only more fundamental to music education in the twenty-first century, but also more likely to engage practitioners and provide impetus for the curricular transformations The MayDay Group and others seek. Further, I posit that philosophy of place may provide a useful lens for engaging others in critical dialogue about curriculum and other matters of importance in music education.

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Notes on A Philosophy of Place

Take the word “home”
for example,
often considered
to have an address.
How it could sweep across you
miles beyond the last
neat packages of ice
and nothing be wider
than its pulse.¹

Although most literature on philosophy of place has been written within the last quarter century, conceptions of place in the understanding of human life and mind have roots in phenomenology and existentialist traditions.² In everyday parlance, “place” means an area or geographic locality—a physical space. More sophisticated conceptions of place account for both space and time. Place may mean an area or geographic locality (space) in which someone or something was, is, or can be (time). A regional map, for example “is of a place, and that place is that place and not another, not only because its space is different from another space, but also because it truly represents a given space at a given time” (Flay 1989, 2).

Philosophy of place, however, moves beyond time-space conceptions and considers place a human phenomenon; places become places through and in the lived experiences and interpretations of those who encounter them (Pickles 1985, 170). In other words, place as a space-time abstraction is useful as a reference, but it is devoid of meaning and sociocultural significance without the actions and interactions of people in that space-time. For example, “space is to place what house is to home. Home, like place, is experiential, whereas house, like space, is objective” (Jung and Jung 1989, 88; emphasis theirs). Or, put another way, “places... are always profoundly human, made and made meaningful in the conceptualization and articulation of their boundaries, character, and ultimately, their value, in relation to humans” (Leary 1997, 20). Philosophy of place considers space-time as lived rather than as material or mental (Cresswell 2002). Place is not fixed or unchanging, not frozen in time or bounded in space; rather, place is dynamic and fluid. Because we understand place through actions, interactions, and relationships, place is “always becoming—in process” (Cresswell 2002, 20). Simply stated, place is nexus and synthesis of space, time, and experience, and it is constantly changing.

Malpas (1998) suggests that understanding place may be essential to “an adequate understanding of human being” and that “finding place is... a matter of finding ourselves” (38–39), pointing to the complex relationship between place and identity. We “become” through our actions; our actions occur in relation to others, to our own histories, and in time-space contexts. Cresswell (2002), citing other writers, notes that places operate through “constant and reiterative practices” (23) that not only affirm and re-affirm individual identity and social belongingness, but also create place or make places what they are. Cresswell summarizes:

Place is constituted through reiterative social practice—place is made and remade on a daily basis. Place provides a template for practice—an unstable stage for performance. Thinking
of place as performed and practiced can help us think of place in radically open and non-
essentialized ways where place is constantly struggled over and reimagined in practical
ways. Place is the raw material for the creative production of identity rather than an a-priori
label of identity. Place provides the conditions of possibility for creative social practice.
(2002, 25)

Three more ideas about place are important to the ensuing discussion of
curriculum and agenda. First, the experience of place is not only fluid, but also
simultaneously individual and collective. “Place” may be socially constructed, but
it is individually understood. We may be in the same space at the same time but
experience and understand place differently, even if we are doing or seeing or hear-
ing the same things, because the web of experiences that makes each of us who
we are is not identical. Writers taking this perspective suggest that understanding
between and among people develops in “the place in between” (perhaps in liminal
spaces) and that the interplay of places is where community develops.³

Second, place is simultaneously unique to the individual, and complex, multiple,
and layered. Each individual is situated in places that not only overlap, connect,
and nest with that person’s experiences, but that also overall, connect, and nest with
and within the places of other individuals, groups, societies, and cultures. We are,
therefore, always multiply situated or multiply placed, even though we may not
know or be conscious of this condition.

Third, places are, in some sense, a narrative synthesis of experience. In whatever
ways we may come to understand place, our places, or ourselves in place, we do so
in the context of the narrative of our lives through time, in location, and in relation to
self and others. We relate our understanding through social transmission of our own
histories, including the stories we tell ourselves and stories we tell to others. In other
words, “places and their corresponding meanings come into being through indi-
vidual encounter, contextual interpretation, and the social transmission of stories”
(Leary, 1997, 20). Put another way, we understand place in part because we have
memory of it (backward in time), act in it now, and anticipate acting in it (future),
and because our shared experiences and our sharing of experiences, whether in
real time or through narratives recalled and retold, affirm our individual and social
identities.

**Philosophy of Place in Education and Place-Based Education**

Philosophy of place, which has been a useful tool for cultural and humanist
geographers, has traveled into schools in what is now known as place-based or
place-conscious education.⁴ Although most often associated with outdoor, envi-
ronmental, and ecological education, place-conscious curriculum and pedagogy
can also be found in rural and urban education initiatives and home-schooling
programs, as well as in political theory, literature, and architecture. David Sobel
(2004) describes place-based education as “the process of using the local com-
munity and environment as a starting point to teach concepts in language arts,
mathematics, social studies, science, and other subjects across the curriculum”
Place-conscious learning is grounded in the “real and proximate, not abstract and remote” (Chin 2001, 19), and is usually described as experiential, multidisciplinary, collaborative, learner-centered, and constructivist. Place-conscious curriculum begins with the local, moves gradually out into the world, and examines the complexities of relationships of places with the goal of promoting social responsibility and action (Sobel 1996). Ultimately, “place-based educators advocate a pedagogy that relates directly to student experience of the world, and that improves the quality of life for people and communities” (Guenewald 2003/Fall, 7).

David Gruenewald describes a synthesis of place-based education and critical pedagogy that can form and inform a critical pedagogy of place. Writing from an ecological perspective, Gruenewald asserts that a critical pedagogy of place “must embrace the experience of being human in connection with others and with the world of nature” (2003/May, 6) and should “[aim] to evaluate the appropriateness of our relationships to each other, and to our socio-ecological places” (8, emphasis his). A critical pedagogy of place for music, then, might be grounded in consideration of socio-musical places. Gruenewald also comments that rather than “actual experience with the phenomenal world, educators are handed, and largely accept, the mandates of a standardized, ‘placeless’ curriculum (8), and further, that current discourse about education, standards, and testing, as well as the very structure of schools, isolates and distances both teachers and students from places outside of schools. Place-conscious music education would seek to reconnect schools and communities and lived experience.

The disposition of place-based educators, regardless of discipline, would be one of examining the local as a starting point for building curriculum rather than accepting the status quo. Gruenewald suggests that place-conscious education begins with questions such as “What happened here? What will happen here?” (2003, 11). While Gruenewald’s questions direct attention to the past and future, focusing on the present—what happens here—seems more apropos to me. Place-conscious education should embody questions of practice in the present: What practices occur here, in this community? Who is “practicing”? Who is participant, onlooker, and absentee? What do the practices communicate about self, community, and context? What narratives, counternarratives, and subnarratives are embodied in these practices? Whose are they? What do they mean? Which practices dominate here? Why? These questions and others could create a “starting place” for building place-conscious music curricula.

An Example

I am writing this essay while living in Arizona, a “border state,” where the school-age population is currently changing rapidly. In the decade from 1992 to 2002, the number of school-age children in Arizona grew by more than 40%, and the number of Hispanic students enrolled in public schools nearly doubled (USDOE 2002). Some time before I knew anything about philosophy of place, Keith Preston, an Arizona band director, recounted a story that illustrates some of the qualities of
thinking one might anticipate from a musician educator conceptualizing curriculum from a philosophy of place. When I asked Keith to re-tell his narrative for this essay, he said:

I was teaching band at Trevor Brown High School in the Phoenix Union District, and I noticed that the school population didn’t match up with who I had in band. Same thing with the choirs and the string program. The school population was about 55% minority ethnic groups and 45% Caucasian, and the band was about 90% Caucasian students. There was a population that wasn’t being served. So I thought we needed to offer something that would be different—maybe a mariachi. A big problem was that I didn’t know anything about it. I knew it was popular, and I had heard banda music and mariachi music, but I didn’t really know much about it. I mean, how do you tune a vihuela?

So I approached my assistant principal with the idea. He listened for a while, then he got a big grin on his face and said, “Can you do it?” I said, “I have no idea.” So he agreed to create the class for the next year. At first it had to be listed as “Orchestra” because it wasn’t in the course catalog, but the guidance counselors helped us get the word out that one particular section of orchestra was going to be mariachi.

That summer I took a two-week mariachi workshop at the university and applied for a grant to get artists-in-residence to come and help me. We had eight or nine students sign up that first year, and the interesting thing was that it wasn’t all Latino kids—a couple of the students were Caucasian and one was African-American. We didn’t have any music, so I purchased CDs and picked out the music by ear and made arrangements. I also borrowed some arrangements from the university professor, who was great about it. We wound up with about 6 or 7 tunes that we could play, and I was learning right along with the kids. We performed a couple of times and word spread. By registration week for the next year we had 38 students sign up, which was too many for one mariachi. So we put them in two levels—a beginning group and a performing group. The performing group went out and played at all kinds of events. We played for donations, and we used the money to buy outfits for the kids. By the third year we actually started to look like a mariachi too. We performed all over the place. This went on for the five years I was at Trevor Brown.

Then I moved to Peoria High School, and I was given a stagecraft course [to teach]. I knew nothing about stagecraft, so in October I asked the principal if I could start a mariachi. He said yes. By that time I had 27 tunes, so we started with those. The Peoria kids got good enough that we could play a 30-minute set, which is about what a mariachi does. It got to be very popular. We played at quinceañeras, weddings, funerals, at a grand opening of a Seven-Eleven. If I would have let it, it would have consumed all of our time, it was so popular. I ended up saying “no” more than “yes” because it was requested so much in the community.

The greatest thing was that the mariachi at Peoria was mixed ethnicities—like Trevor Brown—though the population of the school was more Caucasian than Trevor Brown. And for the students who were Latino, it was a point of pride, even though mariachi was not the music they were listening to by choice. They listened to banda and rock. But this was the music that they came from. I didn’t have to tell them; they told me. And when we played for older people in the community, we could tell we reached them. The students could tell. They brought it up.

Keith’s tale foregrounds place—the local and the lived. Although he does not use the word “marginalized,” he perceives that some students are missing in the school music ensembles, and he devises a remedy, one that he hopes will resonate with some of the “outsider” students. He does not eliminate band, which serves some students and segments of the community well. Instead, he opens another possibility—one connected to place. Fortunately, an administrator supports Keith’s
decision, though the hegemony of the school schedule means that “mariachi” is listed as “orchestra.” Undaunted, Keith continues his activism by engaging other adults (counselors) to make the group visible to students he seeks to serve. He does not assume that his musicianship and success with the band privileges him or that his skills will transfer to mariachi, and he turns to the community outside of the school to educate himself.

When the first mariachi students arrive, Keith continues connecting to the community, enlisting community musicians to help the students and himself. He purchases recordings and makes or borrows arrangements. He learns the language, the names and ways of festivals and events at which mariachis perform, how a mariachi looks as well as how it sounds. He continuously locates himself in roles of learner and co-learner. Note his use of the pronoun “we” whenever he refers to the mariachi, including both learning and performing. “We” implies a “community” of which he is a member. It is hardly surprising that number of interested students increases fourfold by the second year.

Although Keith’s motive for starting a mariachi at the second high school seems different (avoidance of the stagecraft course), he holds on to the idea that mariachi is relevant for some students. He continues to seek help from the community, then he returns the ensemble to the community for all kinds of events (what other school ensemble performs for funerals?). He notices and celebrates the mixture of ethnicities among the students in the mariachi while recognizing the special and specific meaning of the experience for Latino/a students. The students notice community members’ responses to them, and Keith acknowledges and values the students’ observations.

At some level (and without knowing it), Keith operated from a philosophy of place. He asked critical questions: Who goes to this school? Who is in the band? Who is not included, either in the band or in any other ensemble? What does the community tell me about how to serve or engage the marginalized? What is my role and response as a musician and teacher? What changes can I make? Who can help? What do I need to learn? What is my role in this new ensemble? How can the community help us? What can we return to the community? We might critique the depth or breadth of Keith’s questioning, his acceptance of certain assumptions, and so on. The more important point is that Keith recognized the dynamics and fluidity of place, changed the curriculum of his own volition, and invested in the change so that the musical experience was one of quality. Even more, he did so without rejecting an existing musical practice (band) in the school that served some students well. In effect, he invented a curriculum of multiple musical practices that was responsive to place and meaningful for the students.

Keith’s story represents a qualitatively different kind of engagement with curriculum than that of music educators in a neighboring district whose administrator “mandated” mariachi programs in the schools. Given the directive, the teachers shrugged and added the ensembles, but few of them “owned” the decision, and the kinds of critical questions implicit in Keith’s actions were not asked. Similarly, the transformation of curriculum that Keith effected is different than the transformations that occurred in some schools when “multicultural” was applied to
the music curriculum in the United States. While the intention of multicultural curricula may have been, in part, to include the musics of marginalized students, in some instances multicultural music became about “location,” not “place.” In elementary music textbooks, for example, songs of various cultures were inserted like photographs of faraway locations in geography texts. The profession and related school music industries were resoundingly criticized during a symposium preceding the 1990 biennial meeting of the Music Educators National Conference for importing pieces and practices disembodied from people and disconnected from cultures. Eventually, as context, role, and meaning were recognized as relevant, these ideas were applied to the music of “others”—other people and other times—but still not to the lived experiences of students and local practice of their communities. When music and practices are about location (geography), not place (a human construction), meaning is lost.

By pointing to these problematics of multiculturalism as it occurs in some contexts, I do not mean to suggest that inclusion of diverse musics is poor practice or that multiculturalism is the only practice of the music education community that sometimes suffers from failure to consider place. I also do not suggest that Keith’s story is an exemplar of multicultural music education; in fact, Keith never used those words to describe the change he implemented. Rather, the change he implemented might be seen one teacher’s response to his assessment of the local place—the students, the curriculum, the school, and the community—and to his perception that current practice was, simply, not good enough.

I also do not intend to suggest that place-conscious education is a silver bullet. Among the criticisms of place-based education are that it appeals to the parochial, that the local can become tyrannical when one group imposes their meanings on others, that it can become insulated from broader cultural conflicts, and that it involves distinctions in which “the other” may be devalued or ignored. Human failings make any of these shortcomings possible in any context. I do suggest, however, that examining “others’” places before we interrogate and investigate our own increases the likelihood of continuing hegemonic views and practices, and that place-conscious education can inform and possibly transform music education curriculum and pedagogy.

“Placing” Curriculum in Music

local knowledge is to live in a place
and know the place
however barren

We return, then, to the agenda of The MayDay Group, which I interpreted as engaging music educators and others in critique, examination, and reconceptualization of music education practices. While we may reach consensus that decision making about curriculum should be “guided by a sound philosophical process,” the subtext question (even the elephant-in-the-room query) seems to be, “Why doesn’t that occur more often?” Curriculum, though affected by a multitude of “places,” ultimately rests in the hands of the practitioners who enact it. Where
are they in the philosophical dialogue? Are we bold enough to consider that practitioners have been marginalized by the ways in which philosophical discourse is sometimes conducted? Turning the lens of place toward a critique of the ways in which we teach the practice of philosophy, which can affect curriculum, may yield perspective. In other words, asking ourselves the questions “Who are these practitioners?” and “Where are they located (psychologically, socially, physically)?” may enable us to rethink the pathways that we believe lead to engagement in philosophical dialogue and transformation of curriculum and practice.9

Philosophy is an ongoing practice of questioning and thinking aimed at examining the grounds for belief and action; philosophy is not a practice of answers. Yet, the daily experience of music education practitioners, particularly those located in the public school sector, is one in which they are expected to have “answers”—for students, parents, colleagues, and citizens with perspectives that range from sympathetic to skeptical. While there may be little doubt that philosophy yields strong standing ground from which practitioners can respond to those who either support or challenge them, there is no great clamoring for philosophy courses, seminars, or sessions at in-service meetings. Is it possible that the ways in which we engage practitioners in philosophy are disconnected from the “places” of practitioners?

Philosophy of place may be an appropriate starting point for engaging practitioners for two reasons: Philosophy of place begins with consideration of the particular, and philosophy of place foregrounds lived experience. The local and the lived are personal and felt. Beginning the practice of philosophy with questions of “where” and “who” as prelude to considering “what,” “how,” and “why” honors the lived experience of each teacher, who operates in a place unlike any other. Developing teachers’ abilities to examine their contexts (which matter to them immensely) and themselves by asking critical questions of place aims toward embodying Maxine Greene’s sense (1995 and 2001) of “wide awakeness” and being “fully present” as a musician educator, and it is this sense of being wide awake and fully present in place that may propel the kinds of thinking and action that lead to transformation of curriculum rather than tacit acceptance of the status quo. I use “practicing (or asking) critical questions of place” specifically to illustrate what, I believe, must occur—actual practicing of the art of questioning and critique, starting with the local—for the practice of philosophy and the subsequent transformation of curriculum to take hold.

By emphasizing a philosophy of place, I do not mean to privilege this perspective, although my convictions about the usefulness of place as a starting point for practicing philosophy and developing curriculum are strong. Rather, I believe that place should be one of several perspectives music educators consider, for, as Wayne Bowman notes, no single philosophy “gets things wholly right,” and “none gets things wholly wrong” (1998, 4). It is in dialectic and discourse that beliefs evolve and standing ground becomes firm.

Philosophy of place may also be an effective means of critiquing teacher preparation programs, where ideas about school music curriculum are shaped, in part, for teacher preparation programs may be the greatest impediment to curricular
change. Most music teacher preparation programs (in the United States) are constructed on the assumption that those enrolled in them are preparing for careers as K-12 public school music educators. Privileging “K-12” and “public school” has certain consequences, the most important of which is the elevation of certain forms and forums of music making and certain music learners over others. We construct teacher education curricula and name courses in them for what happens in the specific place of K-12 public schools. Everything and everyone else merits a passing mention or elective status. Why is curricular change in schools slow or not prevalent? We are victims of our own curricula and successes. Blaming for our reticence to change teacher preparation programs on the demands of licensure requirements or market forces skirts the issue. 10

I propose that we reconceptualize teacher preparation programs as preparing community music educators. 11 These programs would include preparation for teaching in K-12 public schools, which are part of the community, but would not exclude or “displace” other practices, forums, or people. Consistent with a philosophy of place, courses and content would develop critical thinking about and engagement with community, the people in it, and their practices, including (but not limited to) public school music programs. Graduates might conceive of themselves as independent contractors in music education. Some might choose to engage their services full time in public schools, others might blend public school and other teaching (for example, private schools, church choirs, and studio teaching), and still others might engage in music education entirely outside of schools. The ethic of community music education programs would be one of preparing musician educators who place people at the center of practice, who view practices a fluid, dynamic, and contextual, and who recognize the need for continual examination of the intersections of people, place, and practice.

Music teacher preparation programs conceived of as preparing community music educators would not preclude pursuit of teacher licensure or those who seek careers as K-12 public school music educators. They would, however, change; they might attract different clientele. And therein lies a crucial point: perhaps the most daunting obstacle to the change suggested here is that it would make the borders of music teacher preparation programs permeable. Will we accept those who wish to be music educators in the community, but not in public schools? What curricular alterations would a place-conscious view of music education and music teacher preparation imply, and what changes are we willing to make?

Where might place-conscious music education lead? To develop curriculum at the level of the local and the lived, community music educators should be prepared to consider principles of practice and critical questions, such as: Who are these learners? Where do they come from? What are the musical practices of their communities? Where, when, and with whom do they make music or listen to music? What do they do? How do they learn music? What can music instruction offer them individually? Collectively? Who is present when music is made and learned? Who is missing? Why? Consideration of these and similar questions allows for construction of curricula that are sensitive to learners of various ages and contexts, reflect the places of music in their lives, and, most likely, meet the standards of various organi-
zations. Teacher preparation courses based on this perspective might not only meet certification standards, but could also embrace those who seek careers as musician educators in the community and who do not seek licensure.

Adopting a place-conscious perspective allows musician educators to maintain focus on their fundamental raison d’être—enabling students to engage in music and to acquire musical skills and knowledge, as well as all the related human understandings and personal growth that emanate from engagement in music making. Simultaneously, a place-conscious perspective requires that musician educators examine which practices, which classes and ensembles, for whom, and why in the shaping of curricular and pedagogical choices for individual schools and particular communities. Furthermore, a place-conscious perspective implies that curriculum and practice are dynamic and fluid, changing in response to shifts that occur over time, in spaces, and in the lived experiences of the learners and the nested communities (local, regional, national, and global) in which schools are embedded.

Finally, philosophy of place, applied to curriculum in music, allows us to view curriculum documents as “maps”—documents that are “of a place.” Curriculum documents, viewed through the lens of place, outline what certain people thought and how they acted or believed others should act in certain locations at certain times. The more remote the map (for example, a “national” curriculum) the more likely it is to be global and general rather than local and lived, and the more likely it is to represent a hegemonized agenda. While curriculum documents may be valuable or interesting for multiple reasons, philosophy of place allows us to see them for what they are—“fixed”—while simultaneously viewing the practices of teaching, learning, and music making—the lived curriculum—as fluid, changing, and responsive. A curriculum document might inform practice, but cannot be practice of either curriculum or pedagogy.

Philosophy of place and a critical pedagogy of place are appropriate starting points for inquiry and negotiation of curriculum and pedagogy in music. If we interrogate the local and lived and examine the who and where as well as the what-how-why of music teaching, learning, and making, then perhaps the curricula we enact, individually and collectively, will be more responsive to communities, more transformative of the profession and its practices, and more engaging for more people in more communities than our current perspectives allow.

Notes

2. For historical summaries of philosophy of place, see Malpas (1998) and (1999), and Cresswell (2002).
3. Flay (1989) describes “I” as the “primordial place” and as “a special place among places.” See his essay, pp. 8–9. Taking a different perspective that comments on place as “subjective and intersubjective creation,” Smith et al. (1998) write: “Each one of us has experienced the disappointment of excitedly introducing a friend to a favorite place, and then sensing the incomprehension at the heart of their feigned pleasure. Each one of use has stood amidst an exulting and admiring crowd, and looked without emotion upon what was for us an insipid
and uninspiring scene.” (6). In other words, the old saying “I guess you had to be there” is not about space, but place.
4. “Placed-based” and “place-conscious” are used interchangeably in this essay and elsewhere. See Gruenewald (2003/May).
5. I thank Keith Preston for agreeing to share his narrative for this essay.
6. Several authors suggest that preserving and/or altering curriculum in addition to complete change may be appropriate responses to challenges posed by place-conscious education. Band, in this case, is not “wrong”; rather, a curriculum that offers no other choice for engagement is problematic.
7. The voluntary music standards in the United States (MENC 1994) situate matters of place in Standard 9. This standard is generally interpreted as the “music history” and “multicultural music” standard, implying the music of “other” times, locations, and people. Contextual concerns, or matters of place, become part of the study of “other people’s music,” but not of one’s own music—an odd twist. Bruno Nettl, Patricia Shehan Campbell, and others continue to reiterate that all music should be understood in historical and cultural context, yet the “otherness” associated with Standard 9 persists.
9. My suggestion here respectfully challenges those of us who “teach” philosophy to think about our practices. If the answer to the question “Who are these practitioners?” is “teachers enrolled in graduate courses” or “undergraduate music majors,” then we risk doing what we recommend they do not—teaching the subject and neglecting the people. When we fail to consider the situatedness of teaching and the “places” of practitioners, we begin with questions that, to some, seem remote, abstract, and decontextualized (for example, “What is music?” and/or “What is musicing?”). In these conditions, philosophy becomes a reification of a process, not a practice or disposition. We should hardly be surprised, then, that students and practitioners find philosophy remote and engagement in the practice of philosophy puzzling.
10. For example, attention to early childhood in music teacher education curricula parallels an increase in mandated kindergarten, optional pre-Kindergarten, and early intervention programs in public schools. The presence of young children in public school contexts seemed to legitimize early childhood topics and courses in teacher preparation curricula. We “make room” for whoever is “in place” in schools.
11. While it may seem that the word “community” is not needed, our history is such that “music educator” implies “K-12 public school music educator.” Specifically using the word “community” signifies the difference.

References


Chapter 15
Conclusion: An End Is a Beginning

Thomas A. Regelski

For pragmatic philosophy, what seems like a conclusion is really only a new beginning: the consummation of what has preceded provides only a momentary platform for dealing with the ever-changing needs of the present. Thus, knowledge is always temporal, wed to the particular conditions under which it is gained and to which it is applied and, accordingly, is temporary, awaiting future use. Without use, knowledge is lost or meaningless. ¹

Through use, knowledge is transformed—paradoxically both broadened in its application and refined in its efficacy—and so is the user. The value of knowledge, then, is not simply a matter of “getting” or “having” it in the abstract but of using it; its use determines its meaning, and it has no meaning aside from the uses to which it may be or is put. And such use will always be governed by the unique needs at hand. These needs are also the criteria by which the “goodness” of the solutions is judged.

Accordingly, this “concluding” chapter aspires only to serve to help readers to begin the ongoing process of analyzing and diagnosing the many and changing problems and needs—in all their complexity—facing music educators. Such judgments and choices are the scaffold² of knowledge upon which teaching praxis³ is built, but only for present conditions and thus always for the time being. Once put into action, such knowledge becomes enriched by its use, and the teacher becomes more satisfied as teaching satisfies students’ musical needs better.

Ideals or Idealism?

The foregoing chapters have provided serious studies of many of the varied and complex challenges facing music educators. Authors have been “critical” of ill-considered or unconsidered “received traditions” and of fixed or inflexible methods and materials. They have also focused on action or guiding ideals. These provide

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the same kinds of direction, aspirations, goals, guidance, visions, and values that are at stake in the action ideals that guide our everyday lives—ideals ranging from a “happy marriage,” to “good health,” to “being kind,” to “effective parenting,” and so on. However ubiquitous such visions of value are, none is merely idealistic or utopian when acted upon; they are typically the “heart” of our “being” and guide our most important actions.

Virtually all of our ideals are handed down to us very early in life by our parents and society as recommended habits. And we naturally accept them, even when they don’t actually serve us or others well. But they are capable of education and change; for example, “good health” has benefited from discoveries in science and medicine, and we are now taught to eat healthily and to exercise. Similarly, ideals of a “happy marriage” or “effective parenting” can be informed by a close consideration of evolving developments in today’s world.

Our action ideals also change when we reflect on them—that is, when we reflect on our actions. Thus, we need to ask: What ideals do our actions reflect? How deeply have we considered these ideals? And do they really serve needs as intended or expected? For example, ideals of good parenting or health that consistently lead to actions that bring negative results are obviously not ideal. Sometimes we notice such results ourselves, but others can also help us notice when uncritically accepted traditions and habits work against us.

Ideals for music teaching that we inherit need “critical” reflection, naming, owning-up-to their too often ineffective (or counterproductive) results, and—with courage—change. This is what this book seeks to promote—not the prescription of particular changes. Instead, change is urged through considering action or guiding ideals that (a) alert us to weaknesses of received or fixed traditions and practices by (b) pointing to alternative visions of value, an improved vision of “good health” for music education.

How Healthy Is Music Education Today?

Imagine the doctor who complains about all the sick people in the waiting room. Well, too many music teachers reflect a similar confusion: instead of serving the musical needs of their “clients,” the students, they prefer the rewards of working with the musically “healthy” few. However, school-based music education exists, in the broadest of assumptions and philosophies, to advance the musical “health”—the musical abilities, attitudes, values, habits and, most importantly, the likelihood of musicking—of the “general student,” not just the select few. Its presence in schools is predicated on its contribution to general education in the context of universal education—the provision of schooling for everyone.

There is a tension, then, between the ideals of music education’s inclusive claims as part of general/universal education and certain traditional ideals about musical quality that end up being exclusive. A long-standing problem in music education, then, is whether the proper action ideal is to teach (all) students music or is it to have (a few) students serve music? The latter, for example, often leads to teaching that
protects music from students by excluding those who don’t measure up to its demands. Carelessness with the former ideal often leads to musicking that falls short of the very qualities that make music valuable—or musical. Neither is “healthy” for music education.

**Problematizing or Standardizing Teaching?**

Some music education students or teachers want to be just like their favorite music teacher from days past. Many, usually the most select of the select few, have thrived with their musical activities in school and want a career on the other side of the piano or podium. Others have come to value music per se (and as distinct from it as a social or extracurricular “activity” in school) and want to share it. More than a few express a kind of evangelical zeal for “converting” students to “good music” or to the pleasures of band, chorus, and orchestra. A few even want to be better at teaching music than their school teachers were—especially those teachers who “turned off” or excluded students who deserved better.

What almost all students seem to assume, however, is that they only need to become better musicians and then be taught how to teach. Usually, the assumption is that learning to teach is more or less a simple matter of a given set of approved “how-to” and “what-works” methods, techniques, and materials that, once mastered, can be applied “across the board.” However, teaching music—or teaching anything—is simply not that simple!

As a helping profession (along with medicine, social work, counseling, religious leadership, etc.), teaching is always problematic! Dealing as it does with young people and their various needs and the requirement to be “care-full” to bring about right results, there simply is no smooth sailing. Aspiring to a simplified idealism of teaching music is as fool-hearty as a pilot who always expects good weather or a doctor who expects only healthy patients.

Instead, teaching music needs to be problematized. It needs to be recognized as an always-challenging situation that continually requires diagnosis as a basis for action and equally keen reflection on results. It cannot be standardized with regard to instruction, or “standards-ized” with regard to results, without harm.

To problematize music teaching, its enabling and restricting conditions need to be identified, examined, and dealt with. This involves recognizing and analyzing the various contradictions involved (for example, the tension between musical “quality” and general/universal education) and detecting and naming the tacit and taken for granted assumptions that create certain problems while precluding, excluding, or being blind to other ideals. Failure to problematize music education creates difficulties and complications beyond those that are expectable.

**Does Music Education Always—Automatically—Benefit Students and Culture?**

Clearly not! If it did, music educators would not be inclined to engage constantly in advocacy—noble sounding arguments for the benefits of music education. If it did, it
would not be threatened with losses of scheduling, funding, and students. Whatever inherited ideals guide most music teachers, it seems undeniable that music education is not convincing enough people that it is worthwhile.

Music teachers too easily forget that virtually all citizens have intimately experienced school music. The action ideals guiding their own musical lives and their lack of enthusiastic support for school music reveal the less than ideal visions of value they got from their own music educations!

What is overlooked in most music education advocacy, then, is the distinction between the value of music and the value of music education. One of the most under-recognized problems faced by music educators is the fact that, as several of the authors in this volume have pointed out, music is incredibly healthy in society! Unlike most school subjects, music is unique because it plays an enormous daily role in the lives of students outside of school.

An often unrecognized assumption of school music seems to be, however, that there is something unworthy about the “outside” musical world and that students need to be “converted” to “good music” or at least to add it to their otherwise “unhealthy” musical diets. However, like any attempts at conversion, particularly among adolescents who have a “radar” for adult manipulation or rejection of their values, such conversion attempts are usually doomed to failure and typically leave lingering negative attitudes, particularly for students in required general music classes who “tune out” but can’t “drop out.”

But even students who have been in ensembles for eight years show little evidence of conversion in their musical choices. Most do not continue performing and there is little evidence that their listening tastes have been converted by eight years of performing “good music.” Concert audience attendance regularly fails to sustain professional ensembles economically, and the sale of “classical” music CDs is a very small percentage of the total—presently something like 3%.10

Clearly, then, music is highly valued by society. So the value of music is not the issue—although critics prefer to deny musical value to whatever it is they consider “downtown” music. Most advocacy is based implicitly upon “classical” music, sometimes including jazz, and occasionally folk, ethnic, and world musics. But such rhetoric is meaningful only to those who already enjoy these musics. Noble sounding words alone about musical value are as unlikely to change minds as noble words alone will stop war.

No, it is music education—school music—that is the problem. School music has become its own institution, its own limited kind of musicking. However, since it is not widely seen as relevant to the music world outside of school, it comes under suspicion—all the more so as schooling in general is increasingly pressured to produce results that make noteworthy differences for individuals and society.

If music education was making such a notable difference, it still wouldn’t be entirely out of the woods: there would still be the “nice if you can afford it” argument to overcome. But music teachers would be in a much stronger position to demonstrate that this “nice” is a lot more meaningful and valuable than naysayers assume. Music could be shown, then, to be “nice” in the same tangible ways that a “happy marriage” or “good health” is: Aside from being an action ideal of its own,11
music can be shown to be an inextricable ingredient of a vast number of the other major guiding ideals in our daily lives—for example, its contributions to marriage, family, religion, health, and the like.\textsuperscript{12} Unfortunately, however, music education has steadfastly distanced itself from connection to these important everyday ideals.\textsuperscript{13}

To What Conclusions (Beginnings) Might the Seven Action Ideals Point?

First, and perhaps foremost, the traditional view of “music” as a collection of “works” is challenged by a \textit{praxial view} that instead sees it as a family of distinctive practices, with each family member existing to serve different “goods,” and each instance of which is unique.\textsuperscript{14} In this view, music is always a \textit{doing}—some kind of musicking—and “it” simply does not otherwise exist. The values at stake are not exclusively “in” the sounds we have traditionally called “the music,” but in the totality of the practice, including its social dimensions (past and present).

In this view, to teach music is to enable students to “do” music or to help them engage in musicking in ways that expand its potential value for their lives. School music, then, would be much more appreciative of the music world and to the ways music \textit{does} contribute to life and society. What musical practices—especially in particular communities, regions, etc.—do “just plain folks” engage in and which of those are of the nature that could be included in and advanced by schooling? What musical practices do these folks \textit{not} engage in that they could and would if school were to address them? What changes could be made in music education that, without requiring total restructuring, would maximize the ability and desire of students to “do” music throughout their lives? In sum, what can students do—at all, better, or more often—as a result of instruction?

Second, musicianship—the skills, knowledge, attitudes, and values required for any musicking—is not fixed or singular. Teaching students to read notes, for example, does not amount to developing musicianship. Many musics are not notated and demand aural skills different than those of notated music. Other aural skills and other forms of musicianship are also required by listeners\textsuperscript{15} and by people engaged in composition (for example, using computer software).

Among the most important aspects of musicianship is mindfulness of intended results, which includes awareness of musical choices, since only with a musical outcome in mind can an individual reflect on the adequacy of results. This, of course, is why so much practice time is wasted: When students don’t have musical results in mind, they can’t realize their mistakes and, at best, they dutifully fill time repeating errors.

Teaching musicianship, then, requires attention to the nature and requirements of the musics at stake—to how, when, where, and under what other conditions in “real life” these musics exist and, thus, to the progressive ability of the student to understand the musical needs and criteria at stake and to make effective choices \textit{independently} of a teacher. Given school circumstances, all that needs to be learned can never be taught; thus learners must be \textit{taught how to learn} on their own.
Such musical independence is more difficult to develop when large ensembles are the sole or major curricular vehicle. An education rich in solos, duets, and various chamber combinations—including the smaller ensembles characteristic of many musics—increases independence. Musicianship that is relevant to several musics,—albeit usually in different ways—provides students with more opportunities for different uses that fine tune their skills and abilities. Musical independence is also required for listening, composing, and other musical “doings.”

Third, regarding music as praxis points away from the idealism of “music for its own sake” (and the aesthetic theories that support such disconnection from daily life) and toward bringing about a greater appreciation of how important music really is in its social and cultural contexts. Every kind of music arises as a social praxis. Each is conditioned by social ingredients far too numerous to detail and each is a living practice to the degree it continues to serve social meanings and values.

Social accounts of music and art (see Hauser 1951, Kingsbury 1988, Nattiez 1990, Shepherd 1991, Harrington 2004) demonstrate connections between music and society, that are overlooked by music educators more intent on building their so-called programs than bridges between school music and the musical and social worlds. The action guidelines for the Swedish national curriculum specify, for instance, “from life to school”; that is, in the case of music, from music in life to music in school. But that doesn’t go far enough: “from music in life, to music in school, to music back in life, newly enhanced” is the ideal envisaged here. Music’s use in life is tangible evidence of both its appreciation and of having effectively acquired the knowledge and skills that promote use (Regelski 2006).

Fourth, the view of music envisaged here recognizes a central role for musical and other social institutions. Musical institutions exist to advance their own musical agendas, however, so we must be careful when the ideology of one usurps the integrity and agendas of other institutions. For example, most professional music schools exist to produce professional musicians, and this purpose justifies their exclusivity. However, being predicated on general/universal education, the educational agenda of school music is altogether different and should be inclusive.

We should be alert, as well, to whether and to what degree the interests of other key musical and social institutions coincide with that of the needs of our students. Music teacher groups, musicians unions, local professional ensembles, and the like, all influence, for good or ill (sometimes both), music education in the schools. Thus, traditions get started that, even if once successful, can produce unwelcome results under changed circumstances. These traditions need to be recognized and, in their place, new visions realized. Institutionalizing new relations between “private” music teachers and taking music education out of the schools into—or, where lacking, starting—community music education institutions of various kinds are among the possibilities pointed to by the ideals envisaged here.

Fifth, unlike most teachers, music teachers are practitioners of the subject they teach; they are musicians. However, this status as musicians often narrows their perspectives and even teaching in unhealthy ways. This can be one reason why some put music ahead of their students.
Thus, a wealth of understanding from other disciplines should also inform and guide music teaching. For example, music teaching depends in important ways on one’s understanding of what it means to be human, of what is meant by the “good life” to which music education is intended to contribute, and so on. All teachers regularly take the value of what they teach for granted, but their students don’t always share this assessment. How music fits into and serves a particular student’s life thus requires much more than musical insight. It entails considerable knowledge of how young people learn and a functional awareness of important findings from other disciplines—findings that may contradict traditional pedagogical approaches for music.

The ideals considered here suggest that music teachers must also be aware of what else is going on in school, and of advances being realized in other classrooms—for example, the “new phys ed” that emphasizes healthy individual physical activities rather than team sports; that is, activities that can be continued in life as *amateurs*. Such advances can promote new visions for similar changes in music education.

Sixth, even though such amateurism has been given a bad name in higher musical circles, its root idea is “love” (the Latin *amat*). And fostering the kind of love for music that leads to *making time for it* in life is comparable to the ideals of “good health” that more health and physical education teachers now try to inspire. Among the benefits of such an ideal for music education is producing a greater number of serious amateurs in the community who serve as models for students, who come into the schools, and with whom students study outside of school.

When music is regarded as praxis, the “doing” of music—musicking—in some regular and rewarding capacity is stressed: whether it is singing in a church choir, playing in garage bands of various kinds, accompanying sing-alongs, becoming an audiophile, performing at retirement homes, singing carols, giving or attending concerts or recitals, or any of an endless list of other amateur pursuits. As is the case with other activities, *amateuring* often leads to study, focused practice, and improvement—for example, leading the golfer to the putting green or the driving range. It also often leads to changes in musical choices: the euphonium player in the local Deutchmeister Band, for instance, who attends all the local university band concerts; the church choir member who goes to local choral concerts; the rock guitarist who builds an extensive jazz guitar CD collection; or the country fiddler who studies with a violin teacher.

Such an enlarged amount of local musical amateurs would collectively enhance the musical life of a community, while increasing the richness of their own lives and filling the audiences of amateurs and professionals alike. Such is an action ideal of music conceived as a social praxis, the good of which is seen in its use for human life and society. As is often rightly said, “Music is too important to be left to musicians.”

Finally, all of the above “pointings” entail making *curriculum* a central concern. Too many music teachers refer to their programs but rarely think in terms of curriculum. Their curriculum amounts to little more than the series of materials used,
the repertoire “covered” for the next concert, the “method” adopted, or a dusty doc-
ument written to pacify administration—or all of the above. This is not surprising
since it is rare for curriculum theory to be taught to music educators, despite the
availability of a wide range of important scholarship about it.

Curriculum can refer to (a) a written document, (b) the actual content of instruc-
tion, or (c) what is effectively learned. It is each of these but, in the end, only the
last counts. The written document is useful in coordinating what multiple teachers
actually address, and in predeciding “What of all that can be taught is most worth
teaching?” However, any curriculum is at best a hypothetical and temporary answer
to that question. Thus, teachers need to ask themselves constantly what, of all they
include in instruction, is being taught to pragmatic levels that make the kinds of
personal and social contributions discussed earlier. Attempt too much, and nothing
lasting is accomplished. Attempt teaching things that can’t be taught as they are used
in life, and students encounter only abstractions that are quickly forgotten through
lack of use.

There is another level of curricular theorizing, namely one’s choices of instruc-
tional methods and materials. Because what is addressed by instruction21 may be
well conceived but not implemented well, pedagogical strategies and related rou-
tines need to be “practiced,” updated, revised, and replaced. The old axiom “less
is more” really suggests that “less is best, if done well!” Sometimes curriculum
attempts too much, and less would allow more teacher and student time to be
devoted to effective results. Then, as such results become more efficiently achieved
over time, more can be added to the curriculum.

This final ideal vision is of a music teacher who conducts action research infor-
mally. Action research is undertaken to improve certain needs of the researcher.
In teaching, the prominent need is improving students’ learning. Action research
examines all relevant research then develops hypotheses that are “tested” in action
in the classroom. Successful results are never firm or fixed; teaching and curricu-
lum ideals change, students change, and each group is different.22 And since the
ends sought, like those associated with “good health” or a “happy marriage,” have
no single or final state of perfection, the conclusion of any stage of curricular and
teaching progress is the beginning of the next cycle.

On the other hand, this continual problematizing of music teaching is also the
major source—aside from the musicking involved—of the teacher’s sense of per-
sonal and professional accomplishment. Holding in mind valued action ideals that
problematize teaching leads, in fact, to many of the most important rewards of teach-
ing and discourages burnout.

We hope that what has been presented in these pages has stimulated the crit-
cical capacities needed to make your own informed choices. We hope the ideals
presented and analyzed here have also stimulated visions of value that start your
trip in beneficial directions. And we especially hope that you keep them, and
others you encounter along the way, in mind as you create your own ever-new
beginnings. Both music and students deserve such continuing devotion to right
results.
Notes

1. This follows from the philosopher Wittgenstein who demonstrated that, for example, the meaning of a word is seen in its use.
2. Unlike “foundations,” scaffolds are adjustable for changing needs.
3. Teaching “practice,” as with medical “practice,” is not simply a matter of “practicing” or “rehearsing” something until you get it right. Technically, it is a matter of what, since the time of Aristotle, has been called praxis—knowledge and action that serves human needs. Thus, professional praxis carries an ethical obligation for right results where “rightness” involves meeting the needs of those served. It is not, therefore, a one-size-fits-all kind of tradition (as, for example, in certain crafts). Praxis is “care-full” to diagnose and act in terms of present needs, and its success is judged by the degree it meets those needs.
4. As a reminder, this neologism coined by Christopher Small (1998) replaces “music” as a noun—as a thing—with a verb form (gerund) that reflects the processual and social nature of all forms of “doing” and “making” music. In Small’s words: “There is no such thing as music. Music is not a thing at all but an activity, something that people do” (Small 1998, 2).
5. Thus the idea of “general music”: It is not “music in general” (that is, a survey of general information) but music in the general education of all students. Thus understood, general music classes would improve students’ musicianship for life purposes, and performance ensembles would promote carryover into students’ lives outside school and as adults.
6. Despite claims made by orthodox aesthetic theory for music’s “purely musical” values, the earlier chapters instead demonstrate music’s inherent praxial and thus social dimension. However, this sociality fits well—often too well—with the developmental social needs of adolescents. Thus, the danger exists that musical activities—usually ensembles—meet students’ transitory social needs (self-concept, socializing, need for recognition, etc.) more than they inspire or facilitate the “good life” of musicking. As adults, then, when adolescent growth needs no longer exist, most no longer continue their musicking, and the music education supposedly provided is thrown into doubt. Fond social memories may live on to recommend similar activities for their children, but the pattern continues.
7. For example, discipline problems and not practicing.
8. Actually there are two problems (challenges): The musical needs of typical students are learning “problems,” and meeting those needs typically represents the teacher’s instructional/curricular “problems.” Standardizing instruction fails to take into account differences between the learning needs and abilities of individual students. “Standards-izing” curriculum (that is, according to prescribed, published “standards”) similarly assumes a one-size-fits-all result. Either way, new and unwanted problems are created, such as students who are “turned off” to music (class), who experience failure (for example, seating challenges), or who think “I’ll never be any good at music, so why bother!”.
9. For example, discipline problems and not practicing.
10. And that includes the dedicated audiophiles who, as collectors and connoisseurs, purchase multiple copies of favorite works and artists.
11. That is, any performance, for example, seeks to serve the needs that occasion it in the first place, yet no performance will ever be “ideal” in the sense of “perfect.”
12. Be careful though! Health risks are associated with musicking and are an example of heretofore taken-for-granted assumptions about music education and its automatic benefits. See the “Health and Music” e-column at www.maydaygroup.org, maintained by Leon Thurman.
13. Instead of a “happy marriage,” these received traditions have “divorced” school music and music education from the music world outside school and from society in general.
14. Just as “food” collectively refers to all the foods of the world, so “music” stands in relation to the musics of the world. Pizza has a considerable history; but this one, on this occasion, is unique—in part, because of the occasion. In the same way, music (of any kind) has historical
conditions but, as situated in the present, is always “new.” This is also true for concert music (of any kind).

15. And while performing can influence audience listening, the latter is its own practice with its own needs and requirements. Thus, performers can benefit from far more experiences as audience listeners, especially since listening is a much more likely lifelong musical option for busy adults than performing in ensembles is.

16. For example, playing in tune is a condition of “bending” notes in certain styles; knowing basic tonal harmony serves the harmonic needs of many musics; and aural acuity for patterns (repetition) serves performing of all kinds, and listening.

17. For example, choosing music for particular occasions, arranging music, music therapy, making aerobics tapes, etc.

18. For instance, “different types of music tend to appeal to different social groups” and, thus, each “taste culture” can be “defined in terms of musical values and choices, and its taste public described in terms of such sociodemographic variables as sex, age, social class, and ethnic group” (Russell 1997, 141, 143). It is not surprising, then, that the “classics” of any musical practice are those designated by people who consider themselves to be “classy” regarding that practice.

19. Mainly as a result of the need of the new class of virtuosi to distance itself socially from the many “dilettantes” who used to make music in the home. The rise of the virtuoso in the nineteenth century spelled the death of serious amateurism and contributed to the demise both of personal performing in the home and of the rich musical social life it provided. Instead, the public became listeners.

20. Like “musicking,” “amateuring” as a gerund stresses loving, committed “doing.” (See Booth 1999, Regelski 2007).

21. In this discussion, a distinction is made between “instruction” and “teaching.” The old excuse, “I taught it to them but they didn’t learn it” is a cop-out. Teaching should not be conflated with instruction; it should be reserved for instruction where students actually learn.

22. Results of action research can’t be generalized to other teachers or other situations, only to the near future in the same situation. This calls into question the well-meaning attempts of “show and tell” teacher conferences where one teacher’s hypothesis is offered, often either to be dismissed on the grounds of “it won’t work in my situation” or to be blindly adopted without being adapted to the new teaching situation on the false theory that successful teaching is achieved by accumulating a “what-works” repertoire of imitable techniques (see Regelski 1994–1995).

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